





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THE
OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

Great Britain and France,

ON THE SUBJECT OF

THE LATE NEGOTIATION;

WITH

HIS MAJESTY'S DECLARATION.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

THE PRELIMINARY AND DEFINITIVE

TREATIES OF PEACE;

WITH

AN APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

Colonel Sebastiani's Report to the First Consul,
&c. &c.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY D. N. SHURY, BERWICK STREET, SOHO;

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DECLARATION.

Preliminary Articles of Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the French Republic. Signed at London (in English and French) the 1st of October 1801, the 9th Vendemiaire, Year 10, of the French Republic.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, being animated with an equal desire of putting an end to the calamities of a destructive war, and of re-establishing union and good understanding between the two countries, have named for this purpose; namely, his Britannic Majesty, the Right Honourable Robert Banks Jenkinson, commonly called Lord Hawkesbury, one of his Britannic Majesty's most honourable Privy Council, and his principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French People, Citizen Lewis William Otto, commissary for the exchange of French prisoners in England; who, after having duly communicated to each other their full powers, in good form, have agreed on the following preliminary articles:—

Art. I. As soon as the preliminaries shall be signed and ratified, sincere friendship shall be re-established between his Britannic Majesty and the French Republic, by sea and by land, in all parts of the world; and in order that all hostilities may cease immediately between the two powers, and between them and their allies respectively, the necessary instructions shall be sent with the utmost dispatch to the commanders of the sea and land forces of the respective states, and each of the contracting parties engages to grant passports, and every facility requisite to accelerate the arrival, and

insure the execution of these orders.—It is further agreed, that all conquests which may have been made by either of the contracting parties from the other, or from their respective allies, subsequently to the ratification of the present preliminaries, shall be considered as of no effect, and shall be faithfully comprehended in the restitutions to be made after the ratification of the definitive treaty.

II. His Britannic Majesty shall restore to the French Republic and her allies; namely, to his Catholic Majesty, and to the Batavian Republic, all the possessions and colonies occupied or conquered by the English forces in the course of the present war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad, and the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon, of which island and possessions his Britannic Majesty reserves to himself the full and entire sovereignty.

III. The port of the Cape of Good Hope shall be open to the commerce and navigation of the two contracting parties, who shall enjoy therein the same advantages.

IV. The island of Malta, with its dependencies, shall be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. For the purpose of rendering this island completely independent of either of the two contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee and protection of a third power, to be agreed upon in the definitive treaty.

V. Egypt shall be restored to the Sublime Porte, whose territories and possessions shall be preserved entire, such as they existed previously to the present war.

VI. The territories and possessions of her Most Faithful Majesty shall likewise be preserved entire.

VII. The French forces shall evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory. The English forces shall in like manner evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all the ports and islands which they may occupy in the Mediterranean, or in the Adriatic.

VIII. The

VIII. The Republic of the Seven Islands shall be acknowledged by the French Republic.

IX. The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions, stipulated for by the present preliminary articles, shall take place in Europe within one month; in the continent and seas of America and of Africa, within three months; and in the continent and seas of Asia, within six months after the ratification of the definitive treaty.

X. The prisoners made respectively shall, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the definitive treaty, all be restored, and without ransom, on paying reciprocally the debts which they may have individually contracted. Discussions having arisen respecting the payment for the maintenance of the prisoners of war, the contracting powers reserve this question to be settled by the definitive treaty, according to the law of nations, and in conformity to established usage.

XI. In order to prevent all causes of complaint and dispute which may arise on account of prizes which may be made at sea after the signature of the preliminary articles, it is reciprocally agreed that the vessels and effects which may be taken in the British Channel and in the North Seas, after the space of twelve days, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications of the present preliminary articles, shall be restored on each side; that the term shall be one month from the British Channel and the North Seas as far as the Canary Islands inclusively, whether in the ocean or in the Mediterranean; two months from the said Canary Islands as far as the equator; and lastly, five months in all other parts of the world, without any exception, or any more particular description of time or place.

XII. All sequestrations imposed by either of the parties on the funded property, revenues, or debts of any description, belonging to either of the contracting powers, or to their subjects or citizens, shall be taken off immediately after the signature of the definitive treaty. The decision of all claims brought forward by individuals of the one country against individuals of the other

other for private rights, debts, property, or effects whatsoever, which, according to received usages and the law of nations, ought to revive at the period of peace, shall be heard and decided before competent tribunals; and in all cases prompt and ample justice shall be administered in the countries where the claims are made. It is agreed, moreover, that this article, immediately after the ratification of the definitive treaty, shall apply to the allies of the contracting parties, and to the individuals of the respective nations, upon the condition of a just reciprocity.

XIII. With respect to the fisheries on the coasts of the island of Newfoundland, and of the islands adjacent, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the two parties have agreed to restore them to the same footing on which they were before the present war, reserving to themselves the power of making, in the definitive treaty, such arrangements as shall appear just and reciprocally useful, in order to place the fishing of the two nations on the most proper footing for the maintenance of peace.

XIV. In all the cases of restitution agreed upon by the present treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state in which they may be at the time of the signature of the present treaty, and all the works which shall have been constructed since the occupation shall remain untouched.

It is farther agreed, that in all the cases of cession stipulated in the present treaty, there shall be allowed to the inhabitants, of whatever condition or nation they may be, a term of three years, to be computed from the notification of the definitive treaty of peace, for the purpose of disposing of their properties, acquired and possessed either before or during the present war; in the which term of three years they may have the free exercise of their religion and the enjoyment of their property.

The same privilege shall be granted in the countries restored, to all those who shall have made therein any establishments

establishments whatsoever during the time when those countries were in the possession of Great Britain.

With respect to the other inhabitants of the countries restored or ceded, it is agreed that none of them shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested in their persons or properties under any pretext, on account of their conduct or political opinions, or of their attachment to either of the two powers, nor on any other account except that of debts contracted to individuals, or on account of acts posterior to the Definitive Treaty.

XV. The present preliminary articles shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged in London, in the space of fifteen days for all delay; and immediately after their ratification, plenipotentiaries shall be named on each side, who shall repair to Amiens for the purpose of concluding a Definitive Treaty of Peace, in concert with the allies of the contracting parties.

In witness whereof, we, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Majesty, and of the First Consul of the French Republic, by virtue of our respective full powers, have signed the present preliminary articles, and have caused our seals to be put thereto.

Done at London, the 1st day of October, 1801,
the 9th Vendemiaire, year 10 of the French
Republic.

(L. S.)

HAWKESBURY.

(L. S.)

OTTO.

The

The Definitive Treaty of Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the French Republic, his Catholic Majesty, and the Batavian Republic: signed at Amiens the 27th Day of March 1802.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, being animated with an equal desire to put an end to the calamities of war, have laid the foundation of peace, in the preliminary articles signed at London the 1st of October 1801 (9th Vendemiaire, year 10.)

And as by the 15th article of the said preliminaries it has been stipulated that plenipotentiaries should be named on each side, who should proceed to Amiens for the purpose of concluding a definitive treaty, in concert with the allies of the contracting powers :

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has named for his plenipotentiary the Marquis Cornwallis, Knight of the most illustrious Order of the Garter, Privy Counsellor to his Majesty, General of his armies, &c.; the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, the Citizen Joseph Bonaparté, Counsellor of State ; his Majesty the King of Spain and the Indies, and the Government of the Batavian Republic, have named for their plenipotentiaries, *videlicet*, his Catholic Majesty Don Joseph Nicholas d'Azara, his Counsellor of State, Knight of the Great Cross of the Order of Charles III. Ambassador Extraordinary to the French Republic, &c.; and the Government of the Batavian Republic Roger John Schimmelpenninck, their Ambassador Extraordinary to the French Republic ; who, after having duly communicated to each other their full powers, which are transcribed at the end of the present treaty, have agreed upon the following articles :

Art. I. There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs
and

and successors, on the one part; and the French Republic, his Majesty the King of Spain, his heirs and successors, and the Batavian Republic, on the other part. The contracting parties shall give the greatest attention to maintain between themselves and their states a perfect harmony, and without allowing, on either side, any kind of hostilities, by sea or by land, to be committed for any cause, or under any pretence whatsoever.

They shall carefully avoid every thing which might hereafter affect the union happily re-established, and they shall not afford any assistance or protection, directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them.

II. All the prisoners taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, and the hostages carried away or given during the war, and to this day, shall be restored, without ransom, in six weeks at latest, to be computed from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, and on paying the debts which they have contracted during their captivity. Each contracting party shall respectively discharge the advances which have been made by any of the contracting parties for the subsistence and maintenance of the prisoners in the countries where they have been detained. For this purpose, a commission shall be appointed by agreement, which shall be specially charged to ascertain and regulate the compensation which may be due to either of the contracting powers. The time and place where the commissioners, who shall be charged with the execution of this article, shall assemble, shall also be fixed upon by agreement; and the said commissioners shall take into account the expenses occasioned not only by the prisoners of the respective nations, but also by the foreign troops, who, before they were made prisoners, were in the pay, or at the disposal of any of the contracting parties.

III. His Britannic Majesty restores to the French republic and her allies, namely, his Catholic Majesty

and the Batavian republic, all the possessions and colonies which belonged to them respectively, and which had been occupied or conquered by the British forces in the course of the war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad, and the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon.

IV. His Catholic Majesty cedes and guarantees, in full right and sovereignty to his Britannic Majesty, the island of Trinidad.

V. The Batavian republic cedes and guarantees, in full right and sovereignty to his Britannic Majesty, all the possessions and establishments in the island of Ceylon, which belonged, before the war, to the republic of the United Provinces, or to their East India Company.

VI. The Cape of Good Hope remains in full sovereignty to the Batavian republic, as it was before the war.

The ships of every description belonging to the other contracting parties shall have the right to put in there, and to purchase such supplies as they may stand in need of as heretofore, without paying any other duties than those to which the ships of the Batavian republic are subjected.

VII. The territories and possessions of her Most Faithful Majesty are maintained in their integrity, such as they were previous to the commencement of the war.

Nevertheless, the limits of French and Portuguese Guiana shall be determined by the river Arawari, which falls into the ocean below North Cape, near the Isle Neuve, and the island of Penitence, about a degree and one third of north latitude. These limits shall follow the course of the river Arawari, from that of its mouth which is at the greatest distance from the North Cape to its source, and thence in a direct line from its source to the river Branco, towards the west. The northern bank of the river Arawari, from its mouth to its source, and the lands which are situated to the north

north of the line of the limits above fixed, shall consequently belong in full sovereignty to the French republic. The southern bank of the said river from its source, and all the lands to the southward of the said line of demarcation, shall belong to her Most Faithful Majesty. The navigation of the river Arawari shall be common to both nations.

The arrangements which have taken place between the courts of Madrid and of Lisbon, for the settlement of their frontiers in Europe, shall, however, be executed conformably to the treaty of Badajos.

VIII. The territories, possessions, and rights of the Ottoman Porte are hereby maintained in their integrity, such as they were previous to the war.

IX. The republic of the Seven Islands is hereby acknowledged.

X. The Islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and shall be held by it upon the same conditions on which the Order held them previous to the war, and under the following stipulations :

1. The Knights of the Order, whose *langues* shall continue to subsist after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, are invited to return to Malta, as soon as that exchange shall have taken place. They shall there form a general Chapter, and shall proceed to the election of a Grand Master, to be chosen from amongst the natives of those nations which preserve *langues*, if no such election have been already made since the exchange of the ratification of the preliminary articles of peace. It is understood that an election which shall have been made subsequent to that period, shall alone be considered as valid, to the exclusion of every other which shall have taken place at any time previous to the said period.

2. The governments of Great Britain and the French republic, being desirous of placing the Order of St. John, and the island of Malta, in a state of entire independence on each of those powers, do agree, that

there shall be henceforth no English nor French langues ; and that no individual belonging to either of the said powers shall be admissible into the Order.

3. A Maltese langue shall be established, to be supported out of the land revenues and commercial duties of the island. There shall be dignities, with appointments, and an auberge appropriated to this langue ; no proofs of nobility shall be necessary for the admission of Knights of the said langue ; they shall be competent to hold every office, and to enjoy every privilege in the like manner as the Knights of the other langues. The municipal, revenue, civil, judicial, and other offices under the government of the island, shall be filled, at least in the proportion of one half, by native inhabitants of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.

4. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies, within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner if it can be done : at that period the island shall be delivered up to the Order in the state in which it now is, provided that the Grand Master, or commissioners, fully empowered according to the statutes of the Order, be upon the island to receive possession ; and that the force to be furnished by his Sicilian Majesty, as hereafter stipulated, shall be arrived there.

5. The garrison of the island shall, at all times, consist at least one half of native Maltese ; and the Order shall have the liberty of recruiting for the remainder of the garrison from the natives of those countries only that shall continue to possess langues. The native Maltese troops shall be officered by Maltese : the supreme command of the garrison, as well as the appointment of the officers, shall be invested in the Grand Master of the Order ; and he shall not be at liberty to divest himself of it, even for a time, except in favour of a Knight of the Order, and in consequence of the opinion of the council of the Order.

6. The independence of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, as well as the present arrangement, shall be

be under the protection and guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia.

7. The perpetual neutrality of the Order and of the island of Malta, and its dependencies, is hereby declared.

8. The ports of Malta shall be open to the commerce and navigation of all nations, who shall pay equal and moderate duties. These duties shall be applied to the support of the Maltese language, in the manner specified in paragraph 3, to that of the civil and military establishments of the island, and to that of a Lazaretto, open to all flags.

9. The Barbary States are excepted from the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs, until, by means of an arrangement to be made by the contracting parties, the system of hostility, which subsists between the said Barbary States, the Order of St. John, and the powers possessing languages, or taking part in the formation of them, shall be terminated.

10. The Order shall be governed, both in spiritual and temporal matters, by the same statutes that were in force at the time when the Knights quitted the island, so far as the same shall not be derogated from by the present treaty.

11. The stipulations contained in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, shall be converted into laws and perpetual statutes of the Order, in the customary manner. And the Grand Master, (or if he should not be in the island at the time of its restitution to the Order, his representative,) as well as his successors, shall be bound to make oath to observe them punctually.

12. His Sicilian Majesty shall be invited to furnish two thousand men, natives of his dominions, to serve as a garrison for the several fortresses upon the island. This force shall remain there for one year, from the period of the restitution of the island to the Knights; after the expiration of which term, if the Order of St. John shall not, in the opinion of the guarantying powers,

powers, have raised a sufficient force to garrison the island and its dependencies, in the manner proposed in paragraph 5, the Neapolitan troops shall remain, until they shall be relieved by another force, judged to be sufficient by the said powers.

13. The several powers specified in paragraph 6, *videlicet*, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia, shall be invited to accede to the present arrangement.

XI. The French forces shall evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman territory ; the English forces shall in like manner evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all the ports and islands which they may occupy in the Mediterranean, or in the Adriatic.

XII. The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions stipulated for by the present treaty, except where otherwise expressly provided for, shall take place in Europe within one month ; in the continent and seas of America and of Africa, in three months ; and in the continent and seas of Asia, within six months after the ratification of the present definitive treaty.

XIII. In all the cases of restitution agreed upon by the present treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state they may have been at the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty ; and all the works which shall have been constructed since the occupation, shall remain untouched.

It is farther agreed, that in all the cases of cession stipulated, there shall be allowed to the inhabitants, of whatever condition or nation they may be, a term of three years, to be computed from the notification of this present treaty, for the purpose of disposing of their property acquired and possessed either before or during the war ; in which term of three years they may have the free exercise of their religion and enjoyment of their property.

The same privilege is granted in the countries restored, to all those, whether inhabitants or others, who shall

shall have made therein any establishments whatsoever during the time when those countries were in the possession of Great Britain.

With respect to the inhabitants of the countries restored or ceded, it is agreed, that none of them shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested, in their persons or properties, under any pretext, on account of their conduct or political opinions, or of their attachment to any of the contracting powers, nor on any other account, except that of debts contracted to individuals, or on account of acts posterior to the present treaty.

XIV. All sequestrations imposed by any of the parties on the funded property, revenues, or debts of whatever description, belonging to any of the contracting powers, or to their subjects or citizens, shall be taken off immediately after the signature of this definitive treaty. The decision of all claims brought forward by individuals, the subjects or citizens of any of the contracting powers respectively, against individuals, subjects or citizens of any of the others, for rights, debts, property, or effects whatsoever, which, according to received usages and the law of nations, ought to revive at the period of peace, shall be heard and decided before competent tribunals; and in all cases prompt and ample justice shall be administered in the countries where the claims are made.

XV. The fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland, and of the adjacent islands, and of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, are replaced on the same footing on which they were previous to the war; the French fishermen and the inhabitants of St. Pierre and Miquelon shall have the privilege of cutting such wood as they may stand in need of in the bays of Fortune and Despair, for the space of one year, from the date of the notification of the present treaty.

XVI. In order to prevent all causes of complaint and dispute which may arise on account of prizes which may have been made at sea after the signature of the preliminary articles, it is reciprocally agreed, that the vessels

vessels and effects which may have been taken in the British Channel, and in the North Sea, after the space of twelve days, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications of the said preliminary articles, shall be restored on each side; that the term shall be one month from the British Channel and the North Seas, as far as the Canary Islands inclusively, whether in the ocean or in the Mediterranean; two months from the said Canary Islands as far as the Equator; and, lastly, five months in all other parts of the world, without any exception, or any more particular description of time or place.

XVII. The ambassadors, ministers, and other agents of the contracting powers, shall enjoy respectively in the states of the said powers, the same rank, privileges, prerogatives, and immunities, which public agents of the same class enjoyed previous to the war.

XVIII. The branch of the House of Nassau, which was established in the republic formerly called the Republic of the United Provinces, and now the Batavian Republic, having suffered losses there, as well in private property as in consequence of the change of constitution adopted in that country, an adequate compensation shall be procured for the said branch of the House of Nassau for the said losses.

XIX. The present definitive treaty of peace is declared common to the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the ally of his Britannic Majesty; and the Sublime Porte shall be invited to transmit its act of accession thereto, in the shortest delay possible.

XX. It is agreed, that the contracting parties shall, on requisitions made by them respectively, or by their ministers or officers duly authorised to make the same, deliver up to justice persons accused of crimes of murder, forgery, or fraudulent bankruptcy, committed within the jurisdiction of the requiring party, provided that this shall be done only when the evidence of the criminality shall be so authenticated, as that the laws of the country where the person so accused shall be found,

found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had been there committed. The expenses of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the requisition. It is understood that this article does not regard in any manner crimes of murder, forgery, or fraudulent bankruptcy, committed antecedently to the conclusion of this definitive treaty.

XXI. The contracting parties promise to observe sincerely and *bona fide* all the articles contained in the present treaty, and they will not suffer the same to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by their respective subjects or citizens; and the said contracting parties generally and reciprocally guarantee to each other all the stipulations of the present treaty.

XXII. The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting parties in thirty days, or sooner, if possible, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in due form at Paris.

In witness whereof, we, the underwritten plenipotentiaries, have signed with our hands, and in virtue of our respective full powers, the present definitive treaty, and have caused our respective seals to be affixed thereto.

Done at Amiens, the twenty-seventh day of March one thousand eight hundred and two; the sixth Germinal, year X of the French Republic.

(L. S.)	CORNWALLIS.
(L. S.)	JOSEPH BONAPARTE.
(L. S.)	J. NICOLAS DE AZARA.
(L. S.)	R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

It is agreed that the omission of some titles, which may have taken place in the present treaty, shall not be prejudicial to the powers or to the persons concerned.

It is further agreed, that the English and French languages made use of in all the copies of the present

treaty shall not form an example, which may be alleged or quoted as a precedent, or in any manner prejudice the contracting powers whose languages have not been used ; and that for the future what has been observed, and ought to be observed, with regard to, and on the part of, powers which are in the practice and possession of giving and receiving copies of like treaties in any other language, shall be conformed with ; the present treaty having nevertheless the same force and virtue as if the aforesaid practice had been therein observed.

In witness whereof, we, the underwritten plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Majesty, of the French Republic, of his Catholic Majesty, and of the Batavian Republic, have signed the present separate article, and have caused our respective seals to be affixed thereto.

Done at Amiens, the twenty-seventh day of March one thousand eight hundred and two ; the sixth Germinal, year X of the French Republic.

(L. S.)	CORNWALLIS.
(L. S.)	JOSEPH BONAPARTE.
(L. S.)	J. NICOLAS DE AZARA.
(L. S.)	R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.

To the Copy of the Definitive Treaty published in the Dutch Papers, is added a separate Convention entered into between the French and Batavian Plenipotentiaries, to the following Effect :

THE undersigned plenipotentiary of the French republic declares, conformably to existing stipulations between the French and Batavian republic, and in virtue of special instructions with which he is furnished to that effect on the part of his government, that it is understood that the indemnity stipulated in favour of the House of Nassau, in the 18th article of the present treaty, shall not upon any account, or in any manner, be at the charge of the Batavian republic ; the French government

vernment being guarantee to this effect toward the said republic.

The undersigned plenipotentiary of the Batavian republic, in the name of his government, accepts the above declaration, as explanatory of the aforesaid 18th article of the definitive treaty, signed this day by the plenipotentiaries of the four contracting powers.

The present act shall be presented at the ratification of the two respective governments, and the ratifications exchanged in due form.

Done at Amiens, March 27.

(Signed)

J. BONAPARTE.

R. J. SCHIMMELPENNINCK.

verment being guarantee to this effect toward the said
 republic.
 The undersigned plenipotentiary of the Batavian re-
 public in the name of his government, accepts the
 above declaration, as explanatory of the article 18th
 article of the definitive treaty, signed this day by the
 plenipotentiary of the said contracting powers.
 The present act shall be presented at the ratification
 of the two respective governments, and the ratifications
 exchanged in due form.

Done at Amiens, March 27.

(Signed) J. BONAPARTE

R. J. G. H. A. M. P. R. I. N. K. I. C. K.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE,

&c. &c.

No. 1. Translation.

MY LORD, London, May 23, 1802.

THE 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, which fixes the new organization of the order of Malta, having prescribed various measures, to the execution of which it is necessary that the two principal contracting powers should concur, the First Consul has named General Vial as Minister Plenipotentiary to the order and island of Malta, for the purpose of concerting with the person whom his Britannic Majesty shall appoint for that purpose, respecting the execution of the arrangements agreed upon in the late treaty. General Vial will set out on his destination as soon as your Excellency shall have informed me of his Majesty's intentions, and of the choice he may make.

I have the honor to be, &c.

OTTO.

No. 2.

SIR, Downing-street, May 24, 1802.

In answer to your letter of yesterday, in which you communicate to me the nomination, by the First Consul,

sul, of General Vial to be Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic, to the order of Saint John of Jerusalem; I have the honor to inform you that the King has been pleased to appoint Sir Alexander Ball to be his Majesty's Minister to the order. Sir Alexander Ball will shortly proceed to Malta, and will be instructed to concert with General Vial the necessary measures for carrying into effect the arrangements relative to that island, which are stipulated in the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty of Peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

M. Otto, &c. &c. &c.

No. 3.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated St. Petersburg, April 23, 1802.

I hope very soon to be enabled to re-dispatch your Lordship's last messenger with the answer of this Government to the communications which I have made to them, in obedience to his Majesty's commands, respecting the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens. In the mean time I must not conceal from your Lordship that there is great reason to fear that his Imperial Majesty will decline taking part in the proposed joint guaranty of the possessions and new constitution of the order of Malta.

No. 4.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, May 7, 1802.

I have reason to hope that the first impressions that had been produced here by certain parts of the arrangement relative to Malta have been removed, and that his Imperial Majesty may even be ultimately induced to guaranty the whole of that arrangement, provided that

that the steps which have been taken towards the election of a new Grand Master, according to the mode suggested by this Court, be considered as fulfilling what is required on that head by the latter part of the paragraph of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, and consequently that no new election for that office is to take place in the manner pointed out by the former part of the same stipulation.

No. 5.

SIR,

Downing-street, June 5, 1802.

I informed you in my dispatch No. 10, that M. Otto had made an official communication to me that General Vial was appointed by the First Consul Minister Plenipotentiary to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. Sir Alexander Ball has been in consequence invested with the same character by his Majesty. He will proceed immediately to Malta, and he will receive instructions to concert with General Vial the best means of carrying into complete effect the stipulations contained in the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty. By the paragraph marked No. 1 in that article it is stipulated,

“ The Knights of the order, whose langues shall
 “ continue to subsist after the exchange of the ratifica-
 “ tions of the present treaty, are invited to return to
 “ Malta as soon as that exchange shall have taken
 “ place: they shall there form a general Chapter, and
 “ shall proceed to the election of a Grand Master, to
 “ be chosen from amongst the natives of those nations
 “ which preserve langues, if no such election shall
 “ have been already made since the exchange of the
 “ ratifications of the Preliminary Articles of Peace.”

The object of this paragraph was, that in the event of an election having taken place subsequent to the exchange of the ratifications of the Preliminary Articles of Peace, and antecedent to the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, that election should be considered as valid; and though no mention is made in the article
 of

of the proclamation of the Emperor of Russia, soon after his accession to the throne, by which the Knights of the order were invited to assemble, and to proceed to the election of a Grand Master, the stipulation in question evidently referred to the contingency of an election taking place on the Continent in consequence of that proclamation.

You will inform the French Government, that his Majesty is ready to consider the election which has lately taken place at St. Petersburg, under the auspices of the Emperor of Russia, to be valid, according to the stipulation of the 10th article.

His Majesty has no other object in the whole of this transaction, than that the 10th article of the treaty may be fairly executed, and that the arrangement may be carried into complete execution with as little difficulty as possible.

As the 13th paragraph in the 10th article stipulates that the governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should be invited to accede to the arrangements respecting Malta, it is desirable that the French Government should instruct, without delay, their Ambassadors or Ministers at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, to make, conjointly with his Majesty's Ministers at those Courts, an official communication, desiring the accession of those powers to the arrangements relative to Malta in the Definitive Treaty, by which it is provided, that the independence of the island and the other stipulations shall be under the guarantee of those powers, in conjunction with his Majesty, the French Government, and the King of Spain.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 6.

Extract of a Dispatch from Anthony Merry, Esq. to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, June 17, 1802.

I have now the honor to transmit to your Lordship, inclosed, copy of an answer which reached me last night, (though dated eight days back,) from the French Minister, to the Note Verbale which I delivered to him containing his Majesty's propositions respecting the execution of some points of the arrangements relative to Malta, contained in the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty of Peace. You will find the entire acquiescence of this Government to those propositions expressed in a very satisfactory manner.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 6.)

His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary has the honor to transmit herewith to Citizen Talleyrand, Minister for the Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, the Note Verbale of the communication he has been ordered to make to him by his Government, who are desirous that the proposals it contains may be acceptable to the French Government; and they may be assured that the British Government, in making these proposals, have no other object in view than to facilitate, in the easiest manner, the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, and to act in this respect in perfect harmony with the French Government.

Mr. Merry has the honor to renew, on this occasion, the assurances of his high consideration for M. Talleyrand.

(Signed)

ANT. MERRY.

Paris, 8th June, 1802.

The Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs will find inclosed a list of the suffrages obtained from several Pri-

ories of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, for the election of a Grand Master, which has been received from St. Petersburg by the British Government, with the notice that these priories have agreed amongst themselves, that his Holiness the Pope shall select (*pro hac vice*), from amongst the candidates therein specified, the person who is to fill the post of Grand Master.

His Britannic Majesty on his part is willing to consider an election so made as valid, according to the stipulations of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens.

His Majesty therefore is ready to acknowledge, in quality of Grand Master, the person whom the Pope shall think proper to fix upon, from amongst the names contained in that list.

His Majesty has no other end in view in this than to see the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens duly fulfilled, and the arrangement it contains executed with as little difficulty as possible.

It is stipulated by the 13th paragraph of the same article, that the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Governments, shall be solicited to accede to the said arrangement.

The British Government is of opinion that it might be proper for that of France to send without delay instructions to their Ministers at Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, to make, conjointly with his Britannic Majesty's Ministers, a communication to those powers in which they should be invited to accede to the arrangement respecting Malta, by which the independence of the island, and the other stipulations relative thereto, are placed under the protection and guarantee of those powers conjointly with their Britannic and Catholic Majesties and the French Republic.

Inclosure

Inclosure referred to in No. 6.—(Translation.)

The undersigned, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to transmit to M. Merry, his Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, his answer to the Note Verbale which he addressed to him on the eighth Prairial. He doubts not that his Majesty's Ministers will see in this answer a new proof of the constant dispositions of the First Consul to come to an agreement with the English Government, for the securing and facilitating the execution of the respective clauses of the Treaty which has re-established Peace between the two States.

The undersigned has the honour to renew to M. Merry the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed)

CHA. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, 20th Prairial, Year 10.

[The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic has received the communication which has been made to him by his Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, of the list of the candidates nominated by the votes of the different priories to the Grand Mastership of the Order of Malta; and he has submitted to the First Consul the proposal concerted between the priories of the Order, and approved by his Britannic Majesty, of submitting (*pro hac vice*) to his Holiness the choice among the proposed candidates.

The First Consul had no other object, in whatever relates to the Order of Malta, than to see the 10th Article of the Treaty of Amiens duly executed, and to remove all the obstacles which might render that execution tardy or difficult. He moreover desires equally with his Britannic Majesty, that France and England should act in concert, in order the better to secure the independence and the organization of the Order of Malta. He therefore consents that the choice of its Grand

Master, from the candidates proposed by the votes of the priories, should for this time be submitted to his Holiness.

As to the 13th paragraph of the same article, respecting the accession of the powers, the First Consul thinks with his Britannic Majesty, that the powers should be invited to give their consent to the arrangements agreed upon; and the French Ministers at the courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia shall consequently receive orders to take, conjointly with his Britannic Majesty's Ministers, the necessary steps for obtaining the accession provided by the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens.]

Paris, 10th Prairial, Year 10.

No. 7.

MY LORD,

Paris, June 4, 1802.

I HAD occasion to see Mr. Talleyrand yesterday afternoon, for the purpose of introducing to him, by appointment, some English gentlemen, previously to their presentation to-day to the First Consul.

Having gone first alone into the minister's cabinet, he said, that he had been directed by General Bonaparte, to represent to me several circumstances which stood very much in the way of that perfect reconciliation and good understanding between the two countries and their governments, which it was the First Consul's sincere wish to see re-established; in order that such obstacles might be removed before the arrival in London of the French Ambassador; because, although the circumstances in question had already produced a very disagreeable effect, whilst only M. Otto, as Minister, had to witness them, they would acquire a great addition of force if they should still exist when the Ambassador should be present; and since the First Consul had given orders for General Andreossy to proceed to his destination with as little delay as possible, he wished that I should take an early opportunity to give an account

count to your Lordship of the observations which he was charged to make to me.

After a preface to this effect, M. Talleyrand proceeded to state to me, that the accounts which M. Otto had transmitted of the disgust and inconvenience which he could not but feel and experience at meeting frequently at his Majesty's Court, and at other places, the French Princes, and some French persons still decorated with the insignia of French orders which no longer existed; and at seeing the countenance and support which continued to be given in England, to what, he termed, the *ci-devant* French Bishops, as well as to other persons (he here mentioned Georges) inimical to the present Government of France, had affected so strongly the First Consul, and were in fact so calculated to prevent that system of cordiality which he was anxious to see established, that it was incumbent upon him to express his wish, that his Majesty's Government might be disposed to remove out of the British dominions all the French Princes and their adherents, together with the French Bishops, and other French individuals, whose political principles and conduct must necessarily occasion great jealousy to the French Government. He continued to observe, that the protection and favour which all the persons in question continued to meet with in a country so close a neighbour to France, must alone be always considered as an encouragement to the disaffected here, even without those persons themselves being guilty of any acts tending to foment fresh disturbances in his country; but that the government here possessed proofs of the abuse which they were now making of the protection which they enjoyed in England, and of the advantage they were taking of the vicinity of their situation to France, by being really guilty of such acts, since several printed papers had lately been intercepted, which it was known they had sent, and caused to be circulated in France, and which had for object, to create an opposition to the Government. I cannot, my Lord, do better than refer you to what you will have read in the French official paper of the day before yesterday

terday (under the article of Paris), for the exact text of M. Talleyrand's discourse upon this subject; which he concluded by saying, that he thought the residence of Louis XVIII. was now the proper place for that of the rest of the family, and that I might add this suggestion in my report to your Lordship.

I answered the French Minister, that without any reference to you, I could assure him, that the practices of the French residing in England, of which he complained, had not been encouraged, nor would be countenanced by his Majesty's government; which was so sincerely disposed to cultivate harmony and good understanding between the two countries, as he had represented the First Consul to be; but that I could by no means say how far they would be disposed to adopt the measure which he had intimated it to be General Bonaparte's wish that they should pursue, in order to remove so effectually every thing which might not perhaps be considered equally by them as giving just cause of offence or jealousy to France.

M. Talleyrand did not rejoin upon the matter; but asked me when I proposed writing. Upon my replying I should lose no time, he said, that if I should write as to-day, he would avail himself of the opportunity to convey a letter to M. Otto.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) A. MERRY.

The Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 8.

SIR,

Downing-street, June 10, 1802.

Your dispatches of the 4th instant were received on Monday night, and have been laid before the King.

The account given in that dispatch of the conversation which passed on the 3d instant, between you and M. Talleyrand, respecting the French Princes and their adherents, would have afforded here considerable surprise, if his Majesty's Government had not in some degree

gree been prepared for it by information which had been previously received: from the manner, however, in which this subject has been mentioned to you, it is important that you should take a proper opportunity to explain, candidly and fairly, to the French Government, the line of conduct which his Majesty feels it to be his duty to pursue in this very delicate business. His Majesty would certainly consider it inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Peace, between him and the French Republic, to encourage or countenance any projects that might be hostile to the present government of France. He is sincerely desirous that the peace which has been concluded may be permanent, and may lead to the establishment of a system of good understanding and harmony between the two countries. With these sentiments he is disposed to employ all the means in his power to guard against any circumstance which can have the effect of disturbing the tranquillity that has been so happily restored; and he certainly expects that all foreigners who may reside within his dominions, should not only hold a conduct conformable to the laws of the country, but should abstain from all acts which may be hostile to the government of any country with which his Majesty may be at Peace. As long, however, as they conduct themselves according to these principles, his Majesty would feel it inconsistent with his dignity, with his honor, and with the common laws of hospitality, to deprive them of that protection which individuals resident in his dominions can only forfeit by their own misconduct. The greater part of the persons to whom allusion has been made in M. Talleyrand's conversation with you, are living in retirement; and his Majesty has no reason whatever to suppose, that since the conclusion of peace they have availed themselves of their residence in this country, to promote any designs injurious to the government of France.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 9.

MY LORD,

Paris, June 17, 1802.

I have the honor to acquaint your lordship, that I have executed the instructions given me by your secret and confidential dispatch, (No. 14), in consequence of the communication from M. Talleyrand, which I transmitted in my Number 23, respecting the residence of the French Princes, and other French persons in his Majesty's dominions.

In delivering my answer on this business to the French minister, I took care to express, in the strongest manner, the assurances which your lordship has authorized me to give of his Majesty's sincere desire that the peace which has happily been concluded should be permanent, and that it should lead to the establishment of a system of harmony and good understanding between the two countries; and that, as his Majesty's conduct would, in every respect, be guided by those sentiments, he of course would not tolerate, much less encourage, any proceedings on the part of persons within his dominions, which might be hostile to the present government of France; which assurances might, I trusted, be sufficient to tranquillize and satisfy the First Consul, without recurring to the measures which had been intimated to me, and which could not but be considered as inconsistent with his Majesty's dignity and honor, as well as with the common laws of hospitality, which he could not but observe towards foreigners within his dominions, until they should have forfeited that protection by their misconduct.

M. Talleyrand expressed to me in reply, that the First Consul had solicited no more than the British Government itself had, at the time, demanded of France, when the Pretender was in this country, and then had been practised between other governments under similar circumstances: that he could not see any humiliation in the measure which he had intimated to me; that he

he could assure me it had not been suggested with any such idea ; and that he could only repeat, that the adoption of it would be in the highest degree agreeable and satisfactory to the First Consul, and be considered by him as the most convincing proof of his Majesty's disposition to see a cordial good understanding established between the two countries ; concluding his answer with a request that I would report it to your lordship.

I rejoined upon the subject by observing to the French Minister, that even without adverting to the serious consideration of the King's dignity and honor, the feelings of the people of England were to be taken into account on the occasion : that he must be sensible the relative situation, hitherto, of the two countries, especially in regard to trade, afforded his Majesty's subjects no room to reap those advantages which were common to, and which were always expected from a state of peace ; and that it therefore appeared to me that the First Consul would equally give a proof of his disposition to see harmony and a friendly intercourse re-established between the two nations, by not repeating his wish upon a matter which would operate in the strongest manner against such an approximation and reconciliation of sentiments, were it even only to come to the knowledge of his Majesty's subjects.

I am happy, my lord, to say, that M. Talleyrand shewed no warmth, or any very marked eagerness, in his manner of replying to my communication ; and that our conversation on this head terminated with the last remarks I made to him, when he changed it to another subject.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) ANTH. MERRY.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 10.—Translation.

MY LORD,

I transmitted some time ago to Mr. Hammond, a number of Peltier, containing the most gross calumnies against the French Government, and against the whole nation; and I observed that I should probably receive an order to demand the punishment of such an abuse of the press. That order is actually arrived, and I cannot conceal from you, my Lord, that the reiterated insults of a small number of foreigners, assembled in London to conspire against the French Government, produce the most unfavourable effects on the good understanding between the two nations. Even though the first article of the Treaty of Amiens had not provided for the maintenance of that respect which two independent nations owe to each other, the general maxims of the law of nations would formally condemn so revolting an abuse of the liberty of the press. It cannot be believed, that the law can give more latitude to a libellist than to any other individual who, without declaration of war, should permit himself to violate the duties of good neighbourhood. The offence in question is so much the more serious, as its object is evidently to disturb the harmony which subsists between the two governments.

It is not to Peltier alone, but to the editor of the "Courier Francois de Londres," to Cobbet, and to other writers who resemble them, that I have to direct the attention of his Majesty's government. The perfidious and malevolent publications of these men are in open contradiction to the principles of peace; and if it could ever enter into the mind of the French government to permit retaliation, writers would doubtless be found in France, willing to avenge their countrymen, by filling their pages with odious reflections on the most respectable persons, and on the dearest institutions of Great Britain.

The want of positive laws against these sorts of offences

fences cannot palliate the violation of the law of nations, according to which peace should put a stop to all hostilities ; and doubtless those which wound the honour and the reputation of a government, and which tend to cause a revolt of the people, whose interests are confided to that government, are the most apt to lessen the advantages of peace, and to keep up national resentments.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

OTTO.

To his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, Minister and Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

No. 11.

SIR,

Downing-street, July 28, 1802.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter on the subject of the last number of Peltier. It is impossible that his Majesty's Government could peruse the article in question without the greatest displeasure, and without an anxious desire that the person who published it should suffer the punishment he so justly deserves. The calumnies, however, to which his Majesty's Government, and many of the best subjects in this country, are frequently exposed in the public prints, must necessarily convince all foreign governments of the difficulties which exist in a constitution like that of Great Britain, in preventing the abuse which is often unavoidably attendant on the greatest of all political benefits ; and though publications of this nature are, as they certainly ought to be, by the law of England, subject to punishment, it is often difficult to prove the guilt of an individual so satisfactorily as to obtain the judgment of a court of justice ; and the inconvenience which arises from prosecution, unless there is a reasonable prospect of success, is frequently sufficient to deter both the government and individuals from undertaking it. In the present case I have thought

it my duty to refer the article in question to his Majesty's Attorney General, for his opinion, whether it is or is not a libel, according to the construction of the law of England, and whether it is such a libel as he would, under all the circumstances, recommend for prosecution. As soon as I receive his report, I shall have the honour of communicating it to you.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

No. 12.—NOTE.—(Translation.)

The undersigned Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, having submitted to this Government the letter which his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, Minister and Principal Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty, did him the honour of writing under date of 27th July, is directed to offer the following observations :

If the British Government tolerates censures upon the acts of its administration, and the personal abuse of the most respectable men, it does not suffer even the slightest attempt against the public tranquillity, the fundamental laws of the empire, and supreme authority which arises from them.—Every nation is, moreover, at liberty to sacrifice any advantage whatever in its interior, in order to obtain another to which it attaches a higher value ; but the Government which does not repress the licentiousness of the press, when it may be injurious to the honour or the interests of foreign powers, would afford an opportunity to libellists to endanger the public tranquillity, or at least the good understanding that forms the basis of it ; and whenever such serious injuries are continued in a regular and systematic manner, doubts must arise as to its own dispositions.

The particular laws and constitution of Great Britain are subordinate to the general principles of the law of nations, which supersede the laws of each individual state.

state. If it be a right in England to allow the most extensive liberty to the press, it is a public right of polished nations, and the bounden duty of governments, to prevent, repress, and punish, every attack which might by those means be made against the rights, the interests, and the honour of foreign powers.

This general maxim of the law of nations has never been mistaken without paving the way for the greatest divisions, and has even furnished in England a plausible pretext to those who have written volumes to prove the necessity of the last war against France. Are these men now desirous of presenting to the Consular Government a weapon which they have wielded with so much address? and can they flatter themselves that the authority which has signed the peace has not power to maintain it?

By the first article of the Treaty of Amiens, the two powers agree to afford no protection, either directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them.

But the greatest of all injuries doubtless is, that which tends to debase a foreign government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most decided of all protections, is that, which places unde the safeguard of the laws, men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bonds of society.

The undersigned minister must moreover observe, that this is not a question respecting some paragraphs, which, through the inadvertance of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print; but it is a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the Chief of the French Republic, but against all the constituted authorities of the Republic, against the whole nation, represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. It has ever been remarked that many of these prints contain an appeal to the French people,
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against the government and fundamental laws of their country.

If these observations apply to the English writers, who for these three months past have deluged the public with the most perfidious and unbecoming publications, they are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered them in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace.

It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to excite the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the execution of the *concordate*, that these implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities, and to provoke the just indignation of the French Government and people. Not a doubt exists of these writings having been composed and circulated by *Georges*, and by the former Bishops of France. These men can no longer be considered but as rebels against both political and religious authority; and after their reiterated attempts to disturb the good understanding between the two governments, their residence in England militates openly against the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace.

The meetings likewise which have taken place in the island of Jersey, and the odious plots which are there framed, in spite of the representations which the undersigned minister has already taken care to make on this subject, also demand immediate measures to be taken by a government, the neighbour and friend of France.

Other persons (attached, by recollections never to be effaced, and by regrets too long fostered, to an order of things which no longer exists in France) find themselves daily implicated by the plots of those who pretend to serve them. A sense of their own reputation,

tion will without doubt lead them to avoid a focus of intrigues, with which they ought not to have the least connection.

Peace happily re-established, the mutual desire of the two countries to render it solid and lasting, and the general interests of humanity, require that all these causes of dissatisfaction should be done away, and that his Majesty's ministry should, by frank and energetic measures, manifest their disapprobation of all the attempts made to produce new divisions.

The undersigned has in consequence received especial order to solicit,

1st. That his Majesty's Government will adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and other writings printed in England are filled.

2d. That the individuals mentioned in the undersigned minister's letter of the 23d July last, shall be sent out of the island of Jersey.

3d. That the former Bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, and all those, who like them, under the pretext of religion, seek to raise disturbances in the interior of France, shall likewise be sent away.

4th. That *Georges* and his adherents shall be transported to Canada, according to the intention which the undersigned has been directed to transmit to his government at the request of Lord Hawkesbury.

5th. That, in order to deprive the evil disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two governments, it shall be recommended to the princes of the House of Bourbon at present in Great Britain to repair to Warsaw, the residence of the head of their family.

6th. That such of the French Emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the antient Government of France, shall be required to quit the territory of the British Empire.

These demands are founded upon the Treaty of
Amiens,

Amiens, and upon the verbal assurances that the undersigned minister has had the satisfaction to receive in the course of the negotiations, with regard to a mutual agreement for maintaining tranquillity and good order in the two countries. If any one in particular of these demands does not proceed so immediately from the treaty concluded, it would be easy to justify it by striking examples, and to prove how very attentive the British Government has been in times of internal fermentation, to remove from the territory of a neighbouring power, those who might endanger the public tranquillity.

Whatever may be the protection which the English laws afford to native writers, and to other subjects of his Majesty, the French Government knows that foreigners do not here enjoy the same protection; and that the law, known by the title of the Alien Act, gives the ministry of his Britannic Majesty an authority which it has often exercised against foreigners, whose residence was prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain. The first clause of this act states expressly, that any order in council which requires a foreigner to quit the kingdom shall be executed, under pain of imprisonment and transportation. There exists, therefore, in the ministry, a legal and sufficient power to restrain foreigners, without having recourse to courts of law; and the French Government, which offers on this point a perfect reciprocity, thinks it gives a new proof of its pacific intentions, by demanding that those persons may be sent away, whose machinations uniformly tend to sow discord between the two people. It owes to itself, and to the nation at large (which has made it the depository of its power and of its honor), not to appear insensible to insults and to plots during profound peace, which the irritation of open war could not justify, and it is too well acquainted with the conciliatory dispositions of the British Ministry, not to rely upon its efforts to disperse a faction, equally the enemy of France and England.

The undersigned minister seizes this opportunity to
present

present to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, the homage
of his respectful consideration. OTTO.

London, 17th August, 1802.

No. 13.

SIR,

Downing street, August 28, 1802.

I send you the copy of a letter which I received some days ago from M. Otto, together with a copy of an official note inclosed in it. I have informed M. Otto, that you would receive instructions to enter into explanations with the French Government on the several points to which it refers. It is impossible not to feel considerable surprise at the circumstances under which it has been thought proper to present such a note; at the stile in which it is drawn up; and at the complaints contained in it. Whatever may be the general dispositions of the French Government towards this country, supposing them to be as hostile as they have been at any former period, or even more so, it would appear so contrary to their interest to provoke a war with us at the present moment, that I am inclined to ascribe their conduct, in the whole of this business, more to temper, than to any other motive; but whether their conduct is to be referred to temper or to policy, the effects of it may still be the same; it is therefore become of the utmost importance that a frank explanation should be made of the line of conduct which his Majesty has determined to adopt on reasons of the nature of those to which this Note refers, and of the motives on which it is founded; and it is to be hoped that such an explanation will have the effect of putting an end to a course of proceeding, which can lead only to perpetual irritation between the two governments, and which might ultimately tend to the most serious consequences.

The first consideration that naturally arises on this transaction, is that of the peculiar circumstances under
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which the Note of M. Otto has been presented. It cannot be denied that some very improper paragraphs have lately appeared in some of the English Newspapers against the Government of France; it cannot be denied likewise, that publications of a still more improper and indecent nature have made their appearance in this country, with the names of foreigners affixed to them. Under these circumstances, the French Government would have been warranted in expecting every redress that the laws of this country could afford them; but as, instead of seeking it in the ordinary course, they have thought fit to resort to recrimination themselves, or at least to authorise it in others, they could have no right to complain, if their subsequent appeal to his Majesty had failed to produce the effect that otherwise would have attended it.

Whatever may have been the nature of the prior injury, they have in fact taken the law into their own hands; and what is this recrimination and retort? The paragraphs in the English newspapers, the publications to which I have above referred, have not appeared under any authority of the British Government, and are disavowed and disapproved of by them; but the paragraph in the *Moniteur* has appeared in a paper avowedly official, for which the government are therefore considered as responsible, as his Majesty's Government is responsible for the contents of the *London Gazette*. And this retort is not confined to the unauthorized English newspapers, or to the other publications of which complaint is now made, but is converted into, and made a pretence for a direct attack upon the Government of his Majesty. His Majesty feels it beneath his dignity to make any formal complaint on this occasion; but it has been impossible for me to proceed to the other parts of the subject, without pointing your attention to the conduct of the French Government in this respect, that you may observe upon it in the manner it deserves.

The propositions in M. Otto's official Note, are six
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in number; but may in fact be divided under two heads: the first, that which relates to the libels of all descriptions, which are alleged to be published against the French Government; the last, comprehending the five complaints which relate to the emigrants resident in this country. On the first, I am sure you must be aware that his Majesty cannot, and never will, in consequence of any representation or any menace from a foreign power, make any concession, which can be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject. The constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description; but there exist judicatures, wholly independent of the executive government, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems to be criminal, and which are bound to inflict the punishment the delinquents may deserve; these judicatures may take cognizance, not only of libels against the government and the magistracy of this kingdom, but, as has been repeatedly experienced, of publications defamatory of those in whose hands the administration of foreign governments is placed. That our government neither has nor wants any other protection than what the laws of the country afford; and though they are willing and ready to give to every foreign government all the protection against offences of this nature, which the principle of their laws and constitution will admit, they never can consent to new-model their laws, or to change their constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the present French Government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, or entertain the opinion that the administration of justice in our courts is too tardy and lenient, they have it in their power to redress themselves by punishing the venders and distributors of such publications within their own territories, in any manner that they may think proper, and thereby preventing the circulation of them. If they think their present laws

are not sufficient for this purpose, they may enact new ones; or, if they think it expedient, they may exercise the right which they have of prohibiting the importation of any foreign newspapers, or periodical publications, into the territories of the French Republic. His Majesty will not complain of such a measure, as it is not his intention to interfere in the manner in which the people or territories of France should be governed; but he expects, on the other hand, that the French Government will not interfere in the manner in which the government of his dominions is conducted, or call for a change in those laws with which his people are perfectly satisfied. With respect to the distinction which appeared to be drawn in M. Otto's Note, between the publications of British subjects and those of foreigners, and the power which his Majesty is supposed to have in consequence of the Alien Act, of sending foreigners out of his dominions, it is important to observe, that the provisions of that act were made for the purpose of preventing the residence of foreigners, whose numbers and principles had a tendency to disturb the internal peace of his own dominions, and whom the safety of those dominions might require in many instances to be removed, even if their actual conduct had not exposed them to punishment by law. It does not follow that it would be a warrantable application of such a law to exert its powers in the cases of individuals, such as those of whom complaint is now made, and particularly as they are liable to be prosecuted under the law of the land, in like manner as others have been in similar cases, at the instance, and upon the complaint of foreign governments.

The second general head, which includes the five last complaints, relates to the removal of some of the French emigrants resident in this country. His Majesty entertained hopes that the explanation furnished on this head in my dispatch No. 14, would have proved satisfactory, and would have precluded the necessity of any farther discussion on this subject.

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The French Government have upon several occasions resorted on this part of the subject to precedent, and have particularly rested on the demand formerly made by this country, that the person then called the Pretender should be sent from the French dominions. It is important that the differences between these two cases should be stated. When James the Second abdicated the throne, and left this country, he retired with his adherents to France; and though in the war which immediately succeeded that event, the French Government adopted his cause as their own, no stipulation was made at the treaty of Ryswick, that he should be sent from that country, nor was any subsequent demand ever made to the French Government to this effect; but he was suffered to remain at St. Germain, in the neighbourhood of Paris, surrounded by his family and friends, till the time of his death. It was not till after his demise, when Lewis the Fourteenth, in direct violation of the treaty of Ryswick, had acknowledged his son as King of Great Britain, that a different course of proceeding was adopted by the British Government; and in the treaty of peace signed at Utrecht, which put an end to the war which had been carried on, on account of the Spanish succession, an article was inserted to prevent the Pretender from residing in any part of the French dominions. The demand which was subsequently made for the removal of the Pretender from a town which was situated in the center of these dominions, was founded on this article of the treaty, which was in fact one of the conditions of the peace; but both the article in the treaty and the demand were confined to the Pretender personally, and were not extended to any of his family, or to any of his adherents. After his removal, many of his adherents continued to reside in France; many persons resident in this country, who were attached to the cause of the Pretender, and had promoted the rebellion in his favour, and who were consequently attainted for high treason, sought refuge
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in France, and were permitted to remain there till their death, without any application ever having been made by the British Government for their removal. The Duke of Berwick, the natural son of James the Second, who from his principles and talents was the most dangerous man to the interests of this country and the Protestant succession, continued to be a General in the French armies, and though descended from the King, an Englishman and an emigrant, it was not required that he should be sent out of France. In the present case, there is no article in the treaty of peace, by which his Majesty is bound to send from this country any Frenchman whatever, except on account of the crimes specified in the twentieth article of the Definitive Treaty, and in consequence of the proofs therein required having been adduced. In the present case, it cannot be pretended that his Majesty has ever given the slightest countenance to the cause of the Royalists in France against the present Government, since the period when he acknowledged that Government; and if there were not these important differences in the two cases, they would be totally dissimilar in the only remaining point; for in the case of the House of Stuart, as has been already stated, notwithstanding the violence of the times, and the danger to which the Protestant succession was really exposed, this strong act of authority was confined to the person of the Pretender: and the individual who must be recognised in that character by the French Government, and whose case can alone bear any similarity to the former even in this respect, is not, and never has been within his Majesty's dominions: other precedents might be adduced on this subject; but it is not necessary to state them, as the foregoing are sufficient.

With respect to the complaints in detail under the second head.—Upon the first, you may inform the French Government, that the emigrants in Jersey, many of whom had remained there solely on account of the cheapness of subsistence, had actually removed,
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or were removing, previous to the representation concerning them in Mr. Otto's note, and that before your explanation with Mr. Talleyrand can take place, there will probably not be an emigrant in the island.

To the second complaint, which relates to the Bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, and others, his Majesty can only reply, that if the fact alleged against them can be substantiated; if it can be proved that they have distributed papers on the coast of France, with a view of disturbing the Government, and of inducing the people to resist the new church establishment, his Majesty would think himself justified in taking all measures within his power for obliging them to leave the country; but some proof must be adduced of those facts; and such proof must not be that of their having in a single instance, viz. in reply to the Pope's mandate, published a vindication of their own conduct, in refusing to conform to the new establishment; a proceeding in which they would be justifiable on every principle of toleration and justice; but it should shew that they have since availed themselves of their situation in this country to excite the people of France against the authority of that Government, whether civil or ecclesiastical.

On the third complaint, which respects the removal of Georges, and those persons supposed to be described as his adherents, Mr. Otto must have mistaken me in what he supposes me to have said on that subject. His Majesty is however very desirous to obviate any cause of complaint or uneasiness with respect to these persons; and measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for the purpose of removing them out of his Majesty's European Dominions.

On the fourth complaint, respecting the Princes of the House of Bourbon, I can only refer you to my former answer. His Majesty has no desire that they should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed, or can be induced to quit it; but he feels it
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to be inconsistent with his honour and his sense of justice to withdraw from them the rights of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly; and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two governments.

With respect to the fifth complaint, which relates to the French emigrants wearing in this country the orders of their ancient government; there are few, if any, persons of that description in this country who wear such orders. It might be more proper if they all abstained from it; but the French Government could not persist in expecting, that even if it were consistent with law, his Majesty could be induced to commit so harsh an act of authority as to send them out of the country on such an account.

I have thus stated to you his Majesty's sentiments on the several points contained in Mr. Otto's Note. You will take an early opportunity of communicating these sentiments to the French Government, and of accompanying them with the arguments and explanations above stated. And if it should be desired, and you should be of an opinion, that it was likely to produce any good effect, there is no objection to your putting the substance of what you shall have stated in writing, and of delivering it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a memorandum of your conversation.

Upon the general tone and style of Mr. Otto's Note, it is important to observe, that it is far from conciliating; and that the practice of presenting Notes of this description, on any motive or suggestion of personal irritation, cannot fail to have the effect of indisposing the two governments towards each other, instead of consolidating and strengthening the peace which happily subsists between them. That after a war, in which the passions of men have been roused beyond all former examples, it is natural to suppose that the distrust, jealousy, and other hostile feelings of individuals should

should not immediately subside, and under these circumstances it appears to be both the interest and the duty of the two governments, by a mild and a temperate conduct gradually to allay these feelings, and not on the contrary to provoke and augment them by untimely irritation on their part, and by ascribing proceedings like those above noticed, to causes to which they have no reference. His Majesty has thus fully and frankly explained his sentiments, and the ground of his conduct. He is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace, which is consistent with the honour and independance of the country, and with the security of its laws and constitution. But the French Government must have formed a most erroneous judgement of the disposition of the British Nation, and of the character of its government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power will ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq.

No. 14.—Translation.

NOTE.

General Vial, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic at Malta, having set out for his destination, about the 20th of July, it is to be presumed, that he will soon be in a condition to enter into a concert with his Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary on the evacuation of Malta, and of its dependencies.

The three months, in which this evacuation should have taken place, are expired; and it being the intention of the two governments that the execution of the Treaty of Amiens should experience the least possible delay, the First Consul would have been desirous that

the two thousand Neapolitans who are ready to depart, could have been transported at an early period to the island of Malta, to be in readiness whenever the evacuation shall be on the point of being effected.

It appears, nevertheless, that Mr. Drummond, the English minister at Naples, has not been authorized by his government to facilitate this transport; and that the motive alledged by that minister was, that the stipulations which ought to precede the evacuation not being fulfilled, that evacuation could not yet take place.

In communicating the above details to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, his Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, the undersigned is directed to observe, that the sending the two thousand Neapolitans to the island of Malta cannot but be considered as a preliminary step, in order to accelerate the evacuation, as soon as the necessary measures shall have been taken by the respective Plenipotentiaries; and that it does not in any manner prevent the subsequent concert on the details of the evacuation, conformably to the clauses of the Treaty of Amiens.

The undersigned is moreover directed to request the British Ministry to give general instructions to his Majesty's Plenipotentiaries at Naples, and at Malta, that the evacuation, and the other conditions of the 10th article, may be executed without obstacle, and without these Plenipotentiaries conceiving themselves obliged to refer to their government on each of the successive operations which should take place.

The undersigned embraces this opportunity to present to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, the homage of his respectful consideration.

(Signed)

OTTO.

London, August 21st, 1802.

His Excellency Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

No.

No. 15. NOTE.

The undersigned has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Otto's Note of the 21st instant.

When the Neapolitan Government notified to Mr. Drummond, the King's Minister at Naples, that the two thousand troops which his Sicilian Majesty had selected to serve in Malta, were ready to proceed to their destination, that gentleman declined taking any step to facilitate their embarkation, till he should receive intelligence of the arrival of Sir Alexander Ball in that island, and till he should be informed that the Commander in chief of the British Forces had made suitable preparations for their reception. By the last advices from Malta it appears, that Sir Alexander Ball had arrived there on the tenth of last month, and that after having conferred with General Fox upon the subject, he had written to Mr. Drummond, that there was no impediment whatever to the immediate reception of the Neapolitan troops, and that their quarters would be prepared accordingly; the undersigned has the honor to state this to M. Otto, as the most satisfactory answer which he can give to his Note. It is probable, therefore, that the troops of his Sicilian Majesty are already embarked and on their passage; but to prevent the possibility of any unnecessary delay or misconception, the most explicit instructions will be immediately forwarded to Mr. Drummond on this subject.

With respect to the other points in M. Otto's Note, the undersigned can only repeat what he has before stated to him, that his Majesty is most sincerely desirous to see all the stipulations of the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty carried into effect with the utmost punctuality, and with the least possible delay. With this view he takes this opportunity of observing to M. Otto, that by the very last dispatches from the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, the French Minister at that Court had not even then received any instructions from his government relative to the steps

to be taken in concert with Lord St. Helens, for inviting the Emperor to become guaranty of the provisions and stipulations of the article in question. The French Minister at Berlin was in the same predicament. The undersigned, therefore, requests that M. Otto would have the goodness to represent these circumstances to his government, and to urge them, if they have not already done it, to transmit without delay to their Ministers at those courts the necessary instructions for bringing this part of the business to a conclusion.

The undersigned requests M. Otto to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Downing-street, August 23d, 1802.

No. 16.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury. Dated Paris, October 3, 1802.

As soon as the Helvetic Government had retired from Berne to Lausanne, the Partizans of the antient Federative system of the Swiss Cantons, who established immediately in the former city a provisional government, deputed a confidential to Paris, for the purpose of counteracting the measures of M. Stapfer, and of engaging the First Consul to suffer the inhabitants of Switzerland to settle their affairs amongst themselves. He was instructed in any emergency to address himself to the ministers here of the principal powers of Europe, and to solicit their interference and assistance in the objects of his mission. He reached Paris four days ago, and had reason to flatter himself, from the result of an interview which he had immediately with M. Talleyrand, that the First Consul would put no obstacle in the way of any arrangement which the Swiss might agree upon among themselves for the final settlement of their Government; he was therefore
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much surprised to learn soon afterwards that a change had taken place in the First Consul's sentiments, and his astonishment was completed when he found that the latter had taken so decided and so unfavourable a part in the business as that which is announced by a resolution published in yesterday's *Moniteur*, (which I have the honor to transmit inclosed,) in the form of an address to the inhabitants of Switzerland. This person having, besides this public declaration, acquired some private information of its being the First Consul's intention to give the most immediate and vigorous effect to it, lost no time in addressing a letter to the latter, in which he took the liberty of stating that he must have been deceived by false representations, that his interference in the affairs of Switzerland was, as he was authorised to say, entirely unsolicited by the majority and the best thinking part of the inhabitants, and that he had therefore to intreat of him, in the most earnest manner, to suspend the execution of his resolution until those explanations could take place which he trusted might be the means of preventing the immense effusion of blood which would otherwise inevitably ensue. He at the same time addressed himself in the course of yesterday to me, as well as to the Austrian and Spanish Ambassadors, and to the Russian and Prussian Ministers, (not having gained admittance to M. de Cobenzel, nor to M. de Markoff or Lucchesini, he afterwards wrote to them,) soliciting, in the strongest terms, an interference (jointly, if possible) on their part, with the French Government, to endeavour to avert the impending evil. I naturally observed to him in answer, that the present state of political relations between the great powers of Europe afforded no prospect of his obtaining of their Ministers at Paris to adopt a concerted measure in favour of the object which he had so much at heart, and that of course I could not take it individually upon myself, without any express instruction from my Government. He returned to me to-day, to acquaint me that he was not only as yet with-

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out a reply from any quarter, but had reason to fear that his prayers would not be listened to by the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Ministers; *he therefore conjured me to transmit them to his Majesty's Government, from whom only his countrymen could have a hope of deriving any assistance in the terrible conflict which he knew they were determined to stand, and which would only cease by the extermination of every virtuous and brave man in the country.* He then put into my hand a note, which he had drawn up in a hurry, and of which I inclose a copy. Whilst, my Lord, it was out of my power to give him any encouragement to expect from his Majesty's Government the assistance which his petition expresses, I have thought it my duty to lose no time in making you acquainted with a state of things which may shortly be attended with very important consequences.

Inclosure referred to in No. 16.—(Translation.)

NOTE.

So long as Switzerland was occupied by the French armies, the wishes of the people could never be freely manifested. The petty revolutions which took place in the government were the mere tricks of certain factions, in which the nation at large took but a very trifling interest. Scarcely did Switzerland think herself independent when she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes, and the arbitrary acts of the government furnished her with the means of doing so. Almost the whole of Switzerland, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, shook off the yoke. The cantons formed themselves into constituent bodies, and twelve of the thirteen cantons of Switzerland sent their representatives to the diet of Schwitz, in order there to organize a central power which might be acceptable to the neighbouring powers.

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The aristocratical cantons renounced their exclusive rights; the Pays de Vaud was left at liberty to form its own constitution, as well as Thurgovia and the other new cantons.

The government having taking refuge at Lausanne, was by no means secure there, notwithstanding its regular troops; perhaps even at the present moment it no longer exists.

Who would not have thought that according to the stipulation of the Treaty of Luneville, which grants independence to Switzerland and the right of choosing its own government, every thing was settled, and that this nation might see its former happiness and tranquillity revive?

Who could have thought that the First Consul would have issued such a decree as that of the 8th Vendémiaire?

Is an independent nation to be thus treated? Should Bonaparte persist in his determination, and the other powers should not interpose in our favour, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, although without hope of resistance, exhausted as we are by the Colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or to debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole Universe!

Will the Government of this generous nation, which has at all times afforded so many proofs of the interest it takes in the welfare of the Swiss, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide whether we are still to be ranked amongst *free people*?

We have only men left us:—the revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means; we are without arms, without ammunition, without stores, and without money to purchase them.

No. 17. Note Verbale.

Lord Hawkesbury has received his Majesty's commands to communicate, through M. Otto, to the French

French Government, the sentiments of deep regret which have been excited in his Majesty's mind by the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, which was published by authority in the *Moniteur* of the 1st instant, and by the representations which have been made to his Majesty on this subject, on behalf of the nation whose interests are so immediately affected by it. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the reestablishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

The cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as every other independent state, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has moreover, in the present instance, been formally and explicitly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the French Government in the Treaty of Luneville, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret his Majesty may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to controul that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights. His Majesty thinks himself called upon by his regard for the general interests of Europe, and by his peculiar solicitude for the happiness and welfare of the Swiss nation, to express these his sentiments with a frankness and sincerity which he feels to be due to his character, and to the good understanding which he is desirous of preserving with the Government of France.

Downing-street, October 10, 1802.

M. Otto, &c. &c. &c.

No.

No. 18.

SIR,

Downing-street, Oct. 10, 1802.

His Majesty having deemed it expedient, that a confidential person should be sent at the present moment to Switzerland, in consequence of the communication which he has received from the Swiss Confederacy, through their representative at Paris, I am commanded to inform you that he has made choice of you for that purpose.

It is of the utmost consequence, considering the nature of the business with which you are entrusted, that you should lose no time in taking your departure from hence, and that you should make every practicable exertion to arrive on the frontiers of Switzerland with as little delay as possible. You will inform yourself there what is the actual residence of the Government of the Swiss Confederation, to which you will immediately repair. Having taken the proper means to obtain a confidential interview with the persons who may be entrusted with the principal direction of affairs, you will communicate to them a copy of the Note Verbale which I delivered to M. Otto, and which is herewith inclosed; and you will take every opportunity of impressing upon their minds the deep interest which his Majesty takes in the success of their exertions. You will state to them, that his Majesty entertains hopes, that his representation to the French Government may have the effect of inducing the First Consul to abandon his intention of compelling the Swiss Nation by force to renounce that system of government under which they had so long prospered, and to which they appear to be almost unanimously anxious to return. In this event his Majesty will feel himself bound to abstain from all interference on his part; it being his earnest desire that the Swiss Nation should be left at liberty to regulate their own internal concerns, without the interposition of any foreign power. If, however, contrary to his Majesty's expectations, the French Government should

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persist

persist in the system of coercion announced in the proclamation of the First Consul, inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 1st instant, you will, in that case, inform yourself, by every means in your power, of the disposition of the people at large of the Swiss Confederacy, and particularly of those who have the direction of their affairs, and of those who possess the greatest share of influence amongst them, to persevere in the defence of their rights, and in the maintenance of the system they have adopted. You will likewise enquire into the means of defence of which they may be possessed, and of the probability of their being exerted with success. You will on no account encourage them to persevere in active measures of resistance which they are not themselves desirous to adopt, or which they may believe are unlikely to be ultimately effectual. If, however, you should find that the people of the Swiss Confederacy are generally determined to persevere in the maintenance of their independence, and of their right to return to their ancient system of government; and if you should be of opinion that from the union that subsists amongst the people, and from their zeal and enthusiasm in the cause in which they are engaged, they are finally resolved at all hazards to resist the threatened attempt of the French Government to interpose by force of arms in the settlement of their internal concerns; you will then immediately communicate, in confidence, to the Swiss Government, that either in the event of a French army having entered the country, or in the event of your having reason to be convinced that a French army is actually advancing for that purpose, his Majesty has authorised you to accede to their application for pecuniary succours.

I have furnished you with a cypher and decypher, that you may have it in your power to correspond with his Majesty's ministers at Vienna and Munich, if you should think it advisable; and as it is highly probable that the armies of the Swiss Confederacy may be inadequately supplied with arms, ammunition, or provisions,

sions, and may be desirous of procuring supplies thereof from the neighbouring countries, you will use your utmost endeavours to give them every facility for this purpose. You will be very particular in informing me of the numbers and situation of any Austrian corps in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, and of the probability of their advancing in any event into the Swiss territory.

As it is of great importance that his Majesty's Government should be regularly informed of the events which may be passing in Switzerland, and of the dispositions that may prevail there, you will endeavour to ascertain the most safe and expeditious mode of conveying your letters which will avoid their passing through any part of the French Republic.

As it is possible that previous to your arrival in Switzerland the present state of affairs may have undergone a decided alteration, either in consequence of the submission of the Swiss Cantons, or of any compromise having taken place as to their internal concerns, it will be proper that, in that case, you should take up your residence in such a situation as you may think most convenient in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, of which you will give me the earliest intelligence, and there wait for his Majesty's further orders.

I am, Sir, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Francis Moore, Esq.

No. 19.

MY LORD,

Constance, October 31, 1802.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I arrived here on the 27th instant, and that, having received this evening authentic information of the submission of the Diet of Switzerland, assembled at Schwitz, to the French arms, I lose no time in dispatching the messenger Shaw with this intelligence; from which your Lordship will perceive that it only re-

mains for me to obey that part of my instructions by which I am directed, under such circumstances, to take up my residence in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, and there to await his Majesty's further orders.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

FRA. MOORE.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c.

No. 20.

SIR,

Downing-street, November 25, 1802.

I have duly received your several letters by the messenger Shaw.

As from the present state of Switzerland your continuance in the vicinity of that country appears to be no longer necessary, you are at liberty to return to England as soon as it may suit your convenience.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

Francis Moore, Esq.

No. 21.

Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Liston to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Hague, 13th October 1802.

A few hours after I had sent off my last dispatch to your Lordship (on Saturday the 9th of this month), the French Ambassador, M. de Semonville, waited upon the President of the Government of State, and informed him that he had just received, by a Courier from Paris, orders to inform the government of this country,

“ Que le Premier Consul avoit appris, avec autant de surprise que d'indignation, que des personnes avides de révolutions vouloient de nouveau troubler le repos dans la Batavie, en abusant même pour cet effet de noms respectables; et que le Premier Consul, comme allié

allié de la republique, invitoit le gouvernement à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre des choses établi par la constitution."

These were nearly the words read to me by the Secretary of State, from a note in his own hand-writing, dictated to him by M. de Semonville, with a view to its publication (and a translation was accordingly inserted in the Dutch official paper of the Hague on the 11th); but they fall very far short of the language employed by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in his dispatches to the Ambassador, and in the communication made by him to the Dutch Charge d'Affaires at Paris (who also sent a messenger to the Hague upon this occasion). In these M. de Talleyrand entered into considerable detail on the subject of the plots supposed to be formed in this country against the administration, mentioned the names of the chiefs, and ended by making an offer, on the part of the First Consul, to come to the assistance of the government (should circumstances render it necessary) with all his forces.

No. 22.

MY LORD,

Hague, Oct. 29, 1802.

The recent attack made by Bonaparte upon the liberties and independence of the Swiss Cantons, has naturally made a strong impression on the inhabitants of this country; and the public anxiety has been much augmented by certain symptoms in the conduct of the consular government, which seem to indicate an intention not to withdraw the French troops, which have been kept in the Batavian Republic for some time past, under the title of *auxiliaries*, and paid and maintained at the expence of the Dutch nation.

These troops (amounting to between ten and eleven thousand men) were to remain here till the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty with Great Britain. It was afterwards formally promised on the part of France, that they should evacuate the territories of the republic,

lie, at the latest, on the expiration of the last French year (the 23d of September).—They accordingly began their march to the southward a few days before that period; and the government and the people rejoiced at the prospect of being finally relieved from a load which has become extremely irksome to them. But, on pretence that a great portion of the corps were to be embarked at Flushing for Louisiana, and that there was a want of shipping for their accommodation, they took up their quarters at the frontiers of the country (at Bois-le-Duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom), where they still remain; and demands have continued to be made for their pay and maintenance.

Hopes were, however, entertained, from day to day, that their departure would take place; when, to the astonishment of the Batavian Government, official notice was (last week) transmitted from France to the department of war at the Hague (which has been charged with the support of these corps), that the First Consul has been pleased to appoint a new commander in chief (General Montrichard), and a new staff, for the auxiliary troops in this country; and the notice was given that government might provide for the pay of the officers in question.

The administration appear resolved to oppose all the resistance in their power to this unexpected and oppressive extortion. An express has been sent off to the Dutch Ambassador at Paris, charging him to claim, in the most urgent terms, the accomplishment of the treaties subsisting between the two republics, and the fulfilment of the repeated and recent promises made by the French Government upon this subject. And in case of the failure of this application, they talk of addressing themselves to the principal powers of Europe who had any share or influence in the conclusion of the peace, to intreat their intervention and good offices, with a view to the maintenance of the independence of the republic.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT LISTON.

Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c.

No.

No. 23.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated November 30th, 1802.

His Majesty's government have learnt with some surprize from the communications from General Stuart, that that officer had signified to Colonel Sebastiani his inability to evacuate Egypt, until he should receive specific orders for that purpose. It is certainly true that no warrant has been transmitted to General Stuart, or to his predecessor the Earl of Cavan, for the evacuation of Egypt; neither was it considered to be necessary, inasmuch as his Majesty's government had already expressed their intention to General Stuart, in his instructions, that, except in a case of absolute necessity, the King's troops should remain in Egypt no longer than the month of July last. In all the instances of places which had been conquered by the King's forces, and of which possession had been taken in his Majesty's name, it has been usual when they have been restored to the French Republic, or its allies, that the commanding officer should be furnished with a regular warrant under the King's sign manual, authorising him to make such restoration. But the case of Egypt is different, as that country had never been taken possession of in his Majesty's name, as it had actually been restored to the Ottoman Porte, and as certain stations in it were continued to be occupied merely as military posts, until the means of removing the troops should be provided.

It is probable, that in the present instance, General Stuart may have been misled by a doubt as to the extent of his own power, and by the opinion that he required a warrant to evacuate Egypt, similar to that which had been granted to officers who superintended the restitution of conquests of which possession had been taken in his Majesty's name. In order, however, to obviate any farther difficulties, instructions have now been sent to General Stuart directing him to remove the King's troops from Egypt with as little delay as possible, and information has been given to this effect to General Andreossy.

No.

No. 24.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, July 20, 1802.

I have since renewed my applications to this government on the business of Malta, and have some reason to hope that some impression has been made on the mind of his Imperial Majesty. The French minister, however, has not yet received his instructions; and till they arrive, it will of course be impossible for me to take the requisite steps for bringing this affair to any satisfactory, or even positive issue.

No. 25.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, August 3, 1802.

I must not omit to acquaint your lordship, that although, in order to prevent any further waste of time, I have thought it right to endeavour to obtain a definitive explanation of the intentions of this court, with relation to the proposed guaranty, I have not yet been enabled to demand it officially, according to the terms of the treaty of Amiens, as the French minister here is still without instructions authorizing him to join with me in that instance.

No. 26.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Honourable A. Paget to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, 18th July 1802.

On the 15th instant, M. de Champagny and I met at a conference at the Vice Chancellor's, to whom we presented our respective notes, copies of which I have the honour to enclose, marked A. and B.

Inclosure

Inclosure A. referred to in No. 26.—(Translation.)

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, has the honour to transmit herewith to the vice-chancellor of court and state, a copy of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens. He has, at the same time, the honour to acquaint his excellency that he has received orders from his court to invite his majesty the emperor and king, conformable to the 13th paragraph of that article, to give his guarantee to the arrangements stipulated therein.

He therefore requests the vice-chancellor of court and state to lay this communication before his Imperial Majesty.

The undersigned avails himself, with pleasure, of this opportunity to reiterate to his excellency the expression of his most distinguished consideration.

(Signed)

ARTHUR PAGET.

Vienna, 15th July 1802.

Inclosure B. referred to in No. 26.—(Translation.)

The ambassador of the French republic, on the invitation which has been given him by Mr. Paget, his Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, hastens, in conjunction with that minister, to communicate to the vice-chancellor of court and state, the 10th Article of the treaty of Amiens, concerning the Order and island of Malta, the sixth paragraph of which article places the independency of the island of Malta under the guarantee of his Imperial majesty, and several other powers of Europe.

In taking this step, the ambassador, who has not received any orders respecting it, acts from the knowledge he has of the intention of his government to execute all the stipulations of the treaties it has concluded.

The ambassador seizes, with eagerness, this opportunity

tunity to offer to his excellency the assurances of his high consideration.

Vienne, 26 Messidor, year 10.

(Signed)

CHAMPAGNY.

Count Cobentzel.

No. 27.

Extract of a Dispatch from the Honourable A. Paget to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, 22d August 1802.

I have the honour herewith to transmit to your lordship the emperor's act of guarantee and accession to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

Inclosure referred to in No. 27.—(Translation.)

The emperor and king having been invited by his Britannic Majesty and the First Consul of the French republic to accede to the stipulations contained in the 10th article of the treaty concluded and signed at Amiens on the 29th of March 1802, (4th Germinal, year 10,) respecting the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; and also to take under his protection and guarantee, conjointly with the other powers cited in the sixth paragraph of the said article, whatever was therein especially stipulated on the subject of the island of Malta: and his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty having been at the same time informed that the two above mentioned powers adopted on their part the concert which had been entered into by the two imperial courts, previous to the exchange of the ratifications of the above-mentioned treaty of Amiens, to leave to the Pope the selection of a Grand Master from amongst the candidates nominated for that purpose by the Priorities of the Order: his Majesty the emperor and king, desirous on the present occasion of exhibiting a fresh proof of his sincere friendship for his Majesty the king of

of Great Britain, and for the First Consul of the French republic, has empowered and instructed his grand chamberlain and cabinet minister Count Francis of Colloredo, and his vice-chancellor of court and state Count Lewis of Cobenzel, to proceed in his name to the accession and guarantee of the stipulations of the tenth article of the afore-mentioned treaty; who, in virtue thereof, declare that his majesty accedes, by the present act, to the stipulations contained in this article, with the clause herein-before referred to, respecting the mode of the next election of the Grand Master of the Order; and his majesty specifically guarantees whatsoever is therein regulated, with regard to the independence of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.

In witness whereof we, the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty, have signed the present act of accession and of guarantee; have thereunto affixed the seal of our arms, and have exchanged it against the acts of acceptation, delivered in the Name of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, and of the First Consul of the French Republic. Which acts of accession, of guarantee, and of acceptation, shall be ratified in the space of four weeks, or sooner, if it can be done.

Done at Vienna, the 20th of August 1802.

(L. S.) FRANCIS COUNT OF COLLOREDO.

(L. S.) LEWIS COUNT OF COBENZEL.

No. 28.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, August 21, 1802.

Having opened the subject of your lordship's last dispatch, relative to the accession of this court to the arrangement stipulated in the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, to Mr. Bignon, this gentleman undertook very willingly to mention the same to his government,

and has in fact already performed his promise. In several conversations with Mr. Bignon, in which I have occasionally remarked that nothing had hitherto been said to me here upon the subject of Malta, he has constantly affected the greatest indifference, and treated it as a business of too little importance to occupy the attention of the French government.

No. 29.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, August 31, 1802.

Mr. Bignon received last night instructions from the French government, to invite the king of Prussia, conjointly with me, to accede to the guarantee of the independence of the island of Malta, and of the other stipulations relating to that island, which are contained in the tenth article of the definitive treaty of Amiens. Mr. Bignon sent to me immediately, and we propose to meet to-morrow for the purpose of preparing a note upon this subject, of which we shall each present a copy to Count Haugwitz.

No. 30.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, October 2, 1802.

My note upon the subject of the guarantee of Malta remains unanswered.

No. 31.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Jackson to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, November 25, 1802.

At my first interview with Count Haugwitz, I told him that the only subject in suspense between our two courts,

courts, to which I need call his immediate attention, was that of the guaranty of Malta, on which an answer is still due from him. He adverted to what he had told Mr. Casamajor of the king his master having ordered a report to be made to him on the state of the commanders in Silesia, hinting, that this country took a very slight interest in the fate of the island ; and that he was countenanced in withholding its guaranty *by the example of Spain*. He however added that the report in question had been made to the king, and that he only waited his majesty's commands to confer with me farther upon the subject.

No. 32.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Garlike to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, September 17, 1802.

The French minister has at length been directed by his government to make, conjointly with his majesty's minister here, a formal invitation to the Emperor of Russia for his imperial majesty's guaranty of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, which provide for the independance of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, and of the other arrangements of that article.

No. 33.

Extract of a Dispatch from Sir John Borlase Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, dated St. Petersburg, November 18, 1802.

On the 3d instant I waited upon the Chancellor with General Hedouville, when the note of invitation for his Imperial Majesty's guaranty of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens was presented by each of us.

General de Hedouville entered into various reasons to induce the Russian government to grant the guaranty ; the principal of which was to prove, that without

out the guaranty of Russia, either of the two powers, upon the first difference between them, would look upon themselves at liberty to seize upon the island, which was only important in a military point of view; and the only alteration he should make in his invitation was, that the island might be delivered up to the Neapolitan troops.—He added that the act of guaranty would not be considered as affecting the arrangement of any particular power with the Order, or of any alteration that power might wish to make in the baillages, or that part belonging to itself, *as Spain had already done.*

No. 34.

Extract of a Despatch from Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburg, 25th November, 1802.

The chancellor appointed yesterday evening for delivering to me, and to the French minister, the answer of the Russian government to his majesty's invitation for his Imperial Majesty's accession to the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens.

Inclosure referred to in No. 34.—(Translation.)

Conditions upon which his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias is willing to accede to the stipulations of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

I. The acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem over the island of Malta and its dependencies; the acknowledgement of the Grand Master, and of the civil government of the Order, according to its ancient institutions, with the admission into it of native Maltese. Upon this point, as well as upon every other that may relate to its interior organization, the legal government of the order shall have the power to enact and prescribe such regulations

lations as it may judge best calculated to promote the future welfare and prosperity of the Order.

II. The rights of the king of the Two Sicilies, as suzerain of the island, shall remain upon the same footing as they were previous to the war which is now terminated by the treaty of Amiens.

III. The independance and neutrality of the island of Malta, its ports and dependencies, shall be secured and guarantied by the respective contracting powers, who shall mutually engage to acknowledge and maintain that neutrality in all cases of war; whether between each other, or between any of them and any other power, not excepting his Sicilian Majesty, whose right of suzerainty shall not extend so as to enable him to cause a departure from the neutrality of the island, as guarantied by the present act.

IV. Until the Order shall be in a situation to provide, by its own resources, for the maintenance of its independance and neutrality, as secured by the preceding article, as well as for the defence of their principal residence, the different forts shall be occupied by his Sicilian Majesty's troops, who shall send a sufficient force for the defence of the island and its dependencies, the number of which shall be agreed upon by his said majesty and the two contracting powers, who shall take upon themselves conjointly the expence of maintaining the whole of the said troops, so long as the defence of the island shall continue to be intrusted to them, during which period the said troops shall be under the authority of the Grand Master of his government.

V. The present additional act shall be considered as forming an integral part of the treaty of Amiens, the same as if it had been inserted therein, word for word, and shall be executed in like manner.

VI. Their majesties the emperor of all the Russias, the emperor of the Romans, the king of Spain, the king of the Two Sicilies, and the king of Prussia, shall be invited to accede to this act as guarantees.

(Signed) COMTE ALEXANDRE DE WORONZOW.
No.

No. 35.

MY LORD,

Paris, January 27, 1803.

I have to report to your lordship the purport of a conversation I had on Tuesday last by appointment with M. Talleyrand. He had invited me some days ago for this purpose. The communication he had to make to me related to two points, both equally important, as he said, to the maintenance of good harmony between the two countries; with this difference, however, that the one originated with himself, and was dictated by his anxiety to do away every thing which might feed the mutual irritation of the two countries; and the other, by the express order of the First Consul. That which came from himself related to the English newspapers, against which he pronounced a most bitter philippic, assuring me that the First Consul was extremely hurt to find that his endeavours to conciliate had hitherto produce no other effect than to increase the abuse with which the papers in England continually loaded him. He expatiated much upon this topic, and endeavoured to establish a fact, which I assured him a reference to any one newspaper in Paris would instantly refute, that during four months not a word of provocation had appeared in any French journal, which could justify a retort from those published in England. For the rest, he advanced nothing but what has been said on more than one occasion to Mr. Merry, and reported by him to your lordship. I was however given to understand, that the First Consul was in fact highly incensed, and the more so, he was pleased to say, as it came from a country of whose good opinion he was so very ambitious.

In my reply, I could but go over the old ground, and endeavour to make M. Talleyrand understand—first, That whatever was said in the English papers might be considered but as a national retaliation for what was published in the French papers—secondly, that

that what was *officially* published here was by no means so in England—and thirdly, that although the government possessed a control over the press in France, the English government neither had nor could have, unless they purchased it at the same price, any whatever in England. Upon this he endeavoured to prove to me, that there were papers in England attached to different parties, and went over their names and supposed connections with great precision; and that consequently his majesty's ministers might so far control those at least which depended upon them, as to prevent their inserting that abuse which must be considered as having their sanction. I endeavoured to explain to him what the influence was, which he supposed ministers to possess in England; that it amounted to nothing more than a preference which your lordship, for instance, might give to one paper rather than to another, by sending to it any articles of news which it might be wished to make public; but that your lordship's influence went no farther; and that if the editor of such a paper conceived it more for his interest to continue to write after his own fancy and uncontrolled, than to be the publisher of such occasional articles, in that case all influence was at an end. I told him, that if he had remarked any abusive article in any paper of such a description, it was natural and fair to conclude that it did not depend upon government to prevent it. He persisted in his opinion, that his majesty's ministers might keep certain papers in order, as I did in assuring him, that until the First Consul could so far master his feelings as to be indifferent to the scurrillity of the English prints, as the English government was to that which daily appeared in the French, this state of irritation was irremediable. I told him, however, that I would report the substance of this communication to your lordship, although I could assure him that your lordship could add nothing to the explanation which had been given, and in such detail by Mr. Merry from your lordship.

M. Talleyrand, with great solemnity, required of me to inform him, and this by the express order of the First Consul, what were his Majesty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta. He again on this occasion made great professions of his sincere desire to set aside every thing which could interrupt the good understanding between the two governments; adding, that it was absolutely necessary that the French government should know what it was meant to do, when that clause in the treaty of Amiens, which stipulates the cession of Malta, should be fully accomplished. He said that another Grand Master would now be very soon elected; that all the powers of Europe invited so to do, with the exception of Russia, whose difficulties it was easy to remove, and without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, were ready to come forward; and that consequently the term would very soon arrive, when Great Britain could have no pretext for keeping longer possession. I informed him that I would report his conversation to your lordship, and would have the honor of communicating to him your lordship's answer as soon as I could receive it.

I have the honor to be, &c,

WHITWORTH,

Right Honorable Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 36.

MY LORD, Downing-street, February 9, 1803.

In answer to your excellency's dispatch of January 27, relative to the enquiry made of you, by the French Government, on the subject of Malta, I can have no difficulty in assuring you, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire, that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent

cedent Treaty of Convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and of the treaties of public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession, and of engagements, was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late Treaty of Peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in an official note by the French government, viz. that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the continent. This is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded with reference to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his Majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French Government in the general affairs of Europe, since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace; if the annexations which have been made to France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of the French Government, his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the Treaty of Peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as

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might

might be in his power, was willing to have waived the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the Definitive Treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect the true intent and spirit of the tenth article, the execution of which, according to its terms, had been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to control. A communication to your lordship would accordingly have been prepared conformably to this disposition, if the attention of his Majesty's Government had not been attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. It is impossible for his Majesty to view this report in any other light than as an official publication; for without referring particularly to explanations which have been repeatedly given upon the subject of publications in the *Moniteur*, the article in question, as it purports to be the report to the First Consul of an accredited agent, as it appears to have been signed by Colonel Sebastiani himself, and as it is published in the official paper, with an official title affixed to it, must be considered as authorized by the French Government. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter; insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would warrant his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction, which, on occasions of this nature, independent powers in a state of amity have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Peace concluded between his Majesty and the French Government; and his Majesty would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the honor of his crown, and to the interests of his dominions, if he could see with indifference such a system developed

developed and avowed. His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the conduct of the French Government on various occasions since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, the insinuations and charges contained in the report of Colonel Sebastiani, and the views which that report discloses, without feeling it necessary for him distinctly to declare, that it will be impossible for him to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanation on the subject of this communication.

Your excellency is desired to take an early opportunity of fully explaining his Majesty's sentiments as above stated to the French Government.

I have the honor to be, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 37.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, February 17, 1803.

I have the honor to acquaint your lordship, that I saw M. de Talleyrand on Tuesday last, for the purpose of carrying into effect your lordship's instructions of the 9th instant. I began by telling him that I had nothing new to communicate to him; but merely to confirm officially that which I had already from myself premised. I did not however pass over with the same indifference the arguments with which your lordship has furnished me. I recapitulated them all; the principle on which the Treaty of Amiens was founded; and the right which naturally arose from that principle, of interference on our part for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation, for any essential differences which may have arisen in the relative situation of the two countries. I instanced the cases, beginning with Italy and concluding with Switzerland, in which the territory or influence of France had been extended subsequent to the Treaty of Amiens.

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I represented to him that this principle of compensation had been fully and formally admitted by the French Government, in the course of the negotiation at Amiens. I then told him that notwithstanding the indisputable right which his Majesty might have derived of claiming some counterpoise for such acquisitions, instructions would have been given me, by which I should have been empowered to declare his Majesty's readiness to carry into effect the full intent of the tenth article of the treaty, if the attention of his Majesty's Government had not been roused by the official publication of Colonel Sebastiani's report to the First Consul. It was useless to recapitulate the particulars of this very extraordinary report ; but I appealed to him whether it was not of a nature, exclusive of the personal allusions it contained, to excite the utmost jealousy in the minds of his Majesty's Ministers, and to demand on their part every measure of precaution. I concluded with the distinct declaration, that it was impossible for his Majesty to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanations on the subject of the First Consul's views.

M. de Talleyrand in his reply, did not attempt to dispute the drift of my argument. He admitted, with an affected tone of candour, that the jealousy we felt on the score of Egypt, with a view to our possessions in India, was natural. But he could not admit that any thing had appeared in the conduct of the French government in justification of the alarm we expressed. After repeating what he had said to me in a former conversation on the subject of Sebastiani's mission, which he asserted to be *strictly commercial*, he expatiated at great length on the sincere desire of the First Consul to maintain inviolable the peace which had been so lately concluded ; adding, that the situation of the French finances was such, that were not this desire of peace in the First Consul an effect of system, it would be most imperiously dictated to him by the total impossibility in which this country found itself of carrying on that extensive state of warfare, which even a
partial

partial rupture would naturally lead to. He expressed great surprise, therefore, that any suspicion should attach, when the means of disturbing the public tranquillity were, as must be well known in England, so completely wanting; and desired to know what was the nature and degree of satisfaction which his Majesty would require. On this I told him, that I could not pretend to say by what means those apprehensions, which the conduct of this government had raised in England, were to be allayed; but I could assure him, that in the discussion of them, we should be animated solely by a sincere desire to be convinced of the truth of his assertions, since on that depended the peace and happiness of Europe. I took this opportunity of assuring him that although, according to his statement of the situation of France, we might possess in a greater degree the means of supporting the expence of a war, since those means arose from sources which even a state of warfare did not dry up, yet such was his Majesty's sincere desire of maintaining peace, that nothing but absolute and unavoidable necessity would ever induce him to deprive his subjects of the blessings which they begin to enjoy.

No. 38.

MY LORD,

Paris, February 21, 1803.

My last dispatch, in which I gave your Lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, was scarcely gone when I received a note from him, informing me that the First Consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at the Thuilleries at nine o'clock. He received me in his cabinet with tolerable cordiality, and after talking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the other side of the table, and began. He told me that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should, in the most clear and authentic manner, make known

known his sentiments to me, in order to their being communicated to his Majesty; and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself than through any medium whatever. He said that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him that the Treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was now avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue.

He now enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria as we were bound to do by the treaty. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and, of the two, he had rather see us in possession of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public prints; but this he said he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it was meant to excite this country against him and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who, instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this, he told me that two men had, within these few days, been apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the Bishop of Arras, by the Baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil, as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world.

He acknowledged that the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind (I make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions) which

which blew from England brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him.

He now went back to Egypt, and told me that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence for invading it. *This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it a colony, because he did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might perhaps be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.*

As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined to attempt by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed that after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea. He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him, but still he was determined to attempt it if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprize.

He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France with an army of four hundred and eighty thousand men; for to this amount it is, he said, *to be immediately completed*, all ready for the most

desperate enterprizes; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. Two such countries, by a proper understanding might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said that if he had not felt the enmity of the British Government on every occasion since the Treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities as well as in influence on the Continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British Government, and therefore it was now come to the point whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace, the Treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse in the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies, (alluding to Georges and persons of that description,) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary only to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the Treaty. He now made the tour of Europe, to prove to me that in its present state there was no power with which we could coalesce for the purpose of making war against France; consequently it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain, renew the war when circumstances were more favourable. He said it was not doing him justice to suppose that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression, neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war unless on good grounds. He said that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers, but he hoped that England, Russia, and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land than by plunder.

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In the little I said to him, (for he gave me in the course of two hours but very few opportunities of saying a word,) I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your Lordship's instructions. I urged them in the same manner as I had done to M. de Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as I could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the views of France towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance and jealousy. He maintained that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace was, on the one hand, the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other, the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt, with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with the approbation of all Europe, and more particularly of the Turks, who had repeatedly invited him to join with them for the purpose of forcing us to evacuate their territory.

I do not pretend to follow the arguments of the First Consul in detail: this would be impossible, from the vast variety of matter which he took occasion to introduce. His purpose was evidently to convince me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at the same time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he possessed of annoying us at home and abroad.

With regard to the mistrust and jealousy which he said constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, I observed, that after a war of such long duration, so full of rancour, and carried on in a manner of which history has no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of agitation should prevail: but this, like the swell after a storm, would gradually subside, if not kept up by the policy of either party; that I would not pretend to pronounce which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he complained, and which was still kept up, though with this difference, that in England it was independent of Government, and in France its very act and deed. To

this I added, that it must be admitted that we had such motives of mistrust against France as could not be alledged against us, and I was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the Treaty, when he interrupted me by saying, I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland; "*ce sont des bagatelles :*" and it must have been foreseen whilst the negotiation was pending; "*Vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler à cette heure.*" I then alledged as a cause of mistrust and of jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice, or any kind of redress, for any of his Majesty's subjects. He asked me in what respect; and I told him, that since the signing of the Treaty not one British claimant had been satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period; and that since I had been here, and I could say as much of my predecessors, not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innumerable representations which we had been under the necessity of making in favour of British subjects and property detained in the several ports of France and elsewhere, without even a shadow of justice: such an order of things, I said, was not made to inspire confidence; but, on the contrary, must create mistrust. This, he said, must be attributed to the natural difficulties attending such suits when both parties thought themselves right; but he denied that such delays could proceed from any disinclination to do what was just and right. With regard to the pensions which were granted to French or Swiss individuals, I observed that they were given as a reward for past services during the war, and most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as had been insinuated, of a nature repugnant to the feelings of every individual in England, and to the universally acknowledged loyalty and honour of the British Government. That as for any participation of indemnities, or other accessions which his Majesty might have obtained, I could take upon myself to assure him that his Majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve

preserve than to acquire. And that with regard to the most propitious moment for renewing hostilities, his Majesty, whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure as the greatest calamity : but that if his Majesty was so desirous of peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining allies ; and the less so, as those means which it might be necessary to afford such allies for, perhaps, inadequate services, would all be concentrated in England, and give a proportionate increase or energy to our own exertions.

At this part of the conversation he rose from his chair, and told me that he should give orders to General Andreossy to enter on the discussion of this business with your Lordship, but he wished that I should at the same time be made acquainted with his motives and convinced of his sincerity rather from himself than from his Ministers. He then, after a conversation of two hours, during the greatest part of which he talked incessantly, conversed for a few moments on indifferent subjects in apparent good humour, and retired.

Such was, nearly as I can recollect, the purport of this conference.

It must however be observed that he did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute Colonel Sebastiani's mission *to commercial motives only*, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view, by the infraction by us of the Treaty of Amiens.

I have the honor to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

P. S. This conversation took place on Friday last, and this morning I saw M. de Talleyrand. He had been with the First Consul after I left him, and he assured me that he had been very well satisfied with the frankness with which I had made my observations on what fell from him. I told him, that without entering into any farther detail, what I had said to the First Consul amounted to an assurance, of what I trusted there could

could be no doubt, of the readiness of his Majesty's Ministers to remove all subjects of discussion, where that could be done without violating the laws of the country, and to fulfil strictly the engagements which they had contracted, in as much as that could be reconciled with the safety of the state. As this applied to Malta and Egypt, he gave me to understand that a project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkish Empire would be so effectually secured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt, or any part of the Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain himself farther. Under these circumstances, no one can expect that we should relinquish that assurance which we have in hand, till something equally satisfactory is proposed and adopted.

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 39.

MY LORD, Downing-street, Feb. 18th, 1803.

Your Excellency's dispatch, of February 21st, has been received, and laid before the King.

I have great satisfaction in communicating to you his Majesty's entire approbation of the able and judicious manner in which you appear to have executed the instructions which I gave to you in my dispatch of the 9th instant.

The account you have given of your interview with the First Consul, is in every respect important.

It is unnecessary for me to remark on the tone and temper in which the sentiments of the First Consul appear to have been expressed, or to offer any observations in addition to those so properly made by your Excellency at the time, upon several of the topics which were brought forward by the First Consul in the course of

of your conversation ; I shall therefore content myself with referring your Excellency to my dispatch to Mr. Merry of August 28, 1802, in which the subject of the complaints of the French Government, respecting the freedom of the press, the emigrants, &c. are particularly discussed. I cannot however avoid noticing, that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction is stated to have been thrown out by the First Consul, in answer to the just representations and complaints of his Majesty, in consequence of the unwarrantable insinuations and charges contained in Colonel Sebastiani's report against his Majesty's Government,—the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and his army in that quarter ; but that, on the other hand, the language of the First Consul has tended to strengthen and confirm the suspicions which that publication was peculiarly calculated to excite.

I shall now proceed to give you some farther instructions on the language which it may be proper for you to hold respecting the charge which has been advanced against his Majesty's Government, of their unwillingness to fulfil the Treaty of Amiens. The Treaty of Amiens has been in a course of execution, on the part of his Majesty, in every article in which, according to the spirit of that treaty, it has been found capable of execution. There cannot be the least doubt that Egypt is at this time completely evacuated. The delay which had arisen in the evacuation of Alexandria, was owing to accidental circumstances, the particulars of which were explained to you in my dispatch of the 30th November last ; and I had every reason to believe, from the communication I had with General Andreossy on the subject, that the French Government were perfectly satisfied with the explanation which he was authorized at the time to give them respecting it.

With regard to that article of the treaty which relates to Malta, the stipulations contained in it (owing to circumstances which it was not in the power of his Majesty to controul), have not been found capable of execution.

execution. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished;—the silence of the court of Berlin with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guarantying power;—the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the Treaty to which the King of Spain was a party;—the declaration of the Portuguese Government of their intention to sequester the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories is restored to them;—the non-election of a Grand Master:—These circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island, until some new arrangement could be adjusted for its security and independence. But when it is considered how greatly the dominion, power, and influence of France have of late been extended, his Majesty must feel that he has an incontestible right, conformably to the principles on which the Treaty of Peace was negociated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make with a view of effecting the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct which his Majesty had determined to adopt, have received additional force from the views which have been recently and unreservedly manifested by the French Government, respecting the Turkish dominions, and the islands in the Adriatic (*and which have been in a great degree admitted by the First Consul, in his interview with your Excellency*)—views which are directly repugnant, not only to the spirit, but to the letter of the Treaty of Amiens.

From the postscript in your Excellency's letter, it appears that a project was in contemplation, by which, according to the declaration of Mr. Talleyrand, the integrity of the Turkish territory would be secured so as
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to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or to any other part of the Turkish dominions. His Majesty will consider the communication of such a project as indicating a disposition on the part of the French Government to afford him explanation and satisfaction respecting some of the points which have been the subject of his representations. But after all that has passed, his Majesty cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects, which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal.

I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 40.

MY LORD, Paris, 5th March, 1803.

I saw M. de Talleyrand yesterday, and acquitted myself of your lordship's instructions. I recapitulated the several arguments therein contained, dwelling particularly on the open avowal of the First Consul's views in Egypt; and concluding with the resolution of his Majesty not to withdraw his troops from Malta, until some security should be given, that, by so doing, his Majesty should not expose the safety of his own dominions.

He heard me with great patience, and in answer endeavoured, as before, to convince me that there was no reason whatever for the apprehensions which we entertained. That it was true, the acquisition of Egypt had been, and perhaps still was, a favorite object of the First Consul; but that it was not so much so as to allow him to go to war for its attainment.

I then told him that what had in a particular manner excited the attention of your lordship, in my last report,

port, was the assurance he had given me of some project being in contemplation, whereby the integrity of the Turkish Empire would be so insured, in all its parts, as to remove every doubt or apprehension. I begged him, therefore, to explain himself on this subject, which I conceived to be of the utmost importance; since it was only by such means that both parties could be satisfied. He then gave me to understand, that what he had termed a project was nothing more than what had been expressed in the First Consul's message to the Legislative Body, when he says, that there is a French ambassador at Constantinople, who is charged to give every assurance of the disposition of France to strengthen, instead of to weaken, that government. I expressed a doubt whether this or any other parole security would be considered as sufficient in such a transaction. Hereupon he repeated the question—What then is the security which you require, and which the First Consul can give? This, I told him, must be the subject of the negotiation on which we were willing to enter; and I trusted that the French government would bring into it the same temper, and the same real desire to conciliate, which was manifested by his Majesty's Ministers.

M. de Talleyrand now informed me, that the First Consul had, five or six days ago, ordered instructions to be sent to General Andreossy, by which he was to require an immediate and categorical answer to the plain question—Whether his Majesty would, or would not, cause Malta to be evacuated by the British troops? That he concluded this communication was already made, and that he expected to learn the result of it in a very few days; adding, that all the First Consul wanted was to know precisely on what he had to depend.

I could not help lamenting this precipitate measure, since it could answer no good purpose, and would only tend to introduce into the discussion ill-humour and offended dignity in the place of dispassionate reasoning.

I beg-

I begged him, however, to be prepared, and to prepare the First Consul, to meet with more opposition to his will than he had been accustomed to on similar occasions.

I told him, that his Majesty was willing to discuss the point in dispute with fairness and candour, but certainly never would be intimidated into acquiescence; and I repeatedly urged, that if he wished well to the peace of the two countries, he should prepare the First Consul for the consequences which might naturally be expected from this step, and thus prevent the effect of any sudden gust of ill-humour. He was unwilling to admit that there could be any chance of satisfying the First Consul short of a compliance with his wishes, founded, as he pretended, on good faith.

Our conversation ended here, and I wait the result of Gen. Andreossy's communication with the utmost impatience.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

P. S. In the interval between the writing and the transcribing the above dispatch, I have taken another opportunity of seeing M. de Talleyrand, and I am glad to find, that (for what purpose I know not) he had represented the instructions to General Andreossy as much more absolute and offensive than they really are. I found him to-day entirely disposed to give me another opinion, and to convince me that the First Consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous to discuss fairly and without passion a point which, he admitted, was of importance to both countries. He repeatedly assured me, that much as the First Consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace; and henceforth seek to augment his glory, by improving and consolidating the internal situation of the country, rather than by adding to its possessions.

(Signed)

W.

Right Honorable Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c.

Note from General Andreossy to Lord Hawkesbury, dated March 10, 1803.—Translation.

The undersigned ambassador and minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic to his Britannic Majesty, had received from the First Consul express orders to require from the British Government some explanations respecting the protracted occupation of the island of Malta by the English troops. He had hoped that verbal communications would have been sufficient to have produced satisfactory expositions, by preparing the way for the mutual conciliation of minds and interests, a conduct which has been prescribed to him by his ardent zeal for the maintenance of harmony between the two countries, and of the peace of Europe, objects of the solicitude of the French government: but the undersigned thinks he can no longer delay complying with the instructions he had received, and he has therefore the honour of addressing the following observations to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, which recal to recollection the spirit and the leading features of the verbal communications which he has previously made to him.

By the conditions of the fourth paragraph of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate the island of Malta and its dependencies three months after the exchange of the ratifications.

Ten months have elapsed since the ratifications have been exchanged, and the English troops are still at Malta.

The French troops on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan and Papal States, have not waited the expiration of the three months which were granted to them to withdraw, and have quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had re-established, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon.

What can be alleged in justification of the delay in evacuating Malta? Has not the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens provided for every thing? And the
Neapolitan

Neapolitan troops being arrived, under what pretext do those of England still remain there?

Is it because all the powers enumerated in the 6th paragraph have not yet accepted the guaranty which is devolved upon them? But this is not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the island; and besides, Austria has already sent its act of guaranty; Russia itself has made only a single difficulty, which is done away by the accession of the First Consul to the modifications proposed, unless indeed England itself throws obstacles in the way, by refusing to accede to the proposals of Russia, which after all could not affect the engagements of his Britannic Majesty, who, according to the express conditions of the treaty, is to evacuate the island of Malta within three months, placing it under the guard of the Neapolitans, who are to garrison it until the definitive arrangements of the order are settled.

It should therefore seem impossible, and it would be without example in the history of nations, were his Britannic Majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification, of the very one, which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point.

Indeed the First Consul, who cordially relies on the intentions of his Britannic Majesty, and cannot suppose them to be less open and generous than those with which he is animated, has hitherto been unwilling to attribute the delay of the evacuation of the island of Malta to any other than to maritime circumstances.

The undersigned is, therefore, charged to require explanations on this point, and he is persuaded that the British ministry will be the more anxious to furnish such as will be satisfactory, as they must be sensible how necessary they are for the maintenance of harmony, and how important they are for the honour of the two nations.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to
renew

renew to Lord Hawkesbury the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) F. ANDREOSSY.
Portland Place, 10th March, 1803.

No. 42.

MY LORD,

Paris, March 12, 1803.

The messenger Mason arrived yesterday morning early, with your Lordship's letter of the 7th, informing me, that in consequence of the preparations in the ports of France and Holland, which, though avowedly intended for colonial service, might, in the event of a rupture, be turned against some part of the British dominions, his Majesty had judged it expedient to send a message to both Houses of Parliament, recommending, in terms void of offence, the adoption of such measures as may be consistent with the honour of his crown, and the security of his dominions, and at the same time such as will manifest his Majesty's disposition for the preservation of peace.

I beg leave to return your Lordship my thanks for having apprized me of this circumstance by a special messenger; I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was just setting out to communicate it to the First Consul, and appeared under considerable agitation. He returned with me to his cabinet, and though he told he was pressed for time, he suffered me to relate the circumstance without interruption. I endeavoured to make him sensible that this measure was merely precautionary, and not in the least degree intended as a menace. I concluded my observations by repeating that it was merely a measure of self security, founded on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, remarking at the same time, that had not even these armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumstance of the First Consul's determination to augment so considerably

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bly his army in time of peace, would have been a full and sufficient motive for such a measure of precaution.

M. de Talleyrand now informed me that he was already acquainted with the business ; that a messenger had that morning arrived, who had brought him a copy of the message, which he communicated to me. I could draw from him no reply whatever to my observations. He confined himself strictly to the assurance which he has so repeatedly made, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by his Majesty's Ministers ; that the First Consul was pacific ; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his Majesty's dominions, unless forced to do so by a commencement of hostilities on our part ; that he should always consider the *refusal to evacuate Malta as such a commencement of hostilities* ; and that as we had hitherto hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures which might eventually be necessary. He disclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other destination than to the colonies ; and concluded, that for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of his Majesty's Government.

He then desired leave to go to the First Consul, promising that he would let me know the result when we met at dinner at the Prussian Minister's. He did not come there till near seven o'clock, and when we rose from dinner, he took me aside, and informed me, that although the First Consul had been highly irritated at the unjust suspicion which his Majesty's Government entertained, yet he would not allow himself to be so far mastered by his feelings, as to lose sight of the calamities which the present discussion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much on this topic, and explained the measures to which he should be obliged to resort ; he said, that if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same ; that if England prepared for war, he would do the same ; and that if England should

should finally determine on hostilities, he trusted to the support of the French nation in the cause of honour and of justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not wish for war; that peace was as necessary to us as it could be to France; that all we desired, and all that we were contending for, was security; that every thing proved to us that that security was threatened by the First Consul's views on Egypt; and that consequently our refusal to evacuate Malta was become as much a necessary measure of precaution, as the defence of any part of his Majesty's dominions. To this kind of reasoning M. de Talleyrand opposed the moderation of the First Consul, his great self denial, and his determination to sacrifice even the most favourite points to his sincere desire to avoid a rupture.

M. de Talleyrand now told me, that, in order to facilitate my communication of the First Consul's sentiments, he would communicate to me a paper which he had that morning drawn up with him; that it was not to be considered as any thing absolutely official; that it was a memorandum to assist me, but such as I might, if I chose, transmit to your lordship. I now inclose it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH

The Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

Note Verbale referred to in No. 42.—(Translation.)

I. If his Britannic Majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetsluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his Majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.

II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, *it is natural* that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.

III.

III. These troops being once in the country, *it is natural* that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position.

IV. *It is natural* that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

V. It is likewise *in the nature of things*, that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

VI. It is also *the natural consequence of all this*, that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.

VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important, as cannot fail to agitate all Europe.

The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English armaments, and nevertheless every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms.

The experience of nations, and the course of events prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote.

As to the differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic Majesty's message, we know not of any



any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined that a serious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament. Europe well knows that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her.

No. 43.

MY LORD,

Paris, March 14, 1803.

The messenger Mason went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and until yesterday, Sunday, I saw no one likely to give me any farther information such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his Majesty's message had produced on the First Consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war. No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace—*Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.—As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, c'en est déjà trop.—Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez...* I told him, that was very far from his Majesty's intentions.—He then proceeded to Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, *les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'épée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectant pas les traités. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crepe noir.—*He then went his round. In a few minutes he came back to me, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again—*Pourquoi des armemens? Contre qui des mesures de précaution? Je n'ai pas*

pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-être tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider.—On ne voudroit, said I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle.—Il faut donc respecter les traités, replied he; malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités; ils en seront responsable à toute l'Europe.—He was too much agitated to make it adviseable for me to prolong the conversation; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase.

It is to be remarked, that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people who were present, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion.

I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to Mr. Talleyrand on this subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 44.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March 15, 1803.

I send your excellency a copy of the note presented to me by General Andreossy on the 10th instant *, and a copy of the answer which I have this day by his majesty's commands returned to it.

* Vide page 92.

No. 45.—NOTE.

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the king the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant.

In obeying the commands of his majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given on more than one occasion by himself verbally to General Andreossi, and by Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French ambassador, that his majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negociated with reference to the actual *state of possession* of the different parties, and to the *Treaties* or *public engagements* by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession and of engagements was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negociation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specially agreed to, in an official note, by the French government, namely, *That his Majesty should*

should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisition of territory made by France upon the continent. That is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded in relation to the then existing state of things ; for the measure of his majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time ; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe since that period ; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guarantied by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace ; if the acquisitions which have been made by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of France, his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature ; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect an arrangement conformable to the true intent and spirit of the tenth article ; the execution of that arrangement, according to its terms, having been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to control. Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and forbearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in conformity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's government ; against the
officer

officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter: insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would have warranted his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction which, on occasions of this nature, independent powers, in a state of amity, have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his Majesty and the French government. His Majesty's ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed to make such a representation to the French government as his Majesty felt to be called for by imputations of the nature above described, by the disclosure of purposes inconsistent with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his people; and as a claim had recently been made by the French government on the subject of the evacuation of Malta, Lord Whitworth was instructed to accompany this representation by a declaration on the part of his Majesty, that before he could enter into any farther discussions relative to that island, it was expected that satisfactory explanations should be given upon the various points respecting which his Majesty had complained. This representation and this claim, founded on principles incontestably just, and couched in terms the most temperate, appear to have been wholly disregarded by the French government; no satisfaction has been afforded, no explanation whatever has been given; but on the contrary, his Majesty's suspicions of the views of the French government with respect to the Turkish empire have been confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events. Under these circumstances his Majesty feels that he has no alternative, and that a just regard to his own honour and to the interests of his people, makes it necessary for him to declare, that he cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of

Malta,

Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal.

With respect to several of the positions stated in the note, and grounded on the idea of the tenth article being executed in its literal sense, they call for some observations. By the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, the island of Malta was to be restored by his Majesty to the Order of St. John, upon certain conditions. The evacuation of the island, at a specified period, formed a part of these conditions; and if the other stipulations had been in a due course of execution, his Majesty would have been bound, by the terms of the treaty, to have ordered his forces to evacuate the island: but these conditions must be considered as being all of equal effect; and if any material parts of them should have been found incapable of execution, or if the execution of them should from any circumstances have been retarded, his Majesty would be warranted in deferring the evacuation of the island until such time as the other conditions of the article could be effected; or until some new arrangement could be concluded which should be judged satisfactory by the contracting parties. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished; the silence of the court of Berlin, with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guarantying power; the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty to which the king of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese government, of their intention to sequester the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories was restored to them:—these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island. The evacuation of Tarentum and Brundisium is in no respect connected

nected with that of Malta. The French government were bound to evacuate the kingdom of Naples by their treaty of peace with the king of Naples, at a period antecedent to that at which this stipulation was carried into effect.

The French government were bound likewise, by engagements with the emperor of Russia, to respect the independence of the kingdom of Naples; but even admitting that the departure of the French troops from Tarentum depended solely on the article of the treaty of Amiens, their departure is, by the terms of the treaty, to take place at the same period as the other evacuations in Europe; namely, one month after the ratification of the definitive treaty; at which period both Porto Ferrajo and Minorca were evacuated by his Majesty's forces; whereas the troops of his majesty were in no case bound to evacuate the island of Malta antecedent to the period of three months after the ratification of the definitive treaty; and even in that event, it must be considered as depending upon the other parts of the arrangement being in a course of execution. With respect to the assertion in the note, that the Neapolitan troops were to form the garrison of Malta until the period when the arrangements relative to the Order could be carried into effect, it will appear, by a reference to the article, that by the preliminary paragraph, the island was to be restored to the Order upon the condition of the succeeding stipulations, and that it was only from the period when the restitution to the Order had actually taken place, that by the 12th paragraph the Neapolitan troops were to form a part of the garrison.

The undersigned has thus stated, with all the frankness which the importance of the subject appears to require, the sentiments of his Majesty on the note delivered to him by General Andreossy, and on the points in discussion between the two countries.

His Majesty is willing to indulge the hope, that the conduct of the French government on this occasion may

may be influenced by principles similar to those which have invariably influenced his own. That as far as possible all causes of distrust, and every impediment to a good understanding between the two countries, may be completely and effectually removed, and that the peace may be consolidated on a secure and lasting foundation.

The undersigned requests General Andreossy to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Downing-street, March 15, 1803.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency General Andreossy,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 46.

MY LORD,

Paris, March 17, 1803.

I called yesterday on M. de Talleyrand, to converse with him on the subject of what had passed on Sunday last at the Thuilleries. He had been since that day so fully occupied with his expeditions to different foreign courts, that I had no opportunity of seeing him sooner. I told him, that I had been placed by the First Consul in a situation which could neither suit my public nor my private feelings. That I went to the Thuilleries to pay my respects to the First Consul, and to present my countrymen, but not to treat of political subjects; and that unless I had the assurance from him that I should not be exposed to a repetition of the same disagreeable circumstances, I should be under the necessity of discontinuing my visits to the Thuilleries. M. de Talleyrand assured me, that it was very far from the First Consul's intention to distress me; but he had felt himself personally insulted by the charges which were brought against him by the English government; *and that it was incumbent upon him to take the first opportunity of exculpating himself in the presence of the*
ministers

Ministers of the different powers of Europe. He assured me that nothing similar would occur.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 47.

MY LORD,

Paris, March 18, 1803.

I received your lordship's dispatch, with its inclosure, this morning early; and I learnt at the same time that a messenger had arrived from General Andreossy to M. de Talleyrand; shortly after, M. de Talleyrand sent to desire I would call upon him, which I accordingly did. He told me that he had not only received your lordship's note to the French ambassador, but also the sentiments of the First Consul upon it, which he was desirous to communicate to me, before he re-dispatched the messenger. This he did, and I refer your lordship to the communication which General Andreossy will make, according to his instructions, without loss of time.

From the tenor of this note, it appears that this government is not desirous to proceed to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared so to do; and therefore it expresses a willingness to enter on the discussion of the point, which appears according to their conception, or rather to the interpretation they choose to give to it, the most material. This of course is the safety of Egypt. On this the First Consul declares in the note, as M. Talleyrand did repeatedly to me, that he would be willing to enter into any engagement, by which such a security as would fully quiet our apprehensions, might be given on the part of the French government. On the subject of Malta, the First Consul maintains that he cannot listen to any compromise; with regard to Egypt, he is willing to enter into any engagement which may be thought sufficient.

I told

I told him that he had departed from the letter and the sense of your lordship's note, by confining the question to Malta alone. That note had comprehended other most important considerations. That the best method of bringing the discussion to a speedy conclusion, such as his Majesty's government appeared to wish, was to take it up on a broader scale. But that at the same time his Majesty's government would not refuse to lend itself to any thing reasonable which might be suggested. There was however, I told him, one distinction to be made in the situation of the two governments, in the discussion of this question. By our possession of Malta, France was not threatened; but the reverse was the case, should the access to Egypt be opened by its evacuation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

The Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 48.

MY LORD, Downing-street, March 22, 1803.

Your Excellency's several dispatches to No. 26 inclusive, have been received and laid before the King.

With respect to the subject of your Excellency's dispatch of March 14, I have it in command to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you take the earliest opportunity to represent to Monsieur de Talleyrand the surprise with which his Majesty has learnt the conduct which the First Consul had observed towards your Excellency in the instance to which that dispatch refers; and you will add, that as his Majesty has a right to expect that his Ambassador should be treated with the respect and attention due to the dignity of the Sovereign whom he represents, it will be impossible for you to present yourself on any days of ceremony to the First Consul, unless you receive an assurance that you

will never be exposed to a repetition of the treatment which you experienced on the occasion.

Although your Excellency appears to have anticipated this instruction in one of your most recent conversations with Monsieur de Talleyrand, I nevertheless think it right to enable your Excellency to state to that Minister the sense which the King entertains of this transaction.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K.B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 49.

MY LORD, Downing-street, April 3, 1803.

I inclose to your Excellency, for your information, copies of the official Note delivered to me on the 29th ultimo by General Andreossy, and of the answer which, by his Majesty's command, I this day returned to that communication.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K.B.

&c. &c. &c.

(Translation of inclosure referred to in No. 49.)

The undersigned General of Division, Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary from the French Republic, has laid before his Government the Note addressed to him by his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury. He has received orders to make the following answer to the observations therein contained.

The object of this Note appears to be to explain his Britannic Majesty's message; and to give some elucidations which had been demanded respecting the execution of the Treaty of Amiens.

The

The First Consul will not make any complaint relative to the extraordinary and unexpected assertions of this act issued by his Britannic Majesty. Not one of them is founded.

His Britannic Majesty believes that his kingdom is menaced by preparations made in the ports of Holland and France. He has been deceived: The First Consul has made no preparation.

There were at the time of the message but two frigates in the roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the roads of Dunkirk.

How can his Britannic Majesty's Ministers have been deceived on facts so evident? His Britannic Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and at the Hague have seriously to reproach themselves, if they have credited information so evidently false, and if they did not foresee that they thereby exposed their Government to err in the most important deliberations.

Was is not conformable to the usage practised among nations, first to demand explanations, and thus to take means for being convinced of the falshood of the intelligence which the Ministers might have received? Must not the least effects of the omission of this practice be, to bring on the ruin of families, and carry confusion, uncertainty, and disorder into all the commercial affairs of both nations? The First Consul knows, both from his own sentiments, and judging of other people by the French, that a great nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy and the feelings of true dignity ever inspire the sentiment of esteem for a rival nation, and never the design of menacing her. A great nation may be destroyed, but not intimidated.

The second part of his Majesty's message consists of another assertion no better founded. His Britannic Majesty makes mention of discussions, the success of which is doubtful. What are these discussions? What official notes, what protocole prove the opening, the progress, the vicissitudes of a debate? Can a state of difficulties, which leads to an alternative of peace or
war,

war, spring up unawares without commencement, without progression, and lead without distinction to an appeal to arms before all the means of conciliation have been exhausted.

In this case, the appeal has been publicly made before it could be known that there was room for misunderstanding. The termination of the discussions were announced before they had begun. The issue of a difficult discussion has been declared before it arose. What would Europe, what would both nations think, if they knew that these discussions, announced by his Britannic Majesty as so difficult to terminate, were unknown to the French Government; and that the First Consul, on reading the message, could not comprehend the meaning of either of the declarations therein contained.

He has also abstained from any ostensible step; and whatever may have been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which have taken place in England since that message, he has given no orders, he has made no dispositions, no preparations. He places his glory in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state. He will continue in this system of honest frankness, until his Britannic Majesty has reflected fully on the part he proposes to take.

In Lord Hawkesbury's Note, an opinion is expressed, that the French Republic has increased in power since the Peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch, France has evacuated a considerable territory. The French power has received no degree of augmentation. If his Britannic Majesty is determined to make war, he may allege all the pretexts he pleases. He will find few less founded.

As to the complaints made respecting the publications which may have appeared in France, they are of an order too secondary to be capable of influencing such a decision. Are we then returned to the age of tournaments? Motives of this nature might have authorized,

thorized, four centuries ago, the combat of thirties; but they cannot, in this age, be a reason for war between the two countries.

It might suffice in this respect to reply to his Excellency, that no representation has been made by him on the subject to the government of the Republic; and that, if it was but justice to grant satisfaction, the First Consul had a right to expect that which was required by M. Otto, in his Note of the 22d Thermidor last, upon grounds more serious and more just.

Is it possible that the English Ministry can have been ignorant, that ever since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens the English press has not ceased to spread through Europe the rage of war, the discredit of peace, and shameless and boundless outrages against every thing which is the object of the love and veneration of the French people?

A few days after the ratification of peace, one of his Britannic Majesty's Ministers declared that the peace establishment must be considerable; and the distrust excited by this declaration made in Parliament with as much bitterness as impropriety, furnished a commentary for the exaggeration and alarms which were circulated in despicable pamphlets, and in newspapers as contemptible as those libels. Since that time, these writers have found themselves invariably supported in their insolent observations by particular phrases taken from the speeches of some leading Members of Parliament. These speeches, scarcely to be exceeded by the newswriters themselves, have, for these eighteen months, tended to encourage insult against other governments to that degree, that every European must be offended, every reasonable Englishman must be humiliated, by such unheard-of licentiousness.

What if we connect with these sallies, proceedings more offensive and serious; the indulgence granted to French criminals publishing daily outrages in the French language; the still more inexcusable toleration extended to villains covered with crimes, and plotting

ting assassinations incessantly, such as Georges, who still continues to reside at London protected, and having a considerable establishment; in a word, the little justice which has been shewn to all our representations—How are we to account for the publicity of the complaint which his Britannic Majesty has thought proper to make respecting some indefinite wrongs which he has hitherto thought unnecessary to bring before the First Consul?

The First Consul has had cause to be convinced that all his representations on all these points were useless, and that his Britannic Majesty, regardless of the neighbouring powers, was resolved to authorise every thing within his dominions; but he did not on that account entertain a doubt of the continuance of peace, nor alarm Europe with the notification of war. He confined himself to this principle of conduct, to permit or to prevent in France, with respect to England, whatever should be permitted or prevented in England with regard to France.

He has, however, expressed, and he again expresses his wish, that means should be adopted to prevent in future any mention being made of what is passing in England, either in the official discussions or in the polemical writings in France, as in like manner in the French official discussions and polemical writings no mention whatever should be made of what is passing in England.

Lord Hawkesbury mentions an article in a newspaper containing the report of a French Colonel. In serious discussions an answer on this point might be dispensed with; but it is neither a long nor difficult matter.

A Colonel in the English army has published a work in England, filled with the most atrocious and disgusting calumnies against the French army and its General. The lies it contains have been contradicted by the reception which Colonel Sebastiani experienced. The publicity of his report was at once a refutation and a reparation which the French army had a right to expect. On his arrival in Egypt this officer, to his great astonishment,

nishment, found the English army there, although they should have evacuated it, and the Turks prodigiously alarmed at the continuance of the English army, and at its relations with the natives in rebellion and open revolt against the Sublime Porte.

He must have conceived that the treaties which connect us with the Porte, and by which we have guaranteed to it the integrity of its possessions, compelled us to unite ourselves with that power. It was natural to think that England meant to declare war from the instant she refused to execute the articles of the Treaty. For after all France is not reduced to such a state of debasement as to suffer Treaties made with her to be executed or not at pleasure.

Hence the researches made by this officer, as to the forces which were in Egypt, and as to the position occupied by the English army.

But Egypt has since been restored to the dominion of its lawful Sovereign, and the idea of a rupture between the two nations, on account of the engagement contracted with the Porte, no longer exists.

There remains, therefore, but one object worthy of fixing the attention of the two nations. The execution of the Treaty of Amiens as far as concerns Malta. His Majesty has engaged to restore it to the Order, and to entrust it to the Neapolitan army till the Order should be in a condition to guard it. His Majesty will reject all sophistry, every distinction, every mental reservation which might be offered to him, to put in doubt the force and the validity of his engagement. His Britannic Majesty's equity, his conscience in this respect, are guarantees for the French Republic. Were it otherwise, what means in future would the two nations have for coming to an understanding? Would not all be chaos? This would indeed be adding another calamity to those which have menaced social order.

The undersigned is directed to declare, in short, that the First Consul will not take up the defiance of war given by England to France; that as to Malta, he sees

no subject for discussion, the Treaty having provided for every thing, and settled every thing.

The undersigned has the honor, &c.

(Signed)

F. ANDREOSSY.

Portland Place, 8 Germinal, year 11.

(29 March, 1803.)

(Inclosure referred to in No. 49.)

The undersigned, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for foreign affairs, has laid before the King the note of his Excellency General Andreossy of the 29th of last month.

His Majesty has been induced, by that spirit of moderation and forbearance which have invariably governed his conduct in every part of his communications with the French Government, to abstain from making many observations which the perusal of this note may naturally have suggested to his mind.

His Majesty has perceived with great regret that the French Government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained; and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of his representations, they persist in their requisition that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces.

His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself and to his people as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding; he has therefore judged it expedient to give instructions to his Ambassador at Paris to ascertain distinctly from the French Government whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which his Majesty has complained; or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanations upon the present state of affairs, as may lead to an arrangement which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two Governments.

Governments. It is his Majesty's anxious desire that by this mode of proceeding an end may be put to that state of suspense and irritation which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries; and that the two Governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity.

The undersigned requests General Andreossi to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

HAWKESBURY.

Downing-street, April 3d, 1803.

His Excellency General Andreossy,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 50.

MY LORD, Downing-street, April 4, 1803.

It is become essential, that the discussions which have been for some time subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government should be brought to an issue within as short a time as is consistent with the deliberation which must be given to objects of so much importance.

The last note presented by Gen. Andreossy, in the name of his Government, in answer to my note of the 15th of last month, evades all explanation, and even all discussion, of the points on which complaint has been made by his Majesty.

If the French Government should seriously intend to persist in this course of proceeding, there can be no hopes of a successful termination to the present negotiation. It is important, therefore, that you should ascertain distinctly, in the first instance, whether they are disposed to enter into explanation on the points on which his Majesty has complained, and to come to such an arrangement as may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two countries; and for this purpose you will present a note to the

effect of that which is herewith inclosed. It is possible that the French Government may continue to evade all discussion on the points in question, and confine themselves to a categorical demand, that Malta should be immediately evacuated. In that case, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should declare the impossibility of the relations of amity continuing to subsist between the two countries, and the necessity you will be under of leaving Paris within a certain time. But if, on the other hand, they should shew a readiness to enter into discussion, and to give reasonable satisfaction and explanation, it is important that you should be informed, without loss of time, of the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, as to what might be considered an equitable adjustment of the differences between the two governments at this moment.

I have, therefore, by his Majesty's command, inclosed the project of an arrangement, which, under the present circumstances, would meet the ideas of his Majesty's Government; which would afford security for those objects which are considered as endangered by the unequivocal disclosure of the views of the First Consul, and which, at the same time, might entirely save the honour of the French Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY,

His Excellency Lord Whitworth,
&c. &c.

First inclosure referred to in No. 50.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary, has received the orders of his court to make the following communication to the French Government.

His Majesty has perceived, with great regret, that the French Government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained, and that at the time when they evade all discussion

discussion on the subject of his representations, they persist in their requisition that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces. His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself, and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding. He has therefore commanded the undersigned to ascertain distinctly from the French Government, whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation upon the points on which his Majesty has complained, or whether they are disposed without delay to give such satisfaction and explanation upon the present state of affairs, as may lead to an arrangement which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two governments.

It is his Majesty's anxious desire that by adopting this mode of proceeding, an end may be put to that state of suspense and uncertainty which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries; and that the two governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Second inclosure referred to in No. 50.

Heads of an arrangement to be concluded by treaty or convention between his Majesty and the French Government.

Malta to remain in perpetuity in the possession of his Majesty. The Knights of the order of St. John to be indemnified by his Majesty for any losses of property which they may sustain in consequence of such an arrangement.

Holland and Switzerland to be evacuated by the French troops.

The island of Elba to be confirmed by his Majesty to France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged.

The Italian and Ligurian Republics to be acknowledged

ledged by his Majesty, provided an arrangement is made in Italy for the King of Sardinia, which shall be satisfactory to him.

No. 51.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 7, 1803.

I received your Lordship's dispatches of the 4th instant by the messenger Wagstaff, with their inclosures, yesterday evening; and shall probably in the course of the day have an opportunity of communicating to M. de Talleyrand the note, which I shall translate for that purpose.

No. 52.

MY LORD, Paris, April 7, 1803.

Since writing the preceding dispatch, I have seen M. de Talleyrand, and communicated to him the inclosed note, which I trust your Lordship will find as close a translation as possible of that which I received from your Lordship. He read it over with much attention, and when he had done he appeared to be in expectation of some other communication. Upon desiring he would explain himself, he said, that he was in hopes I should have furnished him with the heads of those points, on which it was affirmed in the note that the French Government had so repeatedly refused all explanation and satisfaction. I told him that it would have been entirely useless to repeat what had been so often urged in vain; that he could not but know that the explanation required, referred to the conduct of the French Government, and the system of aggrandisement which it had constantly pursued since the conclusion and in direct violation of the Treaty of Amiens, founded, as it indisputably was, on the state of possession of the two countries at the time; that with regard to the satisfaction, it evidently referred to the unjustifiable insinuations

sinuations and charges against his Majesty's Government, against the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter, contained in the official report of Colonel Sebastiani. He was by no means disposed to admit that either of these cases could justify the assertion of the French Government having refused explanation and satisfaction, on the ground that no notice had been taken of these transactions but in a very cursory manner; nor had any explanation ever been required as to any particular transaction whether in Italy or elsewhere, and if it had, it would immediately have been given; and that the language of Colonel Sebastiani was not to be put in any comparison with that used by Major Wilson, in his account of the campaign of Egypt. I urged the difference of a common publication like that to which he alluded, and a report to the First Consul published by him in his official paper. On this occasion, M. de Talleyrand was disposed to call in question the authenticity of the *Moniteur*. In short, the most ungrounded assertions were substituted for arguments; and amongst these, I cannot but place that so often repeated of the First Consul's having entirely given up all idea whatever of Egypt, consequently we could have no pretext for retaining Malta.

He assured me for the rest, that he would communicate it this evening to the First Consul, and that tomorrow he should in all probability have a communication to make in return.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 52.)

Le soussigné, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique, a reçu ordre de sa cour de communiquer ce qui suit au gouvernement de France.

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Sa Majesté a vû à regret que le gouvernement de France continue à refuser toute satisfaction et toute explication sur les objets dont elle à se plaindre, et qu'en évitant toute discussion de ce qui fait le sujet de ses représentations il persiste néanmoins à demander l'évacuation de l'Isle de Malthe par les forces de sa Majesté. Sa Majesté sait trop ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même et à son peuple pour acquiescer à de pareils procédés. En conséquence elle a ordonné au soussigné de savoir distinctement du gouvernement de France, s'il est déterminé à perseverer dans son refus de toute satisfaction et de toute explication sur les objets de plainte de sa Majesté, ou bien s'il est disposé à donner sans delai cette satisfaction et cette explication sur l'état actuel des affaires de maniere à pouvoir conduire à un arrangement qui seroit de nature à ajuster les differens qui actuellement existent entre les deux gouvernemens.

Sa Majesté desire sincerement l'adoption de ce moyen que mettroit fin à un état de suspension et d'incertitude si nuisible à l'interêt des deux nations, et de voir que les deux gouvernemens agissant par les mêmes principes de justice et de moderation puissent s'entendre pour concourir aux mesures es plus susceptibles de leur assurer une tranquillite permanente.

Le soussigné prie son excellence M. de Talleyrand d'agréer l'assurance de sa haute consideration.

WHITWORTH.

No. 53.

MY LORD,

Paris, April 9, 1803.

In my conversation yesterday evening with M. de Talleyrand, I found him, after he had seen the First Consul, more disposed to contest the substance of the note which I had presented the day before, than to afford any farther explanation. He said, that in order to proceed regularly, it would be necessary that the French government should be informed precisely what were the objects

objects which had created such uneasiness, and on which it was alleged all explanation had been refused. That although this had, perhaps, been touched upon in general conversation, yet no specific charge had been adduced in such a manner as to demand a formal explanation. I told him that if the object of the French government was to protract the present state of suspense and uncertainty, that object might be answered to the extent indeed of a very few days, by forcing me to such a reference; but I must at the same time declare to him, that it could be productive of no advantage, and would serve only to provoke such a recapitulation of the system and conduct which France had pursued since the Treaty of Amiens, as would have all the appearance of a Manifesto, every item of which would carry conviction to every individual in Europe; that it appeared therefore more likely to answer the end which both parties proposed, that of hastening the conclusion of an amicable arrangement to take up the business on the basis which I should propose, and by which they would admit no more than what was incontrovertible, namely, that if the French government exercised a right of extending its influence and territory, in violation of the spirit of the Treaty of Amiens, Great Britain had, if she chose to avail herself of it, (which I was confident she would not do further than was necessary as a measure of security,) an undoubted right to seek a counterpoise. He did not seem inclined to dispute this position, but rather to admit that such a right did exist, and might be claimed in consequence of the acquisitions which had been made by France. On the point of satisfaction I found him much more obstinate. He said that the First Consul was hurt at the expression (*satisfaction*,) to which he gave an interpretation I had never understood belonged to it, as implying superiority; so that if the British government required satisfaction of the French, it arrogated to itself a superiority. I told him, what certainly must be understood by every one, that the demand of satisfaction implied that one party had been offended by another, and of course had a right to demand

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demand such satisfaction ; that an inferior had an equal right with his superior to demand it ; but in the case in question there was perfect equality, and consequently there was no offence to be found but in the conduct which rendered such an appeal necessary. The discussion of this point took up a considerable time without producing any thing decisive.

We at last came to the main point of the business ; and on this I cannot say any real progress has been made. M. de Talleyrand repeated to me that the First Consul had nothing more at heart than to avoid the necessity of going to war, and that there was no sacrifice he would not take, short of his honor, to obtain this end. Is there, said M. de Talleyrand, no means of satisfying both parties ; for at the same time that the First Consul insists, and will always insist, on the full execution of the treaty, he will not object to any mode by which you may acquire the security you think so necessary. You are not satisfied with the independence of Neapolitan troops ; what others will answer the purpose ? he then started the idea of a mixed garrison, composed of English, French, Italians, Germans, &c. He begged that I would refer once more to your lordship, and submit the inclosed paper, which he drew up in my presence. I told him that we were only losing time by such a reference ; that my instructions were positive, and had certainly not been sent me without the fullest consideration. I could not, however, refuse what he so earnestly required ; and your lordship will see by the paper how the matter rests after this conference. I will confess to your lordship, that my motive for consenting to forward this sort of proposal is, that supposing we should find the First Consul as obstinate as he now appears to be on the point of abandoning Malta to us in perpetuity, and that a temporary possession might be considered as the next best thing, something of this kind might derive from it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c.

(Translation

(Translation of Inclosure referred to in No. 53.)

The conversation with M. Talleyrand to-day has led us to this result. Every thing which may tend to violate the independence of the order of Malta, will never be consented to by the French Government. Every thing which may tend to put an end to the present difficulties, or be agreeable to the English Government, and which shall not be contrary to the Treaty of Amiens, the French Government have no objection to make a particular convention respecting it. The motives of this convention shall be inserted in the preamble, and shall relate to the respective grievances concerning which the two governments shall think it adviseable to come to an understanding with each other.

No. 54.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth, to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April, 14, 1803.

Since my last, the negociation is at a stand, in the expectation, I suppose, of the answer which may arrive, to the overture which I communicated to your Lordship on the 9th instant, and which is expected here to produce a good effect, notwithstanding the little hope I have given. To-morrow I shall, in all probability, be in possession of this answer from your Lordship, and be enabled to speak still more positively.

No. 55.

MY LORD, Downing-street, April 18th, 1803.

His Majesty has received from his Charge d'Affaires at Hamburgh, the most extraordinary account of the conduct of Monsieur Rheinhard, the French Minister at that place, with respect to a most gross and unwarrantable libel upon his Majesty's Government. He has been assured that the French Minister, having proposed the insertion of that libel in the official gazette

zette for the town of Hamburgh, and the insertion of it having in the first instance been refused, the French Minister went so far as to demand, in his official capacity, the insertion of that article by order of the Senate. His Majesty is unwilling to believe that the French Government could have authorised so outrageous an attack upon his Majesty and his Government, and so daring a violation of the independence of a neutral state. It is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should communicate these circumstances to the French Government, and state at the same time the impossibility of bringing the present discussions to an amicable conclusion, unless some satisfaction shall be given to his Majesty for the indignity which has thus been offered to him in the face of all Europe by the French Minister at Hamburgh.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 56.

MY LORD, Downing-street, April 13, 1803.

Your Excellency's dispatches have been received, and laid before the King.

His Majesty has observed, with great satisfaction, the admission by the French Government of the justice of his claim to some compensation, in consequence of the increased power and influence of France, since the period of the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty.

Although, under the circumstances of your conversation with M. Talleyrand, and particularly after the Note verbale which he gave to you, it might have been expedient that you should have deferred presenting the project contained in my dispatch No. 7, in the form of a project, it is desirable that you should communicate without delay, in some mode or other, the contents of that project, for the purpose of ascertaining distinctly whether the conditions are such as to induce the French Government

Government to give way upon the question of Malta. These conditions appear to his Majesty so well calculated to save the honor of the French Government on the subject of Malta—if the question of Malta is principally considered by them as a question of honor—and at the same time hold out to them such important advantages, that the success of the proposition is at least worth trying, particularly as the result of it might be productive of the most easy means of adjusting the most material of our present differences.

With respect to the assertion so often advanced and repeated by M. Talleyrand in your last conversations of the non-execution of the Treaty of Amiens relative to Malta, I have only to observe again, that the execution of that article is become impracticable from causes which it has not been in the power of his Majesty to controul. That the greatest part of the funds assigned to the support of the order, and indispensably necessary for the independence of the order and defence of the island, have been sequestrated since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, in direct repugnance to the spirit and letter of that treaty; and that two of the principal powers who were invited to accede as guarantees to the arrangement, have refused their accession, except on the conditions that the part of the arrangement which was deemed so material relative to the Maltese inhabitants should be entirely cancelled. The conduct of the French Government, since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, gives his Majesty a right, which is now at length admitted by themselves, to demand some compensation for the past, and security for the future. Such compensation could never be considered as obtained by the possession of an island, which would only entail a very heavy expence on this country;—and the degree of security which would be provided by these means, would only be such as his Majesty, under the present circumstances, is entitled to demand.

I observe in the note verbale of Monsieur Talleyrand, he makes use of the expression, *the independence of the Order of Malta*. If this is meant to apply to the Order exclusively,

exclusively, his Majesty would be willing, for the preservation of peace, that the civil government of the island should be given to the Order of St. John; the Maltese enjoying the privileges which were stipulated in their favour in the treaty of Amiens; and that, conformably to principles which have been adopted on other Occasions, the fortifications of the island should be garrisoned for ever by the troops of his Majesty.

In the event of either of these propositions being found unattainable, his Majesty might be disposed to consent to an arrangement by which the island of Malta would remain in his possession for a limited number of years, and to waive in consequence his demand for a perpetual occupation, provided that the number of years was not less than ten, and that his Sicilian Majesty could be induced to cede the sovereignty of the island of Lampedosa for a valuable consideration. If the proposition is admitted, the island of Malta should be given up to the inhabitants at the end of that period, and it should be acknowledged as an independent state. In this case, his Majesty would be ready to concur in any arrangement for the establishment of the Order of St. John in some other part of Europe.

You will not refuse to listen to any proposition which the French government may be disposed to make to you with a view to an equivalent security for those objects in regard to which his Majesty claims the possession or occupation of Malta; but the three propositions to which I have above alluded, appear, at the present moment, to furnish the only basis for a satisfactory arrangement; and you will decline receiving any proposition which does not appear to you to offer advantages to his Majesty as substantial as that which I have last stated.

It is very desirable that you should bring the negotiation to an issue, if possible, without referring to his Majesty's government for further instructions, after the receipt of this dispatch; and if you should be of opinion that there is no hopes of bringing it to a favourable

able conclusion, you may inform M. Talleyrand of the necessity you will be under, after a certain time, to leave Paris.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 57.

MY LORD,

Paris, April 18, 1803.

I did not fail to put into immediate execution the instructions contained in your lordship's dispatch, (No. 11.) on the subject of the libel inserted by the French minister in the *Hamburgh Gazette*. I represented the outrageous and unprecedented conduct of M. Rheinhardt in such terms as it deserves; and fairly declared to M. de Talleyrand, that, until satisfaction shall be given to his Majesty for the indignity which has been offered him by the French minister in his official character, there could be no possibility whatever of bringing the present discussion to an amicable issue. M. de Talleyrand assured me, that the French government saw the conduct of M. de Rheinhardt in the same light as his Majesty's ministers, and that they could not be more surprised than the First Consul had been at seeing such an article inserted by authority; that an immediate explanation had been required of M. Rheinhardt, five days ago; and if his conduct had been such as had been represented, he would, doubtless, feel the effects of the First Consul's displeasure; and that, in the mean time, I might inform your lordship that he was completely disavowed. I told M. de Talleyrand, that, as the insult had been public, it would be necessary that the reparation should be so also. He answered me again, that the First Consul considered M. Rheinhardt's conduct as so reprehensible, that every satisfaction might be expected.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

My

No. 58.

MY LORD,

Paris, April 18, 1803.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's dispatches of the 13th instant.

I saw Joseph Bonaparte immediately on the receipt of your lordship's dispatch; and without troubling your lordship with a repetition of the arguments I used to hasten the conclusion of the negociation, amongst which I endeavoured to convince him of the importance of preventing the ultimatum which would inevitably follow the rejection of what I had to propose, I will briefly state, that on finding it perfectly impracticable to establish the principle of our keeping possession of Malta in perpetuity, I delivered to him in writing the second proposal I had to make. He did not fail to observe, that by this modification the difficulty which he considered as insurmountable was not removed; that although the Order was restored, it could not be considered as independant; and, in fact, Malta would belong to that power which had possession of the forts. I enforced the adoption of this plan by every reason which could serve to recommend it; but the possession in perpetuity was constantly urged as a difficulty which nothing could remove. Our conversation lasted near two hours. I confess that I gained no solid ground of hope that the project, which he assured me he would take to the First Consul at St. Cloud, would be adopted. But he said that he was not without hope that he might be authorised to propose to me the occupation of the fortresses for a term of years. It was my wish, that such a proposal should come from him rather than from me. I told him that I did not well see how such a tenure would suit us; but that I wished too sincerely to avoid the fatal extremities to which I saw the discussion was tending, not to give any reasonable proposal which might be made on their part every assistance in my power. This proposal originated with him,
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and was therefore received by me merely as a matter which I would refer to your lordship. If, however, I can bring the matter to an immediate conclusion, and without further reference to your lordship on the principle of our retaining possession of the fortresses of Malta for a term of years not less than that pointed out by your lordship, and with the assurance that this government will not oppose the cession of the island of Lampedosa, I shall have great pleasure in announcing to your lordship such a conclusion.

I do not enter into detail of the conversation which I had the same morning with M. de Talleyrand, immediately upon my leaving Joseph Bonaparte, as it differed in nowise from what I have above mentioned. He suggested also the possibility of coming to an arrangement on the ground of a temporary occupation, and I made him the same answer.

Such is the state of the discussion at this moment. I am in expectation of hearing very shortly either from Joseph or M. de Talleyrand; and I am not without hopes that I may be able to announce to your lordship that such an arrangement is made, as may answer his Majesty's expectations, in a very few days. Your lordship may be assured, that I feel the necessity of expedition. Were it less urgent, I might perhaps hope to bring the discussion to even a more favourable issue.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

The Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

(Translation of Inclosure referred to in No. 58.)

His Majesty will consent, for the sake of preserving peace, that the government of the island of Malta shall be given to the Order of St. John; the Maltese enjoying those privileges which have been granted on former occasions. The fortifications of the island shall be occupied in perpetuity by the troops of his Majesty.

No. 59.

MY LORD,

Paris, April 20, 1803.

I had hoped that the first extraordinary messenger I should have occasion to send, would have been to announce to your lordship, that the differences between the **two governments** were adjusted on one of the modifications pointed out to me by my last instructions from your lordship. In this expectation I am deceived. I saw Joseph Bonaparte the night before last, before I had sealed up my dispatches of that evening to your lordship; but as all he said tended only to justify the hope I had given your lordship in those dispatches, I added nothing to them. He assured me positively, that I should hear from M. de Talleyrand in the course of yesterday morning, and that a meeting would be appointed in order to settle the term of years for which the First Consul might be induced to consent to the cession of Malta. It is true that he declared, that in order to gain his consent, it would be necessary to hold out the advantages which the British government was willing to offer in return, meaning the acknowledgements of the new governments in Italy. I told him that this offer was made only with a view to the possession of Malta in perpetuity; but after some conversation, I gave him to understand, that I would not refuse to admit the demand, *sub sperati*, on the condition, that the cession should be made for a considerable term of years; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated; and that a suitable provision should be made for the King of Sardinia. He seemed to think there could be no difficulty in this arrangement; and I left him in the persuasion, that I should the next day, yesterday, or this morning, receive the summons from M. de Talleyrand, which he had given me reason to expect.

I am sorry to say, that no such summons has been received by me, neither has any further notice been taken

taken of the business. So that I feel that I should betray the confidence your lordship may place in me, were I to delay any longer requesting, that I may be immediately furnished with the terms on which his Majesty's ministers would be willing to conclude, and which probably will not differ much from those above stated, in order that I may propose them in the form of an ultimatum; and that at the expiration of the period allowed for deliberation, I may be authorised not only to declare that I am to leave Paris, but actually so to do, unless in the intermediate time the French government should accede to our demands.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Right Honorable Lord Hawkesbury,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 60.

MY LORD, Downing-street, April 23, 1803.

Your excellency's dispatches of the 18th and 20th instant have been received, and laid before the king.

It is necessary for me to do little more on the present occasion than to refer you to my dispatch of the 13th of April, in which I stated to you the several propositions on which alone, in the judgment of his Majesty, the differences between this country and France could be satisfactorily adjusted.

If, upon the receipt of this dispatch, it shall not have been in your power to bring the negotiation to a conclusion on any of the propositions to which I have above referred, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should communicate, officially, to the French government, that you have gone, in point of concession, to the full extent of your instructions; and that, if an arrangement, founded upon one of these propositions, cannot be concluded without further delay, you have received his Majesty's commands to return to England.

His Majesty can only consent to relinquish the permanent occupation of Malta by his forces, on the conditions that the temporary possession shall not be less than ten years; that the authority, civil and military, shall, during that period, remain solely in his Majesty; and that, at the expiration of that period, the island shall be given up to the inhabitants, and not to the order; and provided likewise, that his Sicilian Majesty shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the Island of Lampedosa. It is indispensable that, as a part of this arrangement, Holland should be evacuated by the French troops within a short period after the conclusion of a convention by which all those provisions are secured. His Majesty will consent to acknowledge the new Italian States, upon the condition that stipulations in favor of his Sardinian Majesty, and of Switzerland, form a part of this arrangement.

It is his Majesty's pleasure that, in the event of the failure of the negotiation, you should delay your departure from Paris no longer than may be indispensably necessary for your personal convenience; and that you should in no case remain there, after the receipt of this dispatch, more than seven days.

I have the honor to be, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

(No. 61.)

MY LORD,

Paris, April 23, 1802.

As I heard nothing from M. de Talleyrand, I called on him on Thursday, in order to learn the effect of the proposal which I had made, conformably to your Lordship's instructions, on the basis of a perpetual possession of the forts of Malta, on re-establishing the order in the civil government of the island. He told me, that if I had called on him sooner he should two days

days ago have communicated to me the First Consul's answer, which was, that no consideration on earth should induce him to consent to a concession in perpetuity of Malta, in any shape whatever; and that the re-establishment of the order was not so much the point to be discussed as that of suffering Great Britain to acquire a possession in the Mediterranean. I told him that I did not call sooner because I was given to understand that he would have himself proposed it to me, for the purpose of communicating the answer of the First Consul; and that it did not in any shape become me to put myself on the footing of a solicitor in this transaction. After some conversation, and finding (what I most sincerely believe to be the case) that the First Consul's determination was fixed on the point of a possession of Malta in perpetuity; I repeated to him what I had previously suggested to Joseph Bonaparte, the modification which I had to propose, namely, that for the sake of peace his Majesty would be willing to wave his pretensions to a possession in perpetuity, and would consent to hold Malta for a certain number of years to be agreed upon, on the condition that no opposition should be made on the part of the French government to any negotiation his Majesty might set on foot with his Sicilian Majesty for the acquisition of the island of Lampedosa. We discussed this proposal in a conversation of some length; and I made use of all the arguments which have been furnished me by your Lordship or which occurred to me in its favour. I begged him particularly to recollect that we were in actual possession of the object, and that therefore every modification tending to limit that possession was in fact a concession on the part of his Majesty, and a proof of his desire to sacrifice to his love of peace the just claim which he had acquired in consequence of the conduct of France, and which had recently been admitted, of a much more considerable compensation and counterpoise. M. de Talleyrand did not seem disposed to dispute any of my positions, and I left him, I confess, fully

fully impressed with the idea that the next day (Friday) I should find him prepared to treat on this ground, and that the only difficult point to be arranged would be the number of years for which Malta should be ceded to his Majesty.

Your Lordship will conceive my surprise when, on seeing him the next day, he told me that although he had not been able to obtain from the First Consul all he wished, still the proposition he had to make would, he trusted, be such as fully to answer the purpose: He then said, that the First Consul would on no terms hear either of a perpetual or a temporary possession of Malta; that his object was the execution of the Treaty of Amiens; and that rather than submit to such an arrangement as that I had last proposed, he would even consent to our keeping the object in dispute for ever; on the ground that in the one there was an appearance of generosity and magnanimity, but in the other, nothing but weakness and the effect of coercion; that therefore his resolution was taken, and what he had to propose was the possession we required of the island of Lampedosa, or of any other of the small isles, of which there were three or four between Malta and the coast of Africa; that such a possession would be sufficient for the object we had in view, which was a station in the Mediterranean, as a place of refuge and security for any squadron we might find it convenient to keep in that sea. I suffered him to expatiate a considerable time, and without interruption, on the great advantage we were to derive from such an acquisition, as well as on the confidence which the First Consul reposed in our pacific intention in lending a hand to such an establishment. He concluded by desiring I would transmit this proposal to your Lordship. I told him that I was extremely sorry indeed to find that we had made such little progress in the negotiation; that my orders were positive; that I could hear of nothing short of what I had proposed, neither could I possibly undertake to make such a proposal to his Majesty, since every word
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of my instructions (from which I certainly should not depart) applied positively to Malta, unless an equivalent security could be offered, and surely he would not pretend to tell me that Lampedosa could be considered as such; that the possession of Malta was necessary for our security, and was rendered so not from any desire of aggrandizement on the part of his Majesty, but by the conduct of the French Government; and that so strongly were we impressed with the necessity, that rather than abandon it, we were prepared to go to war. That it was on this ground I must declare to him, that I could neither take upon myself to forward such a proposal as he had made to me, or indeed any thing short of what I had last proposed as a fair equivalent. That in so doing, I acted in conformity to his Majesty's views, who would most assuredly disapprove of my conduct, were I, by unnecessarily protracting the negociation, to add one day, or one hour, if it could be avoided, to the suspense and anxiety under which his own subjects and all Europe must labour at such a crisis; that I had hoped the French Government, actuated by the same generous motives, would have acted in the same manner; that it might, by pursuing a contrary line of conduct, gain still a few days; but I must declare, that in a very short time I should have to communicate to him those very terms from which his were so wide, but to draw nearer to which was, perhaps, the object of his negotiating, in the form of an Ultimatum, which would at least have one good effect, that of bringing the matter to an issue, and the certainty even of war was preferable to the present state of indecision.

To all I could say M. Talleyrand objected the dignity and honor of the First Consul, which could not admit of his consenting to any thing which might carry with it the appearance of yielding to a threat. I told him that it never could be admitted that the First Consul had a right to act in such a manner as to excite jealousy and create alarm in every State of Europe, and
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when asked for explanation or security, say that it was contrary to his honor or his dignity to afford either. Such arguments might perhaps do when applied to some of those Governments with which France had been accustomed to treat, or more properly to dictate to, but never could be used to Great Britain; that his Majesty had a right to speak freely his opinion, and possessed also the means, whenever he chose to employ them, of opposing a barrier to the ambition of any individual, or of any State which should be disposed to threaten the security of his dominions, or the tranquillity of Europe.

Our conversation concluded by M. de Talleyrand's assuring me that he would report the substance of it to the First Consul in the evening, and that probably he should have occasion to see me on the following day.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 62.

MY LORD, Paris, April 25, 1803.

The conversation I had on Saturday morning with M. Talleyrand has produced nothing from which I can draw a more favourable conclusion as to the result of the negociation, than when I last addressed your Lordship. He told me, that although he had seen the First Consul the night before, he had nothing to add to what he had communicated to me on Friday; that the First Consul was determined not to give his consent to our retaining Malta, either in perpetuity or for a term, although of the two he would prefer the former as the less repugnant to his feelings; that he was therefore ordered to repeat the proposal he had lately made me, of acceding to our demand of Lampedosa or any of the neighbouring islands; and that as our object
was

was to obtain a settlement in the Mediterranean, he imagined that which we had ourselves pointed out would answer every purpose we might have in view. But, at all events, the First Consul neither could nor would relinquish his claim to the full execution of the Treaty of Amiens. To this I could only repeat what I had already said to him on the inadequacy of such a proposal, and of the impossibility in which I found myself to transmit it to your Lordship. I lamented the course which the negotiation was taking, and that the First Consul should have so little regard to the dreadful consequences which must ensue, as to suffer them to be outweighed by a mistaken notion of dignity. And I added, that notwithstanding the acquiescence which he might have met with from others, the plea of its being incompatible with the dignity of the French Government to give satisfaction or security, when both might with justice be demanded, could never be admitted by Great Britain.

M. de Talleyrand heard every thing I could say with the utmost patience, notwithstanding he had nothing satisfactory to say, and seemed unwilling to break up the conference. He constantly brought forward the same inadmissible proposal, requesting that I would at least communicate it to your Lordship. This I told him I could not refuse to do, since every thing which passed between him and me must of course make the subject of my reports to your Lordship. I declared however, at the same time, that I should not think myself by any means authorised to suspend the execution of any instructions I might receive, tending to bring the negotiation to an issue, in the expectation of any change which such a proposal might produce. All I could do, and that I would certainly do, would be to communicate the Ultimatum, if his Majesty should think proper to furnish me with it, confidentially to M. de Talleyrand, before I presented it officially to him, as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He assured me that he should consider such a conduct as a further
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proof

proof of my desire to conciliate, and that he could not yet forbear hoping that the differences might be adjusted. I repeated that if his hope was founded on the expectation of his Majesty being induced to recede from his demand, it would be deceiving himself to cherish it.

The remainder of the conversation turned on the calamities which would follow the failure of our endeavour to avoid a rupture. He insinuated that Holland, Naples, and other countries connected with Great Britain, would be the first victims of the war. I asked him whether he thought that such a conduct would add to the glory of the First Consul, or whether the falling on the innocent and defenceless would not rather tarnish it, and ultimately unite against him, not only the honest men in his own country, but every Government in Europe. That it certainly would excite more detestation than terror in England, at the same time that it would serve to impress upon us still more strongly the necessity of omitting no means of circumscribing a Power so perniciously exerted. I could not help adding, that although no act of hostility had actually taken place, yet the inveteracy with which our commerce, our industry, and our credit had been attacked in every part to which French influence could be extended, did in fact almost amount to the same, since it went to prove, in addition to the general system of the First Consul, that his object was to pursue, under the mask of peace, the same line of conduct in which the preceding Governments had acted.

I now trust entirely to the effect of the Ultimatum, which will at least convince him that we are in earnest, and that he has nothing to expect from protraction. I shall not however, as I said before, make use of this officially, until I have tried its effect in a more conciliatory manner.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

P. S. Your

P.S. Your Lordship's dispatches of the 23d with their inclosures, were delivered to me by Shaw this evening at nine o'clock. I shall see M. de Talleyrand to-morrow morning; and I trust your Lordship will not disapprove my following the line of conduct I had proposed, and which I have mentioned to your Lordship, of informing him of the nature of my instructions a few hours before I carry them officially into execution.

W.

No. 63.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 27, 1803.

I avail myself of the opportunity of a messenger passing through from Constantinople and Vienna, to inform your Lordship of the state of the negotiation at this moment. I communicated to M. de Talleyrand the purport of my instructions of the 23d, yesterday at four o'clock. He immediately asked me if the possession of Malta was still insisted upon. I told him most certainly it was; and I repeated to him the particulars of the terms on which it was yet possible to conclude the business. That these were, the possession of Malta for ten years, during which period the authority, civil and military, was to remain solely in his Majesty, and that at the expiration of that term it was to be given up to the inhabitants, and not to the order; provided also, that his Sicilian Majesty shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the island of Lampedusa; that Holland should be evacuated by the French troops within a month after the conclusion of a convention by which all these provisions shall be secured; and that his Majesty would consent to acknowledge the new Italian States, provided stipulations were made in favour of his Sardinian Majesty and of Switzerland.

I had no sooner made known these conditions than

M. de Talleyrand told me it would be perfectly unnecessary to delay the official communication; for, as the possession of Malta was still insisted upon, although for a term, the First Consul would not consent to them. I accordingly did repeat them to him in the manner he desired; when he told me that he comprehended perfectly what we required, but that in similar cases it was usual to state the demand in writing, and he desired I would give him a note upon the subject. I told him that I would repeat to him once more, or as often as he pleased, the express terms which I had stated to him, and that as my communication to him was verbal, I should of course be content with an answer in the same form. He consented at length to receive it, and to communicate to me the First Consul's answer as soon as possible. I desired that he would recollect that Tuesday next must be the day of my departure.

No. 64.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated April 29, 1803.

My last letter to your Lordship was of yesterday evening. This morning a person came to me whom I suspect of being employed by the First Consul for the purpose of ascertaining my sentiments, and told me that I should, in the course of the day, receive a letter from M. de Talleyrand, drawn up under the inspection of the First Consul, which, although not exactly what I might wish, was however so moderate as to afford me a well-grounded hope, and might certainly be sufficient to induce me to delay, for a short time, my departure. I told him that it would be a matter of great satisfaction to me to perceive a probability of bringing the negotiation to a favourable issue; and that I should be extremely sorry to spoil the business by any useless precipitation. But it must be recollected that I acted in conformity to instructions; that those instructions were positive; that by them I was enjoined to leave Pa-
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ris on Tuesday next, unless in the intermediate time certain conditions were agreed to. Having received no letter in the course of the day, about four o'clock I went to M. de Talleyrand; I told him that my anxiety to learn whether he had any thing favourable to tell me, brought me to him, and in case he had not, to recal to his recollection that Tuesday was the day on which I must leave Paris, and to request that he would have the necessary passports prepared for me and my family. He appeared evidently embarrassed, and after some hesitation observed, that he could not suppose I should really go away; but that at all events the First Consul never would recal his Ambassador. To this I replied, his Majesty recalled me in order to put an end to the negotiation, on the principle that even actual war was preferable to the state of suspense in which England, and indeed all Europe, had been kept for so long a space of time.

From the tenor of his conversation, I should rather be led to think that he does not consider the case as desperate. Upon my leaving him he repeatedly said, *J'ai encore de l'Espoir.*

Saturday Evening.

P. S. This day has passed without any occurrence whatever. The letter in question is not yet arrived.

No. 65.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated May 2, 1803.

Another day has passed over without producing any change. I determined to go myself to M. de Talleyrand, and to deliver, instead of sending, the inclosed letter. I told him that it was with great reluctance that I came to make this last application to him. That I had long since informed him of the extent of the term which had been assigned for my stay at Paris, and that as I had received to this moment no answer what-
ever

ever to the proposal I had repeatedly made, I could no longer delay requiring him to furnish me with the necessary passports for the return of myself, my family, and the remainder of my mission, to England. Upon this I gave him the letter, a copy of which I inclose, and on reading it he appeared somewhat startled. He lamented that so much time had been lost ; but said that enough remained, if I was authorised to negotiate upon other terms. I could of course but repeat to him, that I had no other terms to propose, and that therefore unless the First Consul could so far gain upon himself as to sacrifice a false punctilio to the certainty of a war, of which no one could foresee the consequence, nothing could possibly prevent my departure to-morrow night. He hoped, he said, this was not so near ; that he would communicate my letter, and what I had said, to the First Consul immediately, and that in all probability I should hear from him this evening. I thought it, however, right to apprise him that it was quite impossible I could be induced to disobey his Majesty's orders, and protracting a negotiation on terms so disadvantageous to ourselves, unless he should furnish me with such a justification as would leave me no room to hesitate ; and that I did not see that any thing short of a full acquiescence in his Majesty's demands could have that effect. He repeated that he would report the conversation to the First Consul, and that I should shortly hear from him.

In this state the business now rests ; I am expecting either a proposition or my passports, and am consequently taking every measure for setting out to-morrow night.

Inclosure referred to in No. 65.—Translation.

SIR,

Paris, May 2, 1803.

When I had the honor on Tuesday last of communicating to you officially the last propositions which I was instructed by my Court to submit to the French Government, for the sake of removing the present difficulties, I had the honor to announce to you, that in case the First Consul should not consent to these propositions, I should find myself under the necessity of leaving Paris in eight days. We are nearly arrived at the end of this period, without my having received any answer to this communication. It remains for me only, therefore, to obey the orders of the King my master to return to him; and for this purpose I entreat you, Sir, to have the goodness to furnish me with the necessary passports.

I seize this opportunity of renewing to your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

His Excellency M. de Talleyrand.

No. 66.

Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Wednesday Morning, May 4, 1803.

Soon after I had dispatched the messenger the night before last, with my dispatches of the 3d, I received a communication from M. de Talleyrand, of which I inclose a copy, the purport of which was so completely short of every thing which could be satisfactory, that I did not think myself authorized to enter into any discussion upon it; and as early as I could on the following morning I returned the answer of which the inclosed is a copy.

After this I concluded, of course, that there was an end to the negociation. I had for some days past been preparing

preparing for my departure; every measure was taken for setting out at four o'clock this morning, and we were expecting only the passports which I had demanded, for the purpose of ordering the post horses. The day and the evening passed without the passports having been sent; and whilst we were deliberating on the motives of such a delay, about twelve o'clock at night, a gentleman who was with me received a communication which convinced me that it was not meant to give me my passports without another attempt, and I was, therefore, not surprised when about one o'clock I received the inclosed note from M. de Talleyrand.

In this situation I am waiting the hour of rendezvous with M. de Talleyrand.

First Inclosure referred to in No. 66.—Translation.

The Undersigned has reported to the First Consul the conversation which he had with his Excellency Lord Whitworth on the 6th of this month, and in which his Excellency announced, that his Britannic Majesty had ordered him to make, verbally, in his name, the following demands:

1st. That his Britannic Majesty should retain his troops at Malta for ten years.

2d. That the island of Lampedosa should be ceded to him in full possession.

3d. That the French troops should evacuate Holland.

And that if no convention on this basis should have been signed within a week, his Excellency Lord Whitworth had orders to terminate his mission, and to return to London.

On the demand made by the Undersigned, that Lord Whitworth would, in conformity to the usage of all ages and of all countries, give in writing what he himself called the *Ultimatum* of his Government, his Excellency declared, that his instructions expressly forbade him to transmit on this subject any written note.

The intentions of the First Consul being entirely pacific, the Undersigned dispenses with making any observations

observation on so new and so strange a manner of treating on affairs of this importance.

And, in order to give a fresh testimony of the value which he attaches to the continuance of peace, the First Consul has directed the Undersigned to make the following notification in the accustomed style and forms.

As the island of Lampedosa does not belong to France, it is not for the First Consul either to accede to or to refuse the desire testified by his Britannic Majesty, of having this island in his possession.

With regard to the island of Malta, as the demand made respecting it by his Britannic Majesty would change a formal disposition in the Treaty of Amiens, the First Consul cannot but previously communicate it to his Majesty the King of Spain, and to the Batavian Republic, Contracting Parties to the said Treaty, in order to know their opinion; and besides, as the stipulations relative to Malta have been guaranteed by their Majesties the Emperor of Germany, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, the Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Amiens, before they agree to any change in the article of Malta, are bound to concert with the guaranteeing Powers.

The First Consul will not refuse this concert, but it belongs not to him to propose it, since it is not he who urges any change in the guaranteed stipulations.

With regard to the evacuation of Holland by the French troops, the First Consul has no difficulty in directing the Undersigned to repeat that the French troops shall evacuate Holland at the instant that the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens shall be executed in every quarter of the globe.

The Undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to his Excellency the English Ambassador, the assurance of his high consideration.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, 12 Floreal, Year 11,
(2d May 1803.)

Second Inclosure referred to in No. 66.—Translation.

The Undersigned, in answer to the note which M. de Talleyrand transmitted to him yesterday evening, has the honor to observe to him, that the King has had no other motive in seeking to accelerate the proceedings of the negociation, than to relieve as soon as possible the two countries the most interested, and Europe in general, from the state of suspense in which they are placed. It is with great regret that he perceives nothing in his Excellency's note which can correspond with this intention, and consequently nothing that can justify him in delaying to obey the orders of his Court. It remains, therefore, only to request the Minister for Foreign Affairs to give him the means of obeying them, by furnishing him with the necessary passports for his return. It is, however, necessary for him to rectify a mistake which has crept into M. de Talleyrand's note. The Undersigned did not say he was expressly forbidden to transmit any written note on the object of the discussion, but that he was not authorized to do it, and that he would not take that responsibility on himself.

He avails himself of this opportunity to renew to his Excellency M. de Talleyrand the assurances of his highest consideration.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Paris, 3d May 1803.

Third Inclosure referred to in No. 66.—Translation.

MY LORD,

Paris, May 3, 1803.

Having to-morrow morning to make to you a communication of the greatest importance, I have the honor to inform you of it without delay, in order that you may not expect this evening the passports which you had demanded. I propose that you should call to-morrow at half past four at the Foreign Department.

Receive, my Lord, the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed)

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 67.

Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Wednesday Evening, May 4, 1803.

I am this moment come from M. de Talleyrand. The inclosed note will shew your Lordship, that the idea which has been thrown out, is to give Malta to Russia.

My only inducement for having undertaken to refer again to your Lordship, is to avoid every reproach of precipitation. The difference will be but five days, and I have declared, that I see so many objections to the plan, that although I would not refuse their solicitation to send it, I could give no hope whatever of its being accepted as a ground of negociation.

Inclosure referred to in No. 67.—Translation.

The undersigned has submitted to the First Consul his Britannic Majesty's ambassador's note of the 3d instant.

After the last communication, addressed to his Excellency, it is more difficult than ever to conceive, how a great, powerful, and enlightened nation, can be willing to take upon itself to declare a war, which would be accompanied by such heavy calamities, and the cause of which would be so insignificant, the object in question being a miserable rock.

His Excellency must have been aware, that the two-fold necessity of making an agreement, with the guaranteeing powers of the Treaty of Amiens, and of not violating a compact, in the execution of which, the honour of France, the security for the future, and the good faith of the diplomatic intercourse between the nations of Europe, were so deeply interested, had imposed a law upon the French Government, of discarding every proposition diametrically contrary to the

Treaty of Amiens. Nevertheless, the First Consul, accustomed for two months to make every species of sacrifice for the maintenance of peace, would not reject a mezzo-termino of a nature to conciliate the interests and dignity of the two countries.

His Britannic Majesty appears to have been of opinion, that the Neapolitan garrison, which was to be placed at Malta, would not afford a sufficient force for securing the actual independence of the island.

This motive being the only one which can explain his Majesty's refusal to evacuate the island, the First Consul is ready to consent that the Island of Malta shall be placed in the hands of one of the three powers who have guaranteed its independence, either Austria, Russia, or Prussia, with a proviso, that as soon as France and England shall have come to an agreement upon this article, they shall unite in their requisitions, to engage other powers, either contracting, or acceding to the Treaty of Amiens, to consent to it.

Were it possible that this proposition should not be accepted, it would be manifest, not only that England never intended to comply with the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, but that she has not been actuated by good faith in any of her demands, and that in proportion as France conceded one point, the British Government advanced another. If this should be demonstrated, the First Consul will at least have given another proof of his sincerity, of his anxiety to devise the means of avoiding war, of his eagerness to embrace them, and of the value which he would place on their being adopted.

No. 68.

MY LORD,

Downing Street, May 7, 1803.

Your Excellency's dispatches have been received, and laid before the King.

The propositions which have been made to you on the part of the French Government, and which have induced

induced your Excellency to delay your departure until the return of the messenger Sylvester, are in every respect so loose, indefinite, and unsatisfactory, and fall so short of the just pretensions of his Majesty, that it is impossible that the French Government could have expected them to have been accepted. During the whole of the discussions which have lately occurred, his Majesty has had a right to consider himself in the character of the injured party. No means have been omitted on his part to induce the French Government to make a full and early explanation of their views, and to afford to his Majesty that satisfaction and security, to which he considered himself to be entitled. It was in consequence of the apparent determination of the French Government, to evade all discussion on the points of the difference between the two countries, that his Majesty was induced to state the grounds on which, according to his views, an arrangement might be concluded satisfactory to both Governments; and he accordingly authorised your Excellency to communicate the three projects, which at different times I had forwarded to you.

Until the very moment when your Excellency was about to leave Paris, the French Government have avoided making any distinct proposition for the settlement of the differences between the two countries; and when, at the very instant of your departure, the French Government felt themselves compelled to bring forward some proposition, they confined that proposition to a part only of the subject in discussion, and on that part of it, what they have brought forward is wholly inadmissible.

The French Government propose, that his Majesty should give up the Island of Malta, to a Russian, Austrian, or Prussian garrison. If his Majesty could be disposed to wave his demand for a temporary occupation of the Island of Malta, the Emperor of Russia would be the only sovereign to whom, in the present state of Europe, he could consent that the Island should be

be assigned ; and his Majesty has certain and authentic information, that the Emperor of Russia would, on no account, consent to garrison Malta. Under these circumstances, his Majesty perseveres in his determination to adhere to the substance of his third project as his ultimatum : as, however, the principal objection stated by the French Government to his Majesty's proposition is understood to be confined to the insertion of an article in a public treaty by which his Majesty shall have a right to remain in possession of the Island of Malta for a definite number of years (*being in no case less than ten*), may be stated in a secret article ; and the public articles may be agreed to conformably to the inclosed project. By this expedient, the supposed point of honour of the French Government might be saved. The independence of the Island of Malta would, in principle, be acknowledged, and the temporary occupation of his Majesty would be made to depend *alone on the present state of the Island of Lampedosa*.

You may propose this idea to M. Talleyrand, at the same time assuring him, that his Majesty is determined to adhere to the substance of his ultimatum. And if you shall not be able to conclude the minute of an arrangement on this principle, you will on no account remain in Paris more than thirty-six hours after the receipt of this dispatch.

I observe by your dispatch, you did not consider yourself authorised to deliver to the French Government any note or project in writing. The words of my dispatch were, that you were to communicate the terms officially, which left it at your own discretion to communicate them verbally, or in writing, as you might judge most expedient. You were certainly right in communicating them, in the first instance, verbally ; but, as so much stress has been laid by M. Talleyrand on this distinction, it is important that I should inform you, that his Majesty neither had, nor has any objection to your delivering the inclosed project as an ultimatum, accompanied by a short note in writing.

I cannot

I cannot conclude this dispatch, without recalling again your attention to the conduct of the French minister at Hamburgh, and referring you to my instructions, by which you should abstain from concluding the arrangement, unless you have received from M. Talleyrand an assurance that his conduct would be publicly disavowed.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

HAWKESBURY.

To his Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 69.

Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, May 9, 1803.

The messenger Sylvester is arrived with your Lordship's dispatch, No. 15, of the 7th of May.

As soon as I received your Lordship's instructions, I prepared a translated copy of the project furnished me by your Lordship, and a short note, with which it is my intention to accompany the communication. I then sent a person to Monsieur Talleyrand, to know when I could see him, and I was informed that he was at St. Cloud. I soon after learnt, that he was gone there in consequence of the accident which happened yesterday to the First Consul. I understand that no bad consequences are likely to ensue, and that he is able to transact business. I cannot, however, expect to see M. Talleyrand before to-morrow morning. Although this circumstance may cause a delay of a few hours, your Lordship may be assured, that the execution of those instructions with which you have furnished me, shall not be protracted. I shall leave Paris most assuredly, or have concluded a satisfactory arrangement, within the time specified by your Lordship, reckoning from the moment of my being able to make an official communication, rather than from that of the receipt of your Lordship's letter.

No.

No. 70.

Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, May 12, 1803.

The messenger Sylvester, as I mentioned in my last dispatch, returned on the 9th at twelve o'clock; and I wrote to M. Talleyrand, informing him of it, and desiring him to name an hour when I might wait on him, in order to communicate to him the purport of my instructions. To this letter I received no answer that evening or the following morning. Anxious to execute my orders, and to lose no time, I inclosed the project furnished me by your Lordship, accompanied by an official note, and a private letter to M. de Talleyrand, and sent it to the foreign department by Mr. Mandeville, with directions to deliver it to M. de Talleyrand, or in his absence to the *Chef du Bureau*. He delivered it accordingly to M. Durand, who promised to give it to his chief as soon as he came in, which he expected, he said, shortly. At half past four, having waited till that time in vain, I went myself to M. de Talleyrand; I was told that the family was in the country, and that they did not know when the minister would be in town. Half an hour after I had returned home, the packet which Mr. Mandeville had given into the hands of M. Durand, was brought to me, I believe, by a servant, with a verbal message, that as M. de Talleyrand was in the country, it would be necessary that I should send it to him there. In order to defeat, as much as depended upon me, *their intention of gaining time*, I wrote again to M. de Talleyrand, recapitulating the steps I had taken since the return of the messengers; and desired Mr. Talbot, the secretary of the embassy, to take it himself at nine o'clock at night, when I thought M. de Talleyrand would be at home, to his house at Meudon. He was, however, not at home. Mr. Talbot was told that he was at St. Cloud, where he had been all day, and that he would not be back until

until very late. He therefore left my private letter, with his name, and returned with the packet. It was my intention to have sent it on the following morning to the Bureau, with orders, that it should be left there; at one o'clock in the morning, I received a note from M. de Talleyrand, accounting for his not being able to answer me sooner, and appointing me at twelve o'clock at the *Bureau des Relations Extérieures*. I went at the appointed time. He began by apologizing for having so long postponed the interview, which he attributed to his having been the whole day with the First Consul. We then entered upon business. I told him that, limited as I was by your Lordship's instructions, he could not be surprised at my impatience to acquit myself of my duty. I explained to him the nature of your Lordship's observations on the proposal of the 4th, and that it was considered as on one hand impracticable, from the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to take charge of Malta, and on the other, as being wholly inadequate to his Majesty's just pretensions. I gave him the note in which this was expressed, and the project, on which alone a satisfactory arrangement could be framed. He read with apparent attention, and without many remarks; and after some time he asked me, if I felt myself authorised by my instructions to conclude with him a convention, framed on the basis of my project, or indeed extending that basis, since the first article of it would be the perpetual possession of Malta to England, in a return for a consideration. I told him, I most certainly was not authorised to enter into any engagement of such a nature, which would make the negociation one of exchange, instead of a demand of satisfaction and security. To this he replied, that the satisfaction and security which we required was Malta, and that this we obtained. That the First Consul could not accede to what he considered, and what must be considered by the public and by Europe, as the effect of coercion, but if it were possible to make the draft palatable, did I think myself

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justifiable

justifiable in refusing to do so. I told him that, acting in strict compliance with my instructions, I could have no need of justification, and that I came to him with the determination of abiding strictly by them. He contended, that by communicating a project, I merely stated on what grounds we would be willing to conclude, and that a counter-project, founded on the basis of giving us what we required, could not be refused a fair discussion. To this, I urged the resolution of his Majesty's ministers, to avoid every thing which could protract the negociation. That I saw no other means of acting up to those views, than by making my stand on the project at all events. I urged him repeatedly to explain himself more fully on the nature of the demand which he should make for Malta, *but he could not, or would not explain himself.* After much contest, it was agreed the proposal should be submitted to me in the course of a few hours, and that I should determine on the line of conduct I might feel myself justified in pursuing, either to sign it, to send it home, or to leave Paris.

The remainder of this day passed without receiving any communication from M. de Talleyrand. Upon this, I determined to demand my passports, by an official note, which I sent this morning by Mr. Mandeville, in order that I might leave Paris in the evening.

At two, I renewed my demand of passports, and was told I should have them immediately. They arrived at five o'clock, and I propose setting out as soon as the carriages are ready.

First Inclosure referred to in No. 70.—Translation.

The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the French Republic, having transmitted to his Court the proposal which was made to him by the minister for foreign affairs on the 3d instant, has just received orders to transmit to his Excellency the accompanying project
of

of a convention, founded on the only basis which his Majesty conceives, under the existing circumstances, to be susceptible of a definitive and amicable arrangement. The minister for foreign affairs will not fail to observe to what degree his Majesty has endeavoured to conciliate the security of his interests with the dignity of the First Consul. The undersigned flatters himself, that the First Consul, doing justice to these sentiments, will adopt, in concert with his Majesty, an expedient so suitable for restoring permanent tranquillity to both nations, and to all Europe.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity, to renew to his Excellency the assurance of his highest consideration.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Second Inclosure referred to in No. 70.—Translation.

PROJECT.

I. The French Government shall engage to make no opposition to the cession of the Island of Lampedosa to his Majesty by the king of the two Sicilies.

II. In consequence of the present state of the Island of Lampedosa, his Majesty shall remain in possession of the Island of Malta, until such arrangements shall be made to him, as may enable his Majesty to occupy Lampedosa as a naval station; after which period, the Island of Malta shall be given up to the inhabitants, and acknowledged as an independent state.

III. The territories of the Batavian Republic shall be evacuated by the French forces within one month after the conclusion of a convention, founded on the principles of this projet.

IV. The King of Etruria, and the Italian and Ligurian Republics, shall be acknowledged by his Majesty.

V. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces.

VI. A suitable provision shall be assigned to the King of Sardinia.

SECRET ARTICLE.

His Majesty shall not be required by the French Government to evacuate the Island of Malta until after the expiration of ten years,

Article IV. V. and VI. may be entirely omitted, or must all be inserted.

Third Inclosure referred to in No. 70.—Translation.

SIR,

Paris, May 10, 1803.

In order not to lose an instant of so precious a time, I have the honour to convey to you the project which I have received from my Court, with the note which accompanies it. I shall have the honour of calling on your Excellency at any hour you may appoint, in consequence of the request I made yesterday. But in the mean while, you will be in possession of the contents of my instructions. I hope to God that they may be of a nature to insure the tranquillity of both countries and of Europe.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

To his Excellency M. de Talleyrand,
&c. &c. &c.

Fourth Inclosure referred to in No. 70.—Translation.

SIR,

Paris, May 10, 1803.

Having yesterday morning received some important instructions to communicate to you, I wrote to you that evening to ask your Excellency at what hour I could have the honour to acquit myself of this duty. That letter has not been answered. At two o'clock this afternoon I sent Mr. Ma [redacted] attached to the embassy, to the office for [redacted] rs, in order to deliver to your excellency, [redacted] absence to your first secretary, a sealed packet [redacted] the papers which

which I had to communicate to you, and I added a second letter to your excellency. M. Mandeville delivered this packet into the hands of M. Durand, who assured him that it should be communicated to you without delay. At half past four, not having received any answer to my letters, I went to the foreign office, and I there learnt that you were in the country, and that it was not known when you would return to town.

Half an hour afterwards having returned home, the papers which my secretary had taken and delivered to M. Durand were brought to me, with a message that I must send them to the minister in the country.

In this state of things, since your excellency does not give me an opportunity of making you this communication, I have no other alternative than to give it in charge to Mr. Talbot, secretary to the embassy. He will have the honour to deliver to you the project of a convention, which, I hope, will serve as the basis to an amicable arrangement between our two governments.

I have only to add, that the term of my stay in Paris is limited, and I must set out on my journey for England on Thursday morning, if the negociation is not favourably terminated before that time.

I request you, Sir, to accept the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Fifth inclosure referred to in No. 70.—(Translation.)

It being impossible for the undersigned to delay any longer executing the orders of his court, he finds himself obliged to request the minister for foreign affairs to have the goodness to expedite the necessary passports for his return to England.

He requests his excellency to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed)

WHITWORTH.

Paris, 12th May 1853.

No.

No. 71.

Extract of a Dispatch from Sir George Rumbold, Bart. to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Hamburgh, March 29, 1803.

Late last night it was determined that the senate should be convened extraordinary on this day, in order to consider of a requisition from the French minister, to insert in the Hamburgh Paper a most offensive article, intended as a justification of the First Consul, and an attack on the measures of the British government. It is with great regret that I inform your lordship, that the senate have judged it prudent to comply with this demand; and that the article will be inserted in the paper of to-morrow. It is now in the hands of the publisher for that purpose. It was the wish of the senate that they might at least be allowed to omit or qualify the most offensive passages, but Mr. Rheinhardt said his orders were positive, for the *full and exact* insertion of the whole.

No. 72.

Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Hill to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Copenhagen, April 2, 1803.

The French minister at Hamburgh received orders from his government to have inserted in the public papers of that city an article which was sent to him, containing a commentary upon his Majesty's communication to parliament, respecting the necessity of increasing the military forces of the country in the present circumstances. The senate of Hamburgh consented with much repugnance to the insertion of this paragraph. The French minister desired that the same should be published in the papers of Altona; but the Danis magistrates said that they could not possibly permit it without an express order from this government. In consequence of this refusal, M. Daguesseau, the
French

French minister at this court, received from his colleague at Hamburgh a copy of the article, with a request that he would solicit the permission of its publication in the Danish papers. To my knowledge he had no answer yesterday, and I have every reason to suppose that this government will show the greatest reluctance in acceding to the French minister's request.

which appears at this court, received from his
father, although a copy of the original, with a
note that he would send the permission of the
author to the French paper. To my knowledge he had
no other authority, and I do not know to whom
the French government will show the original
balance in respect to the French language.

The French government has been very kind
to send me a copy of the original, with a
note that he would send the permission of the
author to the French paper. To my knowledge he had
no other authority, and I do not know to whom
the French government will show the original
balance in respect to the French language.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

Report made to the French Consul by Colonel Sebastiani,
extracted from the *Moniteur* of the 30th of Jan. 1803.

ON the 16th of September I embarked at Toulon on board the *Cornélie*; and on the 30th I arrived at Tripoli. I immediately wrote to Baron Cederstrom, the Swedish-rear-admiral, as well as to the Minister of the Pacha, to offer them my mediation to terminate the differences existing between the Swedish Court and the Regency. My mediation was accepted: the Minister and the Rear-Admiral repaired to the commissarial house of France, and we entered on the negotiation. The two parties were far asunder; the Pacha demanded a considerable sum, and an augmentation of the annual tribute. He urged a treaty made two years ago by an envoy of the King of Sweden, which assured the payment of 245,000 heavy piastres, and of an annuity of 20,000; he added, that two years of war had subjected him to extraordinary expenses, and that he used great moderation in conforming himself to the treaty in question. M. de Cederstrom only offered, in the name of his court, 100,000 piastres for the redemption of the Swedish slaves, who were to the number of a hundred and fifty, and an annuity of 5000 piastres. After much debate, I succeeded in making them sign a treaty which fixed the payment of the ransom at 150,000 piastres, and the annuity at 8000.—On the 1st of October I was presented with much pomp to the Pacha, who received me in the most distinguished manner. The exchange of the ratification of the treaty of peace took place, and the Italian republic was formally acknowledged. I caused its flag to be hoisted on the commissarial house of France, and it was saluted by the frigate and the place with 21 guns.—It was not without difficulty that the Pacha consented to acknowledge that republic. He feared that all Italy was comprized in this new republic, and that, in consequence, he would be obliged to respect indiscriminately all the ships of commerce of that part of Europe:—this would destroy his marine. I gave him the necessary explanations, and particularly those which related to the object of his apprehensions, and he replied to me, ‘Certainly I wish to be at peace with the Italian republic,

republic, without too much injuring my interest; but if it were still more difficult, I would do it, since the great Bonaparte desires it.'—The Pacha of Tripoli is a brave and enterprising man, the friend of France. The English have furnished succours to his brother, who is at present at Derne, without means or credit. His plan is to raise the country against the Bey. The political and administrative affairs of the Regency are conducted by Seid-Muhammed-el-Deghais, Minister of the Pacha. This man is full of sagacity, and has even some notions of European politics. He has been in France, and preserves for our country a predominant sentiment of affection. On the 2d of October I set out from Tripoli, and on the 16th arrived at Alexandria: the same day I waited upon General Stuart, commandant of the English forces by land and sea. I communicated to him the order of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which enjoined me to proceed to Alexandria, and if the English still occupied that place, to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. General Stuart then told me, that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected; but seeing that I insisted, and that I desired an answer less vague, he declared to me, that he had no orders from his Court to quit Alexandria, and that he even believed he should pass the winter there. General Stuart is a man of *mediocre* talents: he has for his aide-camp a French emigrant, called the Chevalier de Sades, a man of talent, and an enemy of France, who has much influence over the General. I went the same day to see Khourchid-Ahmid, the Pacha of Alexandria and the Capitan Bey, commander of the forces of the Ottoman porte. After the customary compliments, and some language agreeable to the Sublime Porte, I announced to them, that the agents of French commerce would assemble in Egypt. This communication gave them the greatest pleasure, and they did not conceal that they saw with grief the stay of the English in the country. I told them, that their stay could not be much longer, and that the general peace left no doubt of their approaching departure. On the 17th I visited the Cheik El-Messiry. The same day I also visited the Cheik Ibrahim Mufti. On the 18th I visited the Coupure du Khalidj, which has formed the lake Marcotis. The current of the waters of the lake Madie is still very strong, and if the Porte does not make haste to re-establish this important canal, the overflows which take place on the little tongue of land that separates the two lakes, will render the opening so considerable, that it will be impossible to travel. I do not think that the Swedish engineer sent by the Porte to direct these labours, has the necessary talents. The formation of the lake Marcotis appears to have contributed to the salubrity of the air. The city has

has no other water than what it draws from the wells of Marabouf. This little fort I found guarded by an English and Turkish garrison, in order to protect the inhabitants who came to draw water. I employed the day of the 19th in perambulating the town, and receiving different individuals who came to visit me. On the 20th, I set out for Cairo, escorted by two Turkish officers, and 6 French soldiers, whom I had taken on board the frigate, but contrary winds obliged me to return to the port. The next day I was at Aboukir, where I passed the night. I profited by this opportunity to visit the fort, which is in a very ruined state. On the 22d I arrived at Rosetta, after having visited the fort Julien; I saw the same day Osman, aga and duvanny of the town, as well as all the christians who reside there. The 23d I was at Faone, where I visited the commandant of the place, the Cadi, and the Cheiks; I received from the latter, and from all those whom I entertained, protestations of attachment to the First Consul. I passed the next day at Ralimanie, where I visited the Cheik Muhammed Abou-Aly; the fort of the town is almost entirely destroyed. I visited on the 25th, at Menouf, the Cheik Abdin, whom the First Consul had appointed Cadi. The other Cheiks of that town who came to visit me, held the same language as those of Faone. I said to them, 'The First Consul loves your country much, he speaks of it often; he interests himself in your happiness; he did not forget you, and recommended you to the Porte. He has made peace with Europe, and this country will feel the interest which he takes, and the recollection which he has preserved of the poor Cheiks of Egypt.'—Muhammed Kachef-Zourba Matzellem, who commanded at Menouf on my journey through that town, has been beheaded in consequence of being accused of communications with the Mamelouks. The two forts of Menouf are destroyed. I arrived the same day at Boulak. I sent immediately Citizen Joubert to inform the Pacha of Cairo of my arrival. The next morning, the 26th, the Pacha sent 300 cavalry and 200 infantry, commanded by the principal officers of his household, to accompany me to him, amidst a great many discharges of artillery. Having arrived at the Pacha's, I said to him, 'Peace has been concluded between the French Republic and the Sublime Porte; the ancient relations of amity and commerce have been re-established, and I am charged by the Great Consul Bonaparte, to assure you of his benevolence, and to announce to you the arrival of commissaries of the French commerce in Egypt.' The Pacha answered me, 'the benevolence with which the First Consul has honoured me, penetrates me with gratitude, and his commercial agents shall meet here the most friendly reception.' I proceeded then to the house which the

Pacha had prepared for me. I received the same day the visits of all the principal men of the country, and of the Copt Intendants. On the 27th I again repaired to the Pacha, with whom I had a long conference. I spoke to him in these words: 'the First Consul takes in you, and the country you govern, a very lively interest, and desires to contribute to your happiness; he has charged me therefore to offer you his mediation, in order to make peace between you and the Beys.'

The Pacha thanked me warmly and sincerely for the interest which the First Consul took in his behalf, but he protested to me that he had the most positive orders from his Court to make a war of extermination upon the Beys, and not to enter into any arrangement with them. I observed, that the unfortunate circumstances which had happened to the Ottoman troops (they had been beaten five times successively by the Mamelouks), rendered their position very critical, and that obstinacy exposed them to the loss of the province. He then communicated to me the order of the Porte, and I saw beyond a doubt that it was not possible for him to enter into any accommodation. I informed him that I intended to visit the different Cheiks of Cairo, and also Madame Murad Bey, and to inspect the environs and fortifications of the city. He ordered immediately that the guard which he had sent should accompany me wherever I wished to go, informing me, that he would use every means in his power to render my stay at Cairo agreeable.—The same day I commenced my visits, beginning with the Cheik Abdallah-el-Chescanoi, of the great mosque. As I was expected by him, he had assembled a considerable number of Cheiks. The conversation turned upon the interest which the First Consul took in Egypt, on his power, his glory, and on his esteem and benevolence for the learned Cheiks of Cairo. Their answers expressed their attachment to his person. He must have been a witness like myself to the enthusiasm excited at the view of the portrait of the First Consul to form an idea of the exaltation of their sentiments. I have given it to all the principal Cheiks of Cairo, and of the towns where I have travelled.—On the 28th I invited the Cheik Omar El-Berky, Prince of the Shiriss: he was ill, and I saw only his son.—The Cheik Suleiman El-Fargoumy received me with much friendship, and assured me of his boundless admiration for the First Consul.—The Citizen Joubert and Beye have certified to me that the inhabitants of Cairo never testified so much attachment to France as on my arrival.—When we pass along the streets, every body salutes us. Their astrologers make predictions every day as to what concerns the First Consul.—On the 29th, I went to visit Madame Murad Bey: her intendant had already prayed of me that I would grant her an interview. I informed her, that the First Consul had charged me

me to interpose my mediation, in order to make their peace with the Sublime Porte; but that the Pacha had ordered that no negotiation should be entered into.—I employed that day and the following in visiting the citadel, the Isle of Ro da Gize, Boulak, and all the other little forts which surround the city. The Turkish soldiers murmured to see me visit their forts, but I feigned not to hear them, and continued my course and my observations.

On the 29th, in returning to Fort Dupuy, a soldier menaced me with his attagan; but as the inhabitants of the city testified highly their indignation against him, I did not stop at his menaces, and continued my route. A moment afterwards Mustapha Oukil, one of the chiefs of the city, passed before me on horseback. In passing, he reproached my guides with marching before a Christian, and above all, before a Frenchman, and menaced them with the bastinado after my departure. I could not be silent under such an insult; and upon my return I sent Citizen Joubert to the Pacha, to make my complaint, and demand a prompt redress. I declared to him that I expected this man would come publicly to me to ask my pardon, place himself at my disposal, and implore my pity. He found that Mustapha was greatly protected by the Pacha, and wanted to arrange it otherwise; but I persisted by declaring formally to the Pacha, that if this reparation was not made in the manner in which I demanded it, I should instantly depart, and immediately write to Paris and Constantinople to state my complaint. This declaration produced all the effect which I expected; and Mustapha, alarmed, came on the following day to me, conducted by Rosetti, and he publicly asked my pardon, and put himself at my disposal. I told him that my first intention had been to cut off his head, and that I only gave him his life at the solicitations of the Pacha and M. Rosetti; but if in future he should ever insult the French, or those in their suite, his destruction would be inevitable. This affair, which was instantly spread throughout the whole city, produced the best effect.—The same day an attempt was made to excite the Albanese against me. Two letters from Rosetta, written by English Protegées, assured that there had been seen upon the coasts of Narolia a French fleet of 300 sail; that we were marching against Constantinople, and that my visit to Egypt had no other object but to deceive them, and blind them to their danger. I made the merchant come to me who had received the letter; I made him give it me—I instantly sent it to the Pacha himself, telling him that this absurd news was spread to occasion disorders, and to endeavour to alter the good understanding which existed between France and the Sublime Porte; and

and I guaranteed the falsehood of it with my head. The Pacha had discovered the snare, and did not fall into it. He even communicated to me a letter from General Stuart, which he had just received, and to which was joined an order of the day, of the First Consul, when he commanded the army of Egypt. This order of the day was dated in August 1799, and recalled to the recollection of the Egyptians, that Constantinople was tributary to Arabia, and that the time was now come to restore Cairo to its supremacy, and to destroy the Eastern Empire of the Ottomans. General Stuart begged the Pacha to consider the spirit of that order, and to judge from it of our attachment, and of our peace with the Turks. I was indignant to find that a soldier of one of the most polite nations of Europe should degrade himself so far as to instigate assassination, by means of such an insinuation—the Pacha treated me with the greatest politeness, and the English at Cairo were witnesses of the attachment of that city to the French. I received a deputation from the monks of Mount Sinai, whom I recommended to the Pacha: I wrote to their superior, to assure them of the friendship and protection of the First Consul. The monks of the Propaganda at Cairo, whom I placed under the national protection which they enjoyed before the war, celebrated a Te Deum for the prosperity of the First Consul. I assisted at this ceremony, at which all the Christians of Cairo were present. The evening before my departure (the 2d of November) I had another interview with the Pacha, and recommended all the Christians of Cairo to his protection, as well as the Turks who, during the residence of the French in Egypt, were connected with them. He not only promised to respect them, but even to treat them with bounty. On the 3d, I set out in a conveyance of the Pacha's, in order to repair to Damietta. The Pacha ordered me to be escorted to Boulak, with the same honours that I received on the day of my arrival. I had written to Captain Gourdain, to repair to Damietta with the frigate, in order to convey me to Syria. On the 5th I stopped a short time at Simenoud, and afterwards at Mansoura, where I saw the Commandant of the city and the Cheik Esseid-Muhammed-El-Chenaoni, who came to see me, as well as all the other Cheiks. I spoke to them in the same manner as the other Cheiks of Egypt, and received the same promises of attachment. The tower of Mansoura is destroyed. The same day I arrived at Damietta. The next day I went to Ahmed-Pacha-Behil, a creature of the Grand Vizier's; he returned my visit the same day. He conducted himself perfectly well to me during my stay in that city.

On the 7th I went to visit the fort of Lesbe and the towers of Bogaz,

Bogaz. They have not continued the works of that fort, which is in a bad state: Those of Bogaz are in a good condition. There is a garrison of 200 men in the fort and in the towers. On the 8th I received the visit of Hassan Toubar: his influence over the inhabitants of Mensale are still the same. On the 9th I went to Seninie, where I saw the Cheik Ibrahim-El-Behlout, he who behaved so well to the French under the orders of General Vial, when they were taken and imprisoned. The First Consul had exempted his village from all contributions. I saw all the Cheiks at Damietta, particularly Ali Khasaki, whom the First Consul had invested with a pelisse: He is possessed of great credit, and is much attached to the French. There are at Damietta two christians, who are men of merit, and may be very useful to us: they are M. Bazile and Don Bazile. They are possessed of good information, have very considerable fortunes, and are very highly respected. In Egypt, Chiefs, Merchants, People, all like to talk of the First Consul—all offer up prayers for his happiness. All the news which concerns him spread from Alexandria or Damietta to the pyramids and the grand cataracts with astonishing rapidity. On the 14th the frigate arrived at Bogaz from Damietta: I immediately set out for Acre, at which place I arrived on the 19th.

The 20th of November, in the morning, I dispatched Citizens Joubert and Legrange to Dgezzar-Pacha, with a letter, in which I stated to him, that peace being concluded between France and the Porte, the relations of commerce should be re-established on the footing they stood before the war, and that I was charged by the First Consul to confer with him on these objects. I begged of him to answer me in writing, if he was inclined to treat with me. In some hours the messengers returned: Dgezzar had received them coldly. He expressed his desire to see me personally, but was unwilling to write. Every body advised me not to see him, without an assurance written by himself; but this he appeared unwilling to do: But notwithstanding this cautionary advice, and this obstinate refusal to write, I determined to repair myself immediately to Acre. I repaired to the house of the Commissary of the Seven Isles. Very soon after, the Drogoman of the Pacha, informed of my arrival, came to conduct me to the Pacha, who received me in an apartment where he was unattended, and which was without any other furniture than a carpet. He had on one side of him a pistol with four barrels, a small air-gun, a sabre, and a hatchet. After inquiring as to my health, he asked me, whether I was not persuaded that our end is pre-ordained in Heaven, and that nothing could change our destiny. I answered that I believed, as he did, in predestination. He continued

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to speak for some time on that subject. I perceive, however, that he affected a degree of simplicity, but that, at the same time, he wished to pass for a man of wit, as well as for a just man. He repeated several times, 'It is said, that Dgezzar is barbarous: this is false; he is but just and severe. Request of the First Consul, not to send me, as commissary of commercial relations, a lame or a blind man; because such a person would be sure to say, that Dgezzar had made him so.' Soon after he said, 'I desire that the commissary you may send shall reside at Seide, as that is the most commercial port in my dominions: Besides, it is not necessary he should reside here, where I shall be myself the French Commissary, and shall take care that your countrymen be well received. I highly esteem the French. In stature Bonaparte is small, but he is nevertheless the greatest of mankind. I know that he is greatly regretted at Cairo, where they wish to see him again.' I made a few observations on the peace between France and the Porte; to which he answered, 'Do you know why I have thus received, and feel so much pleasure at seeing you? It is because you come unauthorized by a *Firman*, and without any orders from the Divan. I have the greatest contempt for its blind Vizier. They say that Dgezzar is a Bosnian, a man of straw, and cruel to excess; but nevertheless, I can stand the ordeal. I was once poor. My father had nothing to bequeath me but courage. I have achieved my own elevation by dint of exertion. This, however, does not make me proud, and Dgezzar, perhaps, will soon finish his career; not that he is old, as his enemies report, (he then performed some of the manœuvres of the Mamelukes, in their mode of rising arms, &c. which he really executed with surprising adroitness and agility,) but because, most likely, God will have it so. The King of France, once so powerful, has perished. Nebuchadnezzar, the greatest of all kings, was, when his time was come, killed by a fly, &c.' He made several other observations in this strain, and afterwards spoke of the motives which induced him to make war upon the French army: From the whole of his demeanour it could easily be seen, that he wished to be on good terms with the First Consul, and that he stifled his resentments. The following is the apologue, which he used to demonstrate the causes of his resistance. 'A black slave,' he said, 'after a long journey, in which he had suffered the greatest privations, arrived at a little field of sugar canes: he stoped therein, and indulged himself in partaking of the delicious liquor they afforded; and at length was determined to remain on the spot. Very soon after, two travellers, who had followed him, came up. The first said to him, salamallee (the mode of wishing

wishing health). The Devil take it, answered the black. The second traveller then approached, and inquired why he had answered in such a way to so good a wish. I had very good reason for it, replied he; if I had answered in a friendly manner, the man would have entered into conversation with me, and afterwards sat down beside me; he would have partaken of my refreshments, and finding them desirable, would have endeavoured to obtain exclusive possession.' I recommended to the favourable attention of Dgezzar the Christians and the convents at Nazareth and Jerusalem: He assured me that he would treat them with much regard. I did not forget the Mutuales, and received the same assurance in their behalf. Dgezzar frequently observed to me, that his word was, with him, more sacred than treaties. Our conversation was interrupted for some moments by a kind of military music, which he performed in a very agreeable style. The palace of Dgezzar is built with much taste and elegance; but, in order to arrive at the apartments, a number of turnings are necessary. At the foot of the staircase, however, is situated a prison, the gate of which is allowed to be open from noon till evening. I saw a number of the unfortunate inhabitants. In the courts I observed twelve field-pieces well mounted, and in admirable order. Never did I encounter a sight more hideous or repulsive than that of the Minister of Dgezzar, whom I met in going out. The Pacha had caused one of his eyes to be put out, and his nose and ears to be cut off. I saw in the town more than a hundred individuals in the same state. On beholding the domestics of Dgezzar, and even the inhabitants of Acre, one would imagine himself in the resorts of brigands ready to assassinate. This monster has imprinted the mark of his atrocious character upon every thing within the limits of his power. I had an opportunity of seeing, while at Acre, the Procurateur of the Propaganda, as well as that of the Holy Land. Of the former, and of the Commissary of the Seven Isles, I collected some information concerning the present state of Syria, and the fortifications of Acre, of which I had seen but a part: I was not suffered to visit them. The Procurateur of the Holy Land is grateful to the First Consul for the protection he had afforded the monks. He assured me that my recommendation to Dgezzar would be very useful. He hinted to me Dgezzar's earnest wishes to be on good terms with the First Consul. It is certain that the former behaved very well to the crew of a French vessel which put into Acre shortly before my arrival. Dgezzar occupies all Palestine, with the exception of Jaffa, where Aboumarak Pacha has been besieged nearly five months by a force of 9000 men. This operation prevents Dgezzar from
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carrying on hostilities with the desired vigour against the Emir of the Druses, who, for the space of a year, had paid him no tribute. Tripoli is tranquil at present: it is different at Aleppo, whence the Pacha has been driven. Damascus is in open rebellion against the Porte:—Not only has the Pacha of the Divan been expelled, but the Aga, who commanded the citadel for the Turks, has been delivered up by the soldiers to the insurgents, who have decapitated him. Tripoli is now under a rebellious Pacha, who is a creature of Dgezzar; who has lately ordered him to protect the pilgrims from Mecca. In a word, all Syria is with Dgezzar, and the Ottomans are as much detested here as in Egypt. The Mutuales live peaceably in their villages; they have, however, been obliged to retire from the borders of the sea. Aboumarak is now at the last extremity: This man is equally inconsiderate and cruel, and is surpassed only by Dgezzar. The Christians are even more in dread of him, and tremble for their future situation. The monks of the convent of Jaffa have withdrawn to Jerusalem. The 21st of November I quitted Acre. As the winds were unfavourable to a voyage to Jaffa, I set sail for Zante, where I arrived the 4th of December. I landed the same day, but the ship's company were put under quarantine. I repaired to the house of the French Commissary, escorted by the officers of health. I soon learned that the Isle and the Republic were split into different parties, and that even the tranquillity of the place was threatened. I assembled the members of the constituted authorities, and the principal persons of the town, at the house of the Governor M. de Calishipode. After having represented to them the interest which the First Consul took in their welfare, I induced them to lay aside that spirit of party which distracted them, and to wait without passion, and in silence, the new constitution. These few words were received with enthusiasm, and all of them exclaimed, 'France for ever! Bonaparte for ever?' These cries were reiterated on my going out by more than 4000 men, who followed me to the door. The Governor and the Russian commandant were alarmed at it; and I learned by the French commissary, on the following day, that two of the leading men were sent to prison, but that, on his solicitations, and fearful of my reproaches, they were set at liberty in the course of the night. I went to the Conciergerie, and had the Governor brought there. I spoke to him strongly on the irregularity of his conduct: he was alarmed, and promised that he would look upon those who cried out, 'Live the First Consul!' as good citizens, and should in future treat them as such. As he sent, in the course of the night, a courier to his government, and I had reason to believe he had made a wrong report, I immediately wrote to the Charge d'Affaires of the republic

republic at Corfou, to inform him what had passed, and that I was setting off for Messina. I do not stray from the truth in assuring you, that the islands of the Ionian sea will declare themselves French as soon as opportunity shall offer itself.

English army in Egypt.—That army, commanded by general Stuart, consists of 4430 men. They wholly and exclusively occupy Alexandria and the neighbouring forts. The Turks, who formed the garrison of some of these forts, have been removed. Lately the English general has occupied Demanhour with 100 infantry and 100 horse, under the pretext of curbing the Arabs. The English have made no necessary works for the maintenance of the forts; the palisades are almost entirely destroyed, and the branches occasioned by the rains have very much damaged all the new fortifications. They occupy none of the works which are beyond the line of the Arabs, and all the redoubts which existed at the departure of the French army are destroyed. The Pacha of Cairo furnishes to the English army corn, rice, wood, and provisions, without any payment. The consumption is treble what it should be: They commit great waste. A great misunderstanding reigns between General Stuart and the Pacha.

STATE OF THE ARMY.

Dillon's Regiment—Emigrants	-	-	450
British Chasseurs—Ditto	-	-	550
Role's Regiment—Swiss	-	-	600
Wetteville's Regiment—Ditto	-	-	680
The 10th Regiment of Infantry—English	-	-	600
The 61st Regiment Infantry—Ditto	-	-	650
The 88th Regiment Infantry—Ditto	-	-	400
Dragoons of the 26th Light—Ditto	-	-	350
Artillery—Ditto	-	-	150
Total			4430

The Turkish army.—Muhammed, Pacha of Cairo, who has taken, it is not known why, the title of Viceroy of Egypt, does not command the troops in person. Muhammed Aly-Serr-Chersme, who had the command since my arrival, was killed before Gaza; they are now under the Orders of Jussef Kiahia. Tair is Pacha of the Arnaoutes, who compose the greatest part of this army, amounting to about 16,000 men. They from time to time receive reinforcements.—Chourchid-Ahmed, a Pacha of Two Tails, is at Alexandria with 600 men, who occupy no fortification. This Pacha is, as one

may say, a prisoner with the English. The Turkish army consists of 7640 men, and that of the Arnaoutes of 8500, making a whole of 16140.—It is useless to add, that this is not an army; they are men ill armed, without discipline, without confidence in their chiefs, and enervated by excessive debauchery. The chiefs are in every thing like their soldiers; ignorant even of the first principles of the military art; and uniformly actuated by the love of wealth, they think of nothing but of obtaining it, and of finding the means of carrying it off in safety. Six thousand French would at present be enough to conquer Egypt.

Army of the Mamelukes.—The army of the Beys is composed of 3000 Mameluks, of 3500 Arabs of the tribe of Ababde of Chark, and of 3500 of the tribe of Binialy. Muhammed Bey Elfy married the daughter of the Cheik of the first, and Maarzouk Bey son of Ibrahim Bey, the daughter of the Cheik of the tribe of Binialy. The power in this army is divided between Ibrahim Bey, who is the chief, Eley Bey and Osman Bey, who has succeeded Murad Bey. Their headquarters are at Djergé. They have eighty French deserters, which form a small corps of artillery. To the present time they have beat the Turks in every action, and the Egyptians prefer them to the Osmanlis. The whole of Upper Egypt has submitted to them.

Syria.—Acre. The body of this place has been repaired; the port has been covered with a small horned work, and the tower of the angle by a half-moon. They have likewise made a small fleche, in front of the palace of the Pacha.—All the works are well kept. The weakest part is that towards the sea, and particularly the point which defends the entrance of the port. The forces of Dgezzar are at present 13 or 14,000 men, of which 9,000 are employed at the siege of Jaffa. Jerusalem and Nazareth are occupied by the troops of the Pacha of Acre. The Naplonsains serve against Aboumarak.—Jaffa. The Vizier, after the taking of Egypt, caused the body of the place to be re-constructed, which is at present in a very good state. Aboumarak, Pacha of Palastine, who defends this place, has a garrison of 4000 men.—Gaza is occupied by 400 troops of Aboumarak.—The Emir of the Druses has refused to Dgezzar his annual contribution, and has raised a respectable armament. The Pacha waits till the fall of Jaffa to attack him. The English wished to interfere as Mediators between the Emir and Dgezzar, but the last refused their mediation. The Porte has, at this moment, little connexion with Syria.

(Signed)

HORACE SEBASTIANI.

No. 2.

Paris, 3 Ventose, Feb. 22.

ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Decree of the Government of the 21st February.

The Government of the Republic decrees, that a view of the present situation of the Republic shall be carried to the Legislative Body by the messengers of the Government, and also the same be inserted in the bulletin of the laws.

(Signed) BONAPARTE, First Consul.

By order of the First Consul,

(Signed) H. B. MARET, Secretary of State.

View of the State of the Republic.

Events have neither frustrated the wishes, nor disappointed the expectations of Government. The Legislative Body, on resuming its labours, has the satisfaction of finding the Republic strengthened by the union of its citizens, more active in its pursuits of industry, and more confident in its prospects of prosperity.

The execution of the concordat, from which the enemies of public order still ventured to conceive criminal hopes, has almost every where produced the most beneficial effects. The principles of an enlightened religion, the voice of the sovereign pontiff, the firmness and perseverance of Government have triumphed over every obstacle. Mutual sacrifices have reunited the ministers of religion; enlightened reason and cordial unanimity have revived the Gallican church; and the happiest change has already manifested itself in the public morals. Every day produces a more perfect coincidence of opinion, and of sentiment. Childhood is more docile to the instructions of parents, and youth more submissive to the authority of magistrates. The conscription goes on smoothly in those very places, where the mere name of conscription was sufficient to stimulate insurrection, and to serve the country is now become a duty of religion.

In those departments which the First Consul visited, he every where received pledges, and observed proofs of a return to those principles which constitute the strength and happiness of society.

In the departments of the Eure, the Lower Seine, the Oise, the inhabitants proudly exult in the national glory. They are sensible to their full extent of the advantages of equality. They hail with blessings the restoration of peace; they

they receive with blessings the re-establishment of public worship. These are the ties that bind down every heart to the state, and the constitution.

It is the duty of Government to cherish and direct these auspicious dispositions.

Other forms of worship have been regularly organised. Consistories are formed and enlightened citizens, tried and acknowledged defenders of public order, of civil and religious liberty.

Public instruction, that indispensable support of society, is every where sought after with eagerness and alacrity. Several lyceums have already been opened; already, as Government had well foreseen, a number of private schools aspire to the rank of the secondary schools. The whole body of citizens shew their conviction, that there can be no happiness without the light of education; that, without talents and information, there can be no equality, but that of misery and servitude.

A military school is opened to receive the young defenders of the country. Soldiers, they will learn to support the life of camps, and endure the fatigues of war. By long habits of obedience, they will be trained up to the art of commanding, and they will bring to the armies courage and discipline, united with talents, and with knowledge.

In the lyceums, as well as in the military school, the youth of the departments, newly incorporated with the Republic, will live mingled without any distinction with the youth of old France. From this confusion of minds and manners, from this communication of habits and of dispositions, from this commixture of interests, of projects, and of hopes, will spring up that fraternity, which, of several nations, will make but one people, destined by their position, by their courage, and by their virtues, to form the centre of union, and the example of Europe.

The National Institute, which has its ascendancy over public instruction, has received a more useful direction, and henceforward will exert a more active influence over the national character, over the language of the country, and over the arts, sciences, and literature.

In order to ensure the stability of our infant institutions, in order to remove from the eyes of the public the spectre of discord, which appeared to them in the periodical return of elections to the supreme magistracy, the friends of the country called for the Consulate for life to be granted to the first magistrate. The people, upon being consulted answered to their call, and the Senate proclaimed the will of the people.

The

The system of lists of eligibility could not resist the test of experience, and the force of public opinion.

The organization of the Senate was incomplete.

The national justice was left to be administered by tribunals without harmony, and without dependence on each other. There was no authority to protect or to reform them; no tie of restraint, to subject them to one common discipline.

In fine, there was wanting to France a power to reclaim justice itself, the power of granting pardon. How often, these twelve years past, has that power been implored! How many unfortunates have fallen the victims of an inflexible sternness, with which wise men reproached our laws! How many criminals have been acquitted through a false indulgence, because our punishments were too severe.

A *Senatus Consultum* has restored to the people the exercise of those rights, which the Constituent Assembly had acknowledged; but it has restored them surrounded with precautions, which preserve the people from errors, or precipitation in their choice; with precautions, which guard the influence of property, and the preponderance of enlightened talents.

Should the first magistracy become vacant, the duties and the proceedings of the Senate are traced out for such an emergency: forms of certain operation guide the wisdom and the liberty of their choice; and the quick decision of that choice deprives ambition of the means of conspiring, and anarchy the means of destroying.

The cement of time will every day consolidate, more and more, this tutelary Institution. It will be not only the term of all disquietudes, and the objects of all hopes, but likewise the fairest recompences that can be held out to public services, and public virtues.

Justice embraces all tribunals with one common bond. They have each their subordinate station and their censor: they are always free in the exercise of their functions; always independent of power, but never independent of the laws.

The privilege of granting pardon, when the interest of the Republic requires it, or when circumstances prescribe indulgence, is entrusted to the hands of the first magistrate; but it is only confided to him under the guard of justice itself; he is to exercise it only under the eyes of a council, and after having consulted the severe oracles of the law.

If institutions may be appreciated by their effects, never was any institution more important in its result than the organic

organic *Senatus Consultum*. From that moment the French people began to confide in their destiny ; property began to resume its former value, and speculations of distant view to be multiplied ; until that moment every thing seemed to float in uncertainty. The present moment was cherished, the next was a subject of alarm, and the enemies of the country continued to cherish hopes. Since that moment, they are reduced to impotence and detestation.

The island of Elba has been ceded to France ; that acquisition gives her a mild and industrious people ; two fine ports, a productive and precious mine : but, being separated from France, it could not be intimately united with any of her departments, or subjected to the regulations of a common administration. Principles have been made to bend to the necessity of circumstances ; exceptions have been established for the island of Elba, which its position, and the public interest, prescribed.

The abdication of the sovereign, the will of the people, and the necessity of existing circumstances, had placed Piedmont under the power of France. Amidst the nations that surrounded it, with the elements that composed its population, Piedmont was unable to support, either the weight of its own independence, or the expences of a monarchy. United to France, it will reap the benefits of its security, and its greatness ; its laborious and enlightened citizens will exert their industry and their talents in the bosom of the arts, and under the shade of peace.

Security and tranquillity prevail in the interior of France. The vigilance of the magistracy, the severity of justice, and a *Gendarmerie* vigorously appointed, and directed by a commander grown grey in the career of honour, has every where impressed terror on the minds and the attempts of the brigands.

Private interest has raised itself to a sentiment of public interest. Citizens have not shrunk from attacking those whom they formerly dreaded, even when they were chained down at the foot of the tribunals of justice. Whole communes have taken up arms and destroyed the brigands. Foreigners envy the security of our public roads, and that public force, which, though often invisible, is always present, attend on their footsteps, and watch for their protection without any necessity of imploring its aid.

During the course of a difficult year, amidst the exigencies of a general scarcity, the poor looked with confidence to the care of government. They supported with courage the privations which necessity imposed ; and they received with gratitude the succours which they were taught to expect.

The

The crime of forgery is no longer encouraged by the hope of impunity. The zeal of the tribunals appointed to prosecute and punish it, and the just severity of the laws, have at length checked the progress of an evil which threatened both the public treasure, and the fortunes of individuals.

Our cultivation daily improves, and defies the most boasted agricultural systems of Europe. In every department are to be found enlightened farmers, who afford both instruction and example.

Premiums have been held out for improving the breed of horses; and similar encouragements are proposed for the improvement of wool by the introduction of a foreign breed of sheep. Zealous administrators are every where occupied in tracing out and revealing the richness of our soil, and in disseminating the useful plans and the happy results which experience daily discovers.

Our manufactures multiply and receive new spirit and improvement. While they emulate each, they will soon, no doubt, become the rivals of the most renowned manufactures of foreign countries. Henceforth there will be nothing wanting to their prosperity but capitals less dearly purchased. But capitalists begin already to give up the hazardous speculations of stock-jobbing, and devote their attention to the improvement of land and the pursuit of useful enterprizes. More than twenty thousand workmen, who were dispersed throughout Europe, have been recalled by the attention and by the favours of government, and will soon be restored to our manufactures.

Among our manufactures there is one which is almost peculiar to France, which Colbert kindled up by his genius. It was buried under the ruins of Lyons: Government has exerted all its endeavours to extricate it. Lyons is again restored to splendour and opulence; already do its manufactures impose a tribute on the luxury of Europe. But the principle of their success is to be found in the luxury of France itself; it is in the changefulness of our taste, and the mutability of our fashions, that foreign luxury must look for its aliment, it is it that gives motion and life to an immense population, who, without that encouragement, must lose itself in corruption and misery.

There will soon be at Compiègne, there will soon arise on the confines of La Vendée, a number of Prytanées, where our youth will be brought up in habits of industry, and instructed in the mechanical arts. From that source our dockyards and our manufactures will one day draw inspectors to direct their labours.

Fourteen millions arising out of the barrier tax, and ten millions out of the extraordinaries, have been employed during the year 10 in improving the public roads, in keeping up the old communications. New communications have also been opened. The Simplon, Mount-Cenis, and Mount-Genèvre, will soon open a triple and easy access to Italy—a high road will lead from Genoa to Marseilles—a road is chalked out from Saint Esprit to Gap—another from Rennes to Brest, through Pontivy. At Pontivy establishments are to be raised which will have a powerful influence over the public mind of the departments of which ci-devant Brittany was composed—a canal will introduce into it new sources of commerce and prosperity.

On the banks of the Rhine from Bingen to Coblentz, a necessary road is cut through inaccessible rocks. The neighbouring communes associate their labours to the sacrifices of the public treasury, and the people of the other bank, who ridiculed the folly of the enterprize, are astonished and confounded at the rapidity of the execution.

A great number of workmen are employed on the canal of Saint Quintin.

The Canal of Ourcq is opened, and soon will Paris people enjoy the benefit of its waters, and the salubrity and the embellishments which they promise.

The canal intended to unite the navigation of the Seine and the Saone, of the Danube and the Rhine, is almost entirely finished as far as Dole, and the public treasury already receives in the increased price of wood, to which that Canal opens the approach, a sum equal to that which it has furnished for the continuance of the work.

The canals of Argues, Mortes, and the Rhone, the draining of the marshes of the Lower Charente, are begun, and will open up new channels to commerce, and afford new lands for cultivation. Works are going forward for the reparation of the dykes of the Isle of Cadsand, of Ostend, of the Cotes du Nord, and the re-establishment of the navigation of our rivers. This navigation is no longer given up solely to the labours and the cares of government. The owners of boats plying on these rivers have already felt that it was their patrimony, and they fix on themselves the taxes by which the works are to be kept in proper repair. On the ocean forts are erecting to cover the roads of the Isle of Aix, and to protect the vessels of the republic. Every where funds are raised for the reparation and improvement of our ports. A new basin and locked sluices will terminate the harbour of Havre, and will form an excellent port for the commerce of La
Manche

Manche. A company of Pilots is formed to secure the safe navigation of L'Escaut, and to free foreign pilots from the danger to which an unknown navigation must expose them.

At Antwerp labours are begun, which will have the effect of restoring to its commerce its ancient celebrity, and the government has in contemplation a plan for forming canals to unite the navigation of the Escaut, the Meuse, and the Rhine, to give to our docks those materials of wood which grows in our own soil, and to our manufactures a perfection which the manufacturers of other countries dispute with us on our own territory.

The Islands of Martinique, Tobago, and St. Lucie have been restored to us with all the elements of prosperity. Guadaloupe, re-conquered and pacified, returns to cultivation. Guiana rises from a long protracted infancy, and assumes a flourishing appearance.

St. Domingo had submitted, and the author of its troubles was in France. Every thing announced the return of prosperity but, a cruel malady delivered it up to new miseries. At length the scourge which desolated our army has ceased its ravages. The forces which now are on the island, and those which will speedily arrive from our different ports, guarantee the prospect of its speedy return to peace and to commercial pursuits.

Vessels are setting sail for the Isles of France and Reunion, and for India.

Our maritime commerce is seeking to renew its ancient connections, to form new relations; and by these efforts it gains new strength. Already happy experience and wise encouragements have re-animated a spirit for engaging in the fishery, which was long the patrimony of France. Commercial expeditions, still more important, are formed or projected for the West India Colonies, the Isle of France, and the East Indies.

Marseilles resumes in the Mediterranean its antient ascendancy.

Chambers of commerce have been restored in the cities where they formerly existed. New ones have been established in those places, which, by the extent of their operations, and the importance of their manufactures, have appeared to deserve them. In these associations, formed by persons whose situation entitles them to the honour of choosing the members, the spirit, as well as the science of commerce, will revive. There its interests will be developed, inseparable from the interests of the state. The merchant will there learn to place, in preference to riches, the con-

sideration which honours them, and before the enjoyments of a vain luxury, that wise economy which fixes the esteem of his fellow-citizens, and the confidence of strangers.

Deputies, chosen from the different chambers, will discuss, in the presence of government, the interests of commerce and manufactures, and the laws and regulations which circumstances may require.

In our forces, by sea and land, instruction and the love of discipline are sedulously inculcated. Responsibility becomes more rigid in our military corps. An economical administration has succeeded to the dilapidating system of contracts. The soldier, better fed and better clothed, understands economy, and his savings, which he throws into the common stock, attach him to his standard as well as to his family.

Every branch of our finances becomes more productive. The collection of direct contribution is less rigorous with regard to the contributors. In the year six it was reckoned that about fifty millions were in the hands of the collectors of taxes, and payments were three or four years in arrear. At this moment the sum in the hands of the collectors is not above three millions, and the contributions are paid even before they are due.

All the rules which have been made, and all the plans of administration which have been formed, give a produce still increasing. The rules applicable to the registering of commercial transactions is productive to a degree, which attests the rapid movements of capital, and the multiplicity of business which is transacted.

In the midst of so many signs of prosperity, the excess of the direct contributions is still made a ground of complaint.

The government has learnt, from every one versed in the principles of taxation, that the surcharge consisted chiefly in the inequality of the mode in which the taxes were imposed. Measures have been taken, and are carrying into effect, to ascertain the real inequalities which exist in the different departments. In the course of the year twelve, regular and simultaneous operations will have ascertained what is the relation which ought to exist betwixt the contributions of the different departments, and what in each department is the just rate of the land tax. The moment that a certain result has been fixed, the government will give orders for those alterations which justice requires. But in the course of this year, and without waiting for those results, it will propose an important diminution in the land tax.

Innovations

Innovations are still proposed in our financial system ; but every change is an evil, if it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated that certain advantage would result from it. The government will seek from time and from discussions, weighed with all possible care, the maturity of these projects, which inexperience often hazards ; which they support by those past examples, the memory of which has been almost effaced from the public mind ; and on the financial doctrines of a nation, which, by unnatural and exaggerated efforts, has broke through every measure of public contribution and expenditure.

With an increase of revenue, which no one ventured to calculate, extraordinary circumstances have led to wants which it was impossible to foresee.

It was necessary to re-conquer two of our colonies, and to re-establish in all the power and the government of the mother country.

It was necessary, by means sudden, and too extended to admit of rigid economy, to procure subsistence for the capital and several of the departments. At least, however, the success of the government has been equal to its efforts, and, after these vast exertions, resources remain henceforth to guarantee the capital against the return of want, and to disconcert the projects of monopoly.

In the methodized statement of the minister of finance, will be found a general view of the annual contributions, and the different branches of the public revenue ; what was their amount during the last year ; what prospect of amelioration existed ; whether from the mode of administration, or the progress of public prosperity, what have been, in the different departments of the ministry, the elements of the expenditure during the year ten ; what are the sums still remaining to be paid for that and former years ; what resources exist to cover them, whether arising from outstanding arrears of taxes, or from the extraordinary funds appropriated to pay off the debts contracted in these years, and which have not yet been exhausted ; what is the actual amount of the public debt ; what has been its increase ; how it has been diminished by natural causes ; and how its extinction has been affected by the sinking fund.

In the account of the minister of the public treasury will be seen a statement of the receipts, the payments of the year ten ; what belongs to the different branches of the revenue ; what is chargeable in each year ; and on each part of the administration.

The united accounts of the two ministers will form a complete table of our financial situation. The government hold
up

up with equal satisfaction the picture which it presents to its friends and its detractors, to citizens and to foreigners.

After authorizing the foreseen expences of the year 12, and appropriating the necessary revenue, objects of the greatest interest will occupy the attention of the Legislative Body. It is necessary to introduce a change into our system of coinage. The custom-house duties must be re-organized, so as more effectually to check the progress of contraband trade. It is at length essential to give to France that civil code so long promised and so long expected.

Above all, projects of laws have been formed under the observations of government, and matured in conferences where commissions from the Council of State and the Tribunate were animated only by the love of truth and regard for the public interest. The same sentiments, the same principles will guide the deliberation of the legislators, and secure to the Republic the wisdom, and the impartiality of the laws which are adopted.

On the Continent, every thing offers us pledges of repose and tranquillity.

The Italian Republic, since the proceedings at Lyons, has been daily strengthening itself by the more intimate union of the people of whom it is composed. The happy harmony among the authorities by which it is governed, its internal administration, its military force already give it the character and the attitude of a state long established; and if wisdom preserve them, they guarantee to it a destiny of uninterrupted prosperity.

Liguria, placed under a mixed constitution, sees at its head, and in the bosom of its authorities, all those of its citizens, the most estimable for their virtues, by their illumination and their fortune.

New shocks have convulsed the Helvetic republic. The Government owed its support to neighbours, whose repose was essential to the repose of France, and it will use every exertion to ensure the success of its mediation, and with it the happiness of a people whose position, whose habits, and whose interests, make it the necessary ally of France.

Batavia successively takes possession of the colonies which the peace restored to her.

She will ever remember that France must ever be her most useful friend or her most destructive foe.

In Germany the last stipulations of the Treaty of Luneville are carrying into effect.

Prussia, Bavaria, all the Secular Princes who had possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, will obtain on the right bank suitable indemnities.

The

The House of Austria finds in the bishopricks of Salzburgh, Aischfett, Trent and Brixen, and the greatest part of Pau, more than it had lost in Tuscany. Thus, by the happy co-operation of France and Russia, all permanent interests are conciliated, and from the bosom of that tempest which seemed ready to overwhelm it, the German Empire, that Empire so necessary to the equilibrium and the repose of Europe, rises more powerful, composed of elements more homogenous, better combined and more adopted to the circumstances and opinions of the present age.

A French Ambassador is at Constantinople, charged with renewing and fortifying the ties which attach us to a power which seems to be threatened with destruction, but which it is our interest to sustain and to support the foundations by which it is upheld.

The British forces are still in Alexandria and Malta. The Government had a fair right of complaint, but it has received intelligence that the vessels which are to convey them to Europe are already in the Mediterranean.

The Government guarantees to the nation the peace of the continent, and it is permitted to entertain a hope of the continuance of maritime peace. This peace is the want, as well as the desire of all nations. For its preservation, the Government will do every thing compatible with national honour, essentially connected with the strict execution of the treaties.

But in England, two parties maintain a contest for power. One of those parties has concluded peace, and appears desirous of maintaining it. The other has taken an Oath of eternal hatred to France. Hence that fluctuation of opinion and of counsels which prevail.—Hence that attitude, at the same time pacific and menacing.

While this contest of parties continues, measures of precaution are what the Government is called upon to adopt. Five hundred thousand men ought to be, and shall be ready to undertake its defence, and avenge its injuries. Strange necessity which miserable passions impose on two nations, whom interest and inclination mutually prompt to the cultivation of peace.

Whatever success intrigues may experience in London, no other people will be involved in new combinations—the Government says, with conscious pride, that England alone cannot maintain a struggle against France.

But we have better hopes, and we believe that in the British cabinet, nothing will be listened to but the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity.

Yes, doubtless, the peace will daily be more consolidated. The relation of the two governments will assume the character

ter of good-will which is suitable to their mutual interests. A happy repose will bury the recollection of the long calamities of a disastrous war, and France and England, rendering their happiness reciprocal, will deserve the gratitude of the whole world.

The First Consul (Signed) BONAPARTE.

By Order of the First Consul,

The Secretary of State, H. B. MARET.

No. 3.—Translation.

Copy of a Letter from Citizen Talleyrand to Cit. Fauvelet.
Paris, 26 Brumaire, 10th year (Nov. 17, 1803.)

I forward to you, Citizen, a series of questions, concerning which I am desirous of having your answers. You will have the goodness to place them opposite the questions on the same sheet of paper, doubled in two, similar to the one which I have the honor to send to you. I shall be obliged to you to send me this paper as soon as possible, without, however, suffering your too great haste to be prejudicial to your accuracy. If you are doubtful upon any point you will have the goodness to mention it. You will probably find no difficulty in consulting with some well-informed merchants or clerks in the custom-house, who you think may have it in their power to give you some positive information, and you will declare the sources from whence you have drawn that information. You will not consider this business as forming a part of your official correspondence. You must not number it, but you must content yourself with putting at the top of it, as in the projet which I enclose to you, *Private Correspondence*.

To Citizen Fauvelet, at Dublin.

No. 4.—Translation.

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.

Questions.

1. What number of vessels have entered and cleared out of the ports within your district within each year from 1792 to 1801 inclusive?
2. What is their tonnage, or their admeasurement in sea tons of 2000 4 P.?
3. Under what flag do they navigate?
4. From whence they come?

5. Whi-

5. Whither bound?
6. With what merchandize freighted.
7. What was the price of freight to the principal ports of Europe, each sea ton of 2000 4 P. S.?
8. What French productions are most in request in the market of the town where you reside, as well as of the other considerable towns in your district?
9. What is the merchandize which can be exported to France with greater advantage from the said markets than from any other?
10. What are the course of exchange, and the current prices of merchandize, from three months to three months from the year 1792 to 1801?
11. *You are required to furnish a plan of the ports of your district, with a specification of the soundings for mooring vessels.*
12. *If no plan of the ports can be procured, you are to point out with what wind vessels can come in and go out, and what is the greatest draught of water with which vessels can enter therein deeply laden?*
13. What are the principal commercial houses?
If the heads of these houses are foreigners, you are to point out of what country they are; and in all cases you are to state with what countries they are principally connected, and what is their chief line of commerce.
14. What is the usual course of exchange?
15. Whether there is a public bank, and what is its organization?
16. Whether there are any insurance companies, public or private, and what are their customs and rules, and the prices of insurance, for European and long voyages?
17. In case there exists any other public establishment which relates to commerce, you are to give every possible detail concerning it, especially in whatever regards manufactures and fisheries.
18. You are to point out the relative conformity of weights and measures with those of France, ancient and modern, as soon as you shall have obtained practical and exact information on those points.
19. You are to add to all this the most extensive information, as well general as particular, which you may be able to obtain from authority, especially with regard to commerce, and particularly respecting false accounts of purchases and sales of different merchandizes, in order to ascertain the expences, rights, and local customs in cases of purchases and sales.
20. Whether

20. Whether there are any fairs in your district; what species of traffic is carried on there, and to what amount.

No. 5.—(Translation,)

From the *Hamburgh Correspondenten* of March 30, 1803.

The following article is inserted by desire.

Paris, March 1803.

For some months a war of newspapers, and of the press, has been kept up between France and England. This seemed merely the dying embers of an extinguished conflagration; the last consolation of a desperate party; the food of some low passions, and a few hungry scribblers. The French Government was far from attaching importance to such matters. Notwithstanding some difficulties in the complete execution of the treaty of Amiens, they still believed they might rely on the good faith of the British Government, and directed their attention solely to the re-establishment of the colonies. Relying upon the sacredness of treaties, they securely dispersed the remains of the French naval force, which had been given a prey to the English fleet. In this situation suddenly appeared a solemn message from the cabinet of St. James's, and informed all Europe that France was making considerable preparations in the ports of Holland and France; an address was voted by parliament, promising to the King of England such extraordinary means of defence, as the security of the British Empire, and the honour of the Three Crowns, might require.

From the sudden appearance of this message, people doubted whether it was the effect of treachery, of lunacy, or of weakness. Let any one cast his eyes over the ports of France and Holland, where he will find only detached naval preparations destined for the colonies, and consisting only of one or two line of battle ships and a few frigates. On the other hand, let him look at the ports of England, filled with a formidable naval force; on such a review one could be tempted to believe that the message of the King of England was mere irony, if such a farce were not unworthy the majesty of a government. If one considers the influence of factions in so free a country, one might suppose that the King of England had only had weakness to yield, if weakness were compatible with the first quality of a King. In short, no rational motives remain to which it can be ascribed, except bad faith—except a sworn enmity to

to the French Nation—except perfidy, and the desire of only breaking a solemn treaty, for the sake of advantages which will be maintained, and the sacrifice of which the honour of France and the faith of treaties forbid.

When a man reads this message he thinks himself transported to the times of those treaties which the Vandals made with the degenerate Romans, when force usurped the place of right, and when with a hasty appeal to arms, they insulted the antagonist they meant to attack. In the present state of civilization there is a respect which a great Monarch, which a polished people owe to themselves, were that respect no more than to seek a plausible pretext for an unjust war. But in this instance every thing is precipitate, and repugnant to decency and to justice. An eternal war would succeed a dreadful contest; and the more unjust the attack, the more irreconcilable would be its animosity.

Such a novelty will doubtless excite the disapprobation of Europe. While even the English, whose national pride had not entirely blinded them, sighed at this prospect, did the *TIMES* call peace of Amiens an Armistice, and in doing so, passed the severest satire on the government it defended; and the rapid fall of the national funds is the first prelude to the misfortunes which may follow as the revenge due for the wound given to all social rights.

The French are less intimidated than irritated by the threats of England. They have neither been dispirited by their reverses, nor elated by their victories; in a war to which there appeared no termination, they saw all Europe confederated against them. Their constancy, their courage, and the prompt activity of their Government, brought it to a conclusion. *This* war would have a different object. France would contend for the liberty of the States of Europe, and the sacredness of their treaties; and if the English Government be determined to make it a national war, perhaps her boasted formidable naval strength would not be sufficient to decide the result, and to secure the victory.

The French, strong in the justice of their cause, and in the confidence they repose in their government, do not dread the new expences and new sacrifices which such a war might render necessary. Their system of finance is more simple and less artificial than that of London, and so much the more solid. It all lies in their soil and in their courage.

On the first news of the English message, all eyes were turned to the Cabinet of the Thuilleries. As most trifling motions received a character of importance, its most unpremeditated words were eagerly caught up. Every one impatiently

tiently expected the Assembly for the presentation of foreigners, which Madame Bonaparte holds once a month. Every one was prepared to draw some inferences from it. It was as splendid as usual. The First Consul made his appearance, and said, on his entrance, to the English ambassador, who was standing beside M. Markoff, "We have been at war for twelve years. The King of England says that France is making immense naval preparations. He has been led into an error. In the French ports there are no preparations of any magnitude. The whole fleet is gone to St. Domingo and the colonies. With regard to the ports of Holland, to which the message likewise alludes, there are only the preparations for the expedition under General Victor, and all Europe knows its destination is for Louisiana. The King says farther, that between the Cabinets of Paris and London differences continue. I know of none. It is true that England ought to have evacuated Malta, and Malta is not evacuated; and as his Britannic Majesty has bound himself by the most solemn treaty ever entered into, it is impossible to doubt of the speedy evacuation of that island; and," added the First Consul, "those who would attempt to frighten the French people should know, that it is possible to kill, but not to intimidate them."

During the course of the evening, when the First Consul happened to be near M. Markoff, he said to him, half aloud, "that the British Ministry wished to keep Malta for five years more. Such a proposal was insulting, and no treaties should be entered into which it was not resolved to observe." At the conclusion of the Assembly, when the English Ambassador was about to retire, the First Consul said to him, "Madame the Duchess of Dorset has spent the unpleasant part of the year at Paris. It is my sincere wish that she may also spend the agreeable season. But if it should happen that we really must go to war, the responsibility is exclusively with those who deny the validity of their own contracts, since they refused to observe treaties which they had concluded."

These words of the First Consul require no comment. They explain completely his present opinions, his past conduct, and his resolution for the future. It is sufficient to compare them with the tergiversations, the duplicity, the evasions, and the message, of the English Government, in order to be enabled to decide on the justice of the dispute.

No. 6.

MY LORD,

Corfu, Dec. 10, 1802.

The last letters from my agent at Zante furnish me with the information, that the *Cornelia* French frigate, having on board Horatio Sebastiani, chief of brigade, and charged with a public mission on the part of the First Consul of the French Republic, came to anchor there on the 3d instant. The envoy finding that a vessel coming from Alexandria was subject to a long quarantine, and could not be permitted to communicate freely with the shore, applied to the Delegate of that island for permission to land, which being granted him, he was conducted to the Delegate's apartments. He then requested that a meeting of the Three Orders might be called, which was also complied with, and twelve persons, four of each Order, met in the Delegate's house. The envoy Sebastiani then harangued them nearly in the terms of the address, which I have herewith the honor of inclosing to your lordship. His speech, however, contained some additional observations, importing, that *Bonaparte had been the first to break the chains of the islanders*. When he had done speaking a tumultuous cry was uttered, of *Viva la Liberta! Viva l'Uguaglianza!*

Before his departure, however, he caused to be forwarded to the Delegate of Cephalonia, and to the Senate of Corfu, copies of the inclosed address, expressing a wish that it might be generally circulated among the people of each island.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

SPIRIDION FORESTI.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

No. 7.

MY LORD,

Corfu, January 2, 1803.

In my letter of the 10th ultimo, your lordship will perceive that I inserted the arrival of the *Cornelia* French frigate at Zante, and that Horatio Sebastiani harangued the people of that island. At that time I was not in possession of his exact oration, but since then the Delegate of Zante transmitted his speech to the Senate of Corfu; a copy of which I beg leave to submit to your lordship's attention.

Monsieur Romieu, the French Minister here, communicated to the Prince of the Senate, that the First Consul of the French Republic had taken under his protection the Catholic,

tholic, Apostolic, and Roman Churches of this Republic; and, on the 19th December, wrote to the Vicar-General of Corfu to inform him of the same; a copy of which permit me to inclose for your perusal.

From the proceedings of the French Commissary here, and those of the other islands, together with the disposition of the natives, I am afraid that this Republic will be a constant theatre of French intrigue. The aforesaid commissaries occasion Count Mocenigo and this Government an infinite deal of trouble.

I have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)

SPIRIDION FORESTI.

Right Honorable Lord Hawkesbury,

&c. &c. &c.

(First Inclosure referred to in No. 7.)—Translation.

Horace Sebastiani, Chief of Brigade of a Regiment of Dragoons, and Envoy of the First Consul in the Levant.

To His Excellency the Delegate of Zante.

SIR,

The First Consul Bonaparte has charged me to visit these Islands which compose your Republic, and to assure the inhabitants that he takes a lively interest in their prosperity.

I know that the difference of political opinions divides this rising republic into various parties, and that, without the wise measures taken by your government, its tranquillity will be destroyed. I could wish to make known to your administrators and fellow-citizens how much the First Consul wishes to see a stop put to those intestine divisions which afflict these islands.

Your political independency has been guaranteed by France, Russia, and the Sublime Porte. These powerful nations, united together by the bonds of the truest friendship, are occupied, in concert with your most enlightened and most virtuous fellow-citizens, to give you a form of government suitable to your situation, and the genius of your inhabitants. Wait with confidence and moderation the result of these important operations, and be assured that you will see the end of your ills, and the beginning of your prosperity. All exaggerations of political opinions are inimical to the general prosperity: absolute democracy, always tempestuous, sacrifices to vain chimeras the security, the property, civil liberty, and, in short, all that constitutes the happiness of a state: Aristocracy which is not moderated
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is always tyrannical ; and the elevation of a small number of families is preferred to talents and to virtue. In order that a government may be prosperous, it is necessary that it should have in its formation a happy combination of the advantages of different forms of government ; the power and promptitude of monarchy, the vigilance and intelligence of aristocracy, and the vigour and elevation of democracy ; that the citizens may find the security enjoyed under the first, the tranquillity of the second, and the equality of rights, fixed by the laws, which are found in the third.

Recollect that the man who forms a part of society only preserves the liberty of doing that which is not prejudicial to the rights of others ; and that equality only consists in the exact execution of the laws, and in the protection which they afford to every member of the political body. As the quarantine prevents communication, I beg you will communicate this my letter to all the authorities, and also to the principal inhabitants.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you of the sentiments of esteem and consideration which I entertain for your person.

(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 7.)—Translation.

Liberty.

Equality.

Corfu, 29th Frimaire, 11th Year
of the French Republic.

The Adjutant Commandant Romieu, Commissary General of Commercial Relations, and Chargé d'Affaires to the Republic of the Seven Islands, to the Vicar General of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Churches at Corfu.

Mr. Vicar General,

I hasten to inform you, with the greatest joy, that I have just received the express orders of my Government to place the Church of the Roman religion in the Republic of the Seven Islands, under its special protection. I make this communication to the Prince of the Senate. This proof of the goodwill of the French towards this church, will be a powerful motive, Mr. Vicar General, for addressing, through the faithful in your communion, the most ardent vows to Heaven for the prosperity of the lives of its Consuls, in the same way as the Roman Churches practise in the French Republic.

With

With the most distinguished consideration, Mr. Vicar General, I have the honor to salute you.

(Signed)

A. ROMIEU.

A true Copy,
Spiridion Foresti.

DECLARATION.

DECLARATION.

HIS Majesty's earnest endeavours for the preservation of peace having failed of success, he entertains the fullest confidence that he shall receive the same support from his parliament, and that the same zeal and spirit will be manifested by his people, which he has experienced on every occasion when the honour of his crown has been attacked, or the essential interests of his dominions have been endangered.

During the whole course of the negotiations which led to the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties of Peace between His Majesty and the French Republic, it was His Majesty's sincere desire, not only to put an end to the hostilities which subsisted between the two countries, but to adopt such measures, and to concur in such propositions, as might effectually contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe. The same motives by which his Majesty was actuated during the Negotiations for Peace, have since invariably governed his conduct. As soon as the Treaty of Amiens was concluded, his Majesty's Courts were open to the people of France for every purpose of legal redress; all sequestrations were taken off their property; all prohibitions on their trade which had been imposed during the war were removed, and they were placed, in every respect, on the same footing, with regard to commerce and intercourse, as the inhabitants of any other State in amity with his Majesty, with which there existed no Treaty of Commerce.

To a system of conduct thus open, liberal, and friendly, the proceedings of the French Government affords

the most striking contrast. The prohibitions which had been placed on the commerce of his Majesty's subjects during the war, have been enforced with increased strictness and severity; violence has been offered in several instances to their vessels and their property; and, in no case, has justice been afforded to those who may have been aggrieved in consequence of such acts, nor has any satisfactory answer been given to the repeated representations made by his Majesty's Ministers or Ambassador at Paris. Under such circumstances, when his Majesty's subjects were not suffered to enjoy the common advantages of peace within the territories of the French Republic, and the countries dependent upon it, the French Government had recourse to the extraordinary measure of sending over to this country a number of persons for the professed purpose of residing in the most considerable sea-port towns of Great Britain and Ireland, in the character of commercial agents or consuls. These persons could have no pretensions to be acknowledged in that character, as the right of being so acknowledged, as well as all the privileges attached to such a situation, could only be derived from a Commercial Treaty; and as no treaty of that description was in existence between his Majesty and the French Republic.

There was consequently too much reason to suppose, that the real object of their mission was by no means of a commercial nature; and this suspicion was confirmed not only by the circumstance that some of them were military men, but by the actual discovery, that several of them were furnished with instructions to obtain the soundings of the harbours, and to procure military surveys of the places where it was intended they should reside—His Majesty felt it to be his duty to prevent their departure to their respective places of destination, and presented to the French government the necessity of withdrawing them; and it cannot be denied, that the circumstances under which they were sent, and the instructions which were given to them, ought to be considered as decisive indications of the dispositions and intentions

tentions of the Government by whom they were employed,

The conduct of the French Government, with respect to the commercial intercourse between the two countries, must therefore be considered as ill suited to a state of peace, and their proceedings in their more general political relations, as well as in those which immediately concern his Majesty's dominions, appears to have been altogether inconsistent with every principle of good faith, moderation, and justice. His Majesty had entertained hopes, in consequence of the repeated assurances, and professions of the French Government, that they might have been induced to adopt a system of policy, which, if it had not inspired other powers with confidence, might at least have allayed their jealousies. If the French Government had really appeared to be actuated by a due attention to such a system; if their dispositions had proved to be essentially pacific, allowances would have been made for the situation in which a new government must be placed after so dreadful and extensive a convulsion as that which has been produced by the French revolution. But his Majesty has unfortunately had too much reason to observe and to lament that the system of violence, aggression, and aggrandizement which characterized the proceedings of the different governments of France during the war, has been continued with as little disguise since its termination. They have continued to keep a French army in Holland against the will, and in defiance of the remonstrances of the Batavian government, and in repugnance of the letter of three solemn treaties. They have, in a period of peace, invaded the territory, and violated the independence of the Swiss nation, in defiance of the Treaty of Luneville, which had stipulated the independence of their territory, and the right of the inhabitants to chuse their own form of government. They have annexed to the dominions of France; Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, and the Island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have de-

spoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound, by a solemn engagement to the emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests and to provide for his establishment. It may, indeed, with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French government.

In the month of October last his Majesty was induced, in consequence of the earnest solicitation of the Swiss nation, to make an effort, by a representation to the French Government, to avert the evils which were then impending over that country. This representation was couched in the most temperate terms; and measures were taken by his Majesty for ascertaining, under the circumstances which then existed, the real situation and wishes of the Swiss Cantons, as well as the sentiments of the other cabinets of Europe. His Majesty learned, however, with the utmost regret, that no disposition to counteract these repeated infractions of treaties and acts of violence was manifested by any of the powers most immediately interested in preventing them; and his Majesty therefore felt that, with respect to these objects, his single efforts could not be expected to produce any considerable advantage to those in whose favour they might be exerted.

It was about this time that the French Government first distinctly advanced the principle, that his Majesty had no right to complain of the conduct, or interfere with the proceedings, of France, on any point which did not form a part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens. That treaty was unquestionably founded upon the same principle as every other antecedent treaty or convention, on the assumption of the state of possession and of engagements subsisting at the time of its conclusion; and if that state of possession and of engagements is materially affected by the voluntary act of any of the parties, so as to prejudice the condition on which the other party has entered into the contract, the

the change so made may be considered as operating virtually as a breach of the treaty itself, and as giving the party aggrieved a right to demand satisfaction or compensation for any substantial difference which such acts may have effected in their relative situations; but whatever may be the principle on which the treaty is to be considered as founded, there is indisputably a general law of nations, which, though liable to be limited, explained, or restrained by conventional law, is antecedent to it, and is that law or rule of conduct to which all sovereigns and states have been accustomed to appeal, where conventional law is admitted to have been silent. The treaty of Amiens and every other treaty, in providing for the objects to which it is particularly directed, does not therefore assume or imply an indifference to all other objects which are not specified in its stipulation, much less does it adjudge them to be of a nature to be left to the will and caprice of the violent and the powerful. The justice of the cause is alone a sufficient ground to warrant the interposition of any of the powers of Europe in the differences which may arise between other states, and the application and extent of that just interposition is to be determined solely by considerations of prudence.—These principles can admit of no dispute; but if the new and extraordinary pretensions advanced by the French Government, to exclude his Majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concerns of other powers, unless they made a specific part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens, was that which it was possible to maintain, those powers would have a right at least to claim the benefit of this principle, in every case of difference between the two countries. The indignation of all Europe must surely then be excited by the declarations of the French Government, that, in the event of hostilities, these very powers, who were no parties to the Treaty of Amiens, and who were not allowed to derive any advantage from the remonstrances of his Majesty in their behalf, are nevertheless to be made the victims of

of a war, which is alleged to arise out of the same treaty, and are to be sacrificed in a contest, which they not only have not occasioned, but which they have had no means whatever of preventing.

His Majesty judged it most expedient, under the circumstances which then affected Europe, to abstain from a recurrence to hostilities, on account of the views of ambition, and acts of aggression, manifested by France on the Continent; yet an experience of the character and dispositions of the French Government could not fail to impress his Majesty with a sense of the necessity of increased vigilance in guarding the rights and dignity of his crown, and in protecting the interests of his people.

Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments, he was called upon by the French Government to evacuate the island of Malta. His Majesty had manifested, from the moment of the signature of the Definitive Treaty, an anxious disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens relative to that island. As soon as he was informed that the election of a Grand Master had taken place, under the auspices of the Emperor of Russia, and that it had been agreed by the different priories assembled at St. Petersburg to acknowledge the person whom the Court of Rome should select out of those who had been named by them to be Grand Master of the Order of St. John, his Majesty proposed to the French Government, for the purpose of avoiding any difficulties which might arise in the execution of the arrangement, to acknowledge that election to be valid; and when, in the month of August, the French Government applied to his Majesty to permit the Neapolitan troops to be sent to the island of Malta, as a preliminary measure for preventing any unnecessary delay, his Majesty consented without hesitation to this proposal, and gave directions for the admission of the Neapolitan troops into the island. His Majesty had thus shewn his disposition not only to throw no obstacle in the way of the execution

tion of the treaty, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the execution of it by every means in his power. His Majesty cannot, however, admit, that at any period since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens the French Government have had a right to call upon him, in conformity to the stipulations of that treaty, to withdraw his forces from the island of Malta. At the time when this demand was made by the French Government, several of the most important stipulations of the arrangement respecting Malta remained unexecuted: the election of a Grand Master had not been carried into effect. The tenth article had stipulated that the independence of the island should be placed under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. The Emperor of Germany had acceded to the guarantee, but only on condition of a like accession on the part of the other powers specified in the article. The Emperor of Russia had refused his accession, except on the condition that the Maltese language should be abrogated; and the King of Prussia had given no answer whatever to the application which had been made to him to accede to the arrangement. But the fundamental principle, upon the existence of which depended the execution of the other parts of the article, had been defeated by the changes which had taken place in the constitution of the order since the conclusion of the treaty of peace. It was to the order of St. John of Jerusalem that his Majesty was, by the first stipulation of the tenth article, bound to restore the island of Malta. The Order is defined to consist of those languages which were in existence at the time of the conclusion of the treaty: the three French languages having been abolished, and a Maltese language added to the institution. The Order consisted, therefore, at that time of the following languages, viz. the languages of Arragon, Castile, Germany, Bavaria, and Russia. Since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, the languages of Arragon and Castile have been separated from the Order

der by Spain, a part of the Italian langue has been abolished by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma to France. There is strong reason to believe that it has been in contemplation to sequester the property of the Bavarian langue, and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian langues within the dominions of the Emperor.

Under these circumstances, the Order of St. John cannot now be considered as that body to which, according to the stipulation of the treaty, the island was to be restored; and the funds indispensably necessary for its support, and for the maintenance of the independence of the island, have been nearly, if not wholly, sequestered. Even if this had arisen from circumstances which it was not in the power of any of the contracting parties to the treaty to control, his Majesty would nevertheless have had a right to defer the evacuation of the island by his forces, until such time as an equivalent arrangement had been concluded for the preservation of the independence of the Order and of the island. But if these changes have taken place in consequence of any acts of the other parties to the treaty; if the French Government shall appear to have proceeded upon a system of rendering the Order whose independence they had stipulated, incapable of maintaining that independence, his Majesty's right to continue in the occupation of the island, under such circumstances, will hardly be contested. It is indisputable, that the revenues of the two Spanish langues have been withdrawn from the Order by his Catholic Majesty; a part of the Italian langue has in fact been abolished by France, through the unjust annexation of Piedmont and Parma, and Placentia, to the French territory. The Elector of Bavaria has been instigated by the French Government to sequester the property of the Order within his territories; and it is certain that they have not only sanctioned, but encouraged the idea of the propriety of separating the Russian langues from the remainder of the order.

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As the conduct of the Governments of France and Spain have, therefore, in some instances directly, and in others indirectly, contributed to the changes which have taken place in the Order, and thus destroyed its means of supporting its independence, it is to those Governments, and not to his Majesty, that the non-execution of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens must be ascribed.

Such would be the just conclusion, if the 10th article of that treaty were considered as an arrangement by itself. It must be observed, however, that this article forms a part only of a Treaty of Peace, the whole of which is connected together, and the stipulations of which must, upon a principle common to all treaties, be construed as having a reference to each other.

His Majesty was induced by the Treaty of Peace to consent to abandon, and to restore to the Order of St. John the island of Malta, on condition of its independence and neutrality. But a further condition, which must necessarily be supposed to have had considerable influence with his Majesty, in inducing him to make so important a concession, was the acquiescence of the French Government in an arrangement for the security of the Levant, by the eighth and ninth articles in the treaty, stipulating the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and the independence of the Ionian islands. His Majesty has, however, since learned, that the French Government have entertained views hostile to both these objects; and that they have even suggested the idea of a partition of the Turkish Empire. These views must now be manifest to all the world, from the official publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani; from the conduct of that officer, and of the other French agents in Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian islands, and from the distinct admission of the First Consul himself, in his communication with Lord Whitworth. His Majesty was, therefore, warranted in considering it to be the determination of the French Government to violate those articles of the Treaty of

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Peace,

Peace, which stipulated for the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and of the Ionian islands, and consequently he would not have been justified in evacuating the island of Malta, without receiving some other security, which might equally provide for these important objects. His Majesty accordingly feels that he has an incontestable claim, in consequence of the conduct of France since the treaty of peace, and with reference to the objects which made part of the stipulations of that treaty, to refuse, under the present circumstances, to relinquish the possession of the island of Malta.

Yet, notwithstanding this right, so clear and so unquestionable, the alternative presented by the French Government to his Majesty, in language the most peremptory and menacing, was the evacuation of Malta, or the renewal of war.

If the views of ambition and aggrandisement, which have thus been manifested by the *French* Government since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, have in so very particular a manner attracted the attention of his Majesty, it has been equally impossible for him not to feel, and not to notice the repeated indignities which have been offered by that Government to his crown and his people.

The report of Colonel Sebastiani contains the most unwarrantable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's Government, against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter. This paper cannot be considered as the publication of a private individual; it has been avowed, and indeed bears evidence upon the face of it, that it is the official report of an accredited agent, published by the authority of the Government to which it was addressed, who thereby have given it their express sanction.

This report had been published a very short time, when another indignity was offered to this country in the communication of the First Consul of France to the
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the legislative body. In this communication he presumes to affirm, in the character of Chief Magistrate of that country, "*That Great Britain cannot singly contend against the Power of France;*" an assertion as unfounded as it is indecent, disproved by the events of many wars, and by none more than by those of the war which has been recently concluded. Such an assertion, advanced in the most solemn official act of a government, and thereby meant to be avowed to all the powers of Europe, can be considered in no other light than as a defiance publicly offered to his Majesty, and to a brave and powerful people, who are both willing and able to defend his just rights and those of their country, against every insult and aggression.

The conduct of the First Consul to his Majesty's Ambassador at his audience in presence of the Ministers of most of the Sovereigns and States of Europe, furnishes another instance of provocation on the part of the French Government, which it would be improper not to notice on the present occasion, and the subsequent explanation of this transaction may be considered as having the effect of aggravating instead of palliating the affront.

At the very time when his Majesty was demanding satisfaction and explanation on some of the points above mentioned, the French Minister at Hamburgh endeavoured to obtain the insertion in a Hamburgh paper of a most gross and opprobrious libel against his Majesty, and when difficulties were made respecting the insertion of it, he availed himself of his *official character of Minister of the French Republic* to require the publication of it, by order of his Government, in the gazette of the senate of that town. With this requisition so made, the Senate of Hamburgh were induced to comply; and thus has the independence of that town been violated, and a free state made the instrument, by the menace of the French Government, of propagating throughout Europe, upon their authority, the most offensive and unfounded calumnies against

his Majesty and his Government. His Majesty might add to this list of indignities, the requisition which the French Government have repeatedly urged that the laws and constitution of his country should be changed relative to the liberty of the press. His Majesty might likewise add the calls which the French Government have on several occasions made upon him to violate the laws of hospitality with respect to persons who had found an asylum within his dominions, and against whose conduct no charge whatever has at any time been substantiated. It is impossible to reflect on these different proceedings, and the course which the French Government have thought proper to adopt respecting them, without the thorough conviction that they are not the effect of accident ; but that they form a part of a system which has been adopted for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his Government.

Under all these insults and provocations, his Majesty, not without a due sense of his dignity, has proceeded, with every degree of temper and moderation, to obtain satisfaction and redress, while he has neglected no means consistent with his honor and the safety of his dominions, to induce the Government of France to concede to him, what is, in his judgment, absolutely necessary for the future tranquillity of Europe. His efforts in this respect have proved abortive, and he has therefore judged it necessary to order his Ambassador to leave Paris. In having recourse to this proceeding, it has been his Majesty's object to put an end to the fruitless discussions which have too long subsisted between the two Governments, and to close a period of suspense peculiarly injurious to the subjects of his Majesty.

But though the provocations which his Majesty has received might entitle him to larger claims than those which he has advanced, yet anxious to prevent calamities which might thus be extended to every part of Europe, he is still willing, as far as is consistent with his
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own honor, and the interests of his people, to afford every facility to any just and honorable arrangement, by which such evils may be averted. He has, therefore, no difficulty in declaring to all Europe, that, notwithstanding all the changes which have taken place since the Treaty of Peace, notwithstanding the extension of the power of France, in repugnance to that treaty, and to the spirit of peace itself, his Majesty will not avail himself of these circumstances, to demand in compensation all that he is entitled to require, but will be ready to concur, even now, in an arrangement, by which satisfaction shall be given to him, for the indignities which have been offered to his crown and to his people, and substantial security afforded against *further* encroachments on the part of France.

His Majesty has thus distinctly and unreservedly stated the reasons of those proceedings to which he has found himself compelled to resort. He is actuated by no disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of any other state; by no projects of conquest and aggrandizement; but solely by a sense of what is due to the honour of his crown, and the interests of his people, and by an anxious desire to obstruct the further progress of a system, which, if not resisted, may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world.

Westminster, May 18, 1803.

THE END.

own honor, and the interests of his people, to afford every facility to any just and honorable arrangement, by which such evils may be averted. He has, therefore, no difficulty in declaring to all Europe, that, notwithstanding all the changes which have taken place since the Treaty of Peace, notwithstanding the extension of the power of France, in repugnance to that treaty, and to the spirit of peace itself, his Majesty will not avail himself of these circumstances, to demand in compensation, that he is entitled to require, but will be ready to consent, even now, in an arrangement, by which satisfaction shall be given to him, for the indignities which have been offered to his crown and to his people, and substantial security afforded against further encroachments on the part of France.

His Majesty has thus distinctly and unreservedly stated the reasons of those proceedings to which he has found himself compelled to resort. He is actuated by no disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of any other state; by no projects of conquest and aggrandizement; but solely by a sense of what is due to the honor of his crown, and the interests of his people, and by an anxious desire to obstruct the further progress of a system, which, if not restrained, may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world.

Whitehall, May 16, 1803.

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